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This paper explores issues of civility in liberal democracy, and in particular, how civility and 
civic engagement must be regenerated in order to forward the democratic ideals of equal rights, 
citizen equality and collective self-government in a meaningful way. Liberal democracy presupposes 
a level of civility in order to uphold standards of individual liberty and freedom, however as a theory 
it fails to compel citizens to support levels of mutual respect.  
An etymological exploration of the term civility introduces the work of puritan theologian 
Roger Williams, whose early writings on individual liberty as well as the role of civility and civic 
engagement can inform popular conversations about civility in modern democracy. This leads to an 
analysis of Rawlsian liberalism, where Rawls seeks to construct a robust civil society by tying 
individual duty of civility to an idealization of citizenship.  
Final analysis explores the possibility of a modern civil liberalism, as influenced by Roger 
Williams. A liberal civil realm must recognize the mutual reliance between individual freedom and a 
collective common good; this will compel citizens to choose to preserve the freedom of all citizens 
through civil engagement and dialogue. This ideal shares important intersections with Jürgen 
Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy, but Williams’ replaces Habermas’ notion of higher-
level intersubjectivity with an appeal to individual freedom of conscience. By doing so, the 
preservation of individual freedom of conscience requires citizen-commitment to an active and 
engaged civil sphere, making the ideal of civility richer than that of Habermas’ theory. Replacing the 
duty of civility with a commitment to the preservation and protection of individual liberty through 
civil dialogue is the best way to rescue modern liberal democracy from its current state of incivility, 







This paper explores issues of civility in liberal democracy, and in particular, how civility and 
civic engagement must be regenerated in order to forward democratic ideals of equal rights, citizen 
equality and collective self-government in a meaningful way. Liberal democracy presupposes a level 
of civility in order to uphold standards of individual liberty and freedom, however as a theory it fails 
to compel citizens to support levels of mutual respect. As a result, civility has become an ideal that 
suggests a desired respect between citizens, but is too variably defined to be useful.  
The introduction considers the current state of civility in America, and presents reasons for 
exploring the notion of civility in modern liberal democracy. This leads to an exploration of the 
definitions of civility in Chapter Two, including the many different definitions used in modern 
conversations about the role and significance of civil conversation. An etymological exploration of 
the term is provided in Chapter Three, where the critical significance and complicated relationship 
of civility within liberalism is revealed. Civility was first equated with the appropriate action and 
behavior of public citizens, as modeled by the Renaissance courtier, whose skills and behavior 
forwarded the interests of the state. The Enlightenment altered the relationship of citizens to the 
state by dividing the civil and political spheres, shifting the notion of civility from appropriate 
behavior of individuals in the political-public realm for the good of the state to the civil behavior of 
equal citizens engaged in the civil realm. 
Chapter Four introduces the historical figure, Roger Williams, whose early writings as the 
founder of Rhode Island reflect this shift and anticipate the ideal of a state responsible for the 
preservation and protection of individual freedom. Williams argued that the preservation of the 
liberty of all citizens required a commitment to both pluralism and tolerance, which necessitated a 
robust notion of civility and an engaged civil sphere.  
 vii 
Nearly three centuries later, philosopher John Rawls furthered this shift by constructing a 
liberal political realm not reliant on the ethical self-understanding of any one community but 
intended to be narrow enough to be acceptable to all reasonable and rational persons. Rawls argues 
that citizens will willingly commit to a principle of public reason as more than a modus vivendi 
because, as citizens, they understand that a theory of justice is necessary to create a strong and 
vibrant liberal political society. However, by attaching the duty of civility to an idealization of 
citizenship, Rawls fails to compel ordinary citizens to uphold the level of civility necessary to 
forward liberal principles of justice. As a consequence, liberalism risks falling into a more traditional 
model, where individual rights are viewed vis à vis the state and other citizens, risking the subjugation 
of individual freedom to a competitive market economy, and jeopardizing the individual freedom of 
citizens. 
Chapter Five explores the arguments of critics of liberalism who contend that the best way 
to regenerate civility is to reconnect the civil and the political spheres. Only then, they argue, can the 
good of the individual be meaningfully connected to the good of the greater political public. 
However, collapsing the civil and political back together risks overvaluing the community at the 
expense of individual freedom and threatens a return to civil majoritarianism as well as greater levels 
of oppression and subjugation.  
In conclusion, I argue that Williams’ commitment to individual freedom of conscience and 
tolerance creates a civil realm that recognizes the mutual reliance between individual freedom and a 
collective common good, and as such, encourages a political public that engages in the process of 
preserving individual freedom of all citizens. This ideal shares important similarities with Habermas’ 
theory of deliberative democracy. However, where Habermas argues for a notion of higher level 
intersubjectivity with an appeal to individual freedom of conscience, Williams’ argues that it is the 
preservation of individual freedom of conscience that requires citizens to commit to a civil sphere 
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that protects individual liberty for all citizens. This necessitates a set of common values, such as a 
sense of mutual dependency, which are arguably forged through an awareness of the vulnerabilities 
associated with a respect for individual liberty. In this way, Williams can inform Rawls’ theory of 
justice by replacing the duty of civility with a commitment to the preservation and protection of 








CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION: CIVILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
 
“In 2011, a survey reported that seventy-six percent of people reported that Americans are less 
civil.” 
- Linton Weeks, “Please Read This Story, Thank You,” NPR1 
 
On July 30, 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into law a Joint Resolution of the 
84th Congress of the United States, replacing the national motto E Pluribus Unum, meaning Out of 
Many, One, with the maxim In God We Trust.2 At the height of the Cold War, this was one of several 
measures enacted by the Eisenhower administration to affix the word God to national idioms, 
including the 1954 inclusion of under God to the Pledge of Allegiance. While the effort to 
reinvigorate a public religiosity was looked upon at the time as an act against the allegedly dangerous 
and radical secularity of communism, Congress’ removal of E Pluribus Unum foreshadowed the next 
half-century of American politics. 
The democratic ideal of freedom and equality for all persons as outlined in the Declaration 
of Independence states that it is “self-evident truth that all persons are created equal.” From the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 to the repeal of “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” in 2011, the United States 
government has worked to secure and protect the rights of marginalized citizens through policies, 
laws, and judicial actions - civil rights legislation attempts to prevent discrimination and protect the 
individual liberties of all citizens. As a result, in the last sixty years citizens of the United States have 
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experienced a marked increase in rights guaranteed to previously unprotected citizens who are now 
granted more equal treatment under the law.  
However, despite accomplishing greater legislative equality for minorities, women, the 
disabled, the elderly and increasingly the LGBT community, civil rights legislation has not resulted in 
the actualization of domestic tranquility or a unified democratic polity. While modernity, including 
limited government and free market capitalism, has lead to a radical decrease in physical violence in 
society, the last sixty years has also demonstrated that civil rights laws do not necessarily promote 
higher levels of civil behavior. 3 Much media attention, scholarship and hand wringing in recent 
decades has been dedicated to a society increasingly blackened by political extremism, legislative 
vitriol, political action committees, congressional non-cooperation and unprecedented levels of 
partisan antics. The current crisis in civility has been attributed to everything from the loss of 
religion in the public sphere, to the acceptance of modern multiculturalism, to extremists in 
Republican Party and the decrease in federal funding for the Humanities. There is much contention 
over who or what the culprit is, and, not lacking in irony, much of the disagreement has not been 
particularly civil.  
There is some agreement, however, that the crisis in civility is both urgent and pervasive. At 
an event in 2009, Jim Leach, Chair of the National Endowment for the Humanities stated that the 
United States is on the brink of “a civility crisis at home, and a civilization crisis abroad.”4 The crisis 
Jim Leach refers to in his speech emphatically argues that this predicament is not limited to politics, 
but reaches beyond the walls of governance into all aspects of society including the anonymous 
arenas of the internet, city streets, schools, and even into the home. In the last half-century, an 
                                                 
3
 Steven Pinker, “Interview about the book The Better Angels of Our Nature,” The New Scientist, accessed April 2, 2012,  
 
4
 Jim Leach, “With Malice Toward None” Convocation of State Humanities Council, Omaha, Nebraska, November 6, 




important point has been repeatedly considered by those who have chosen to address issues of 
civility in liberal democracy: in the United States, civil rights are not synonymous with civil 
treatment.  
In the following essay I will explore the theoretical constructions of civility in modern liberal 
democracy, with the hope of further informing the debate around what it means to be civil in a 
society where individual liberty is primary. Ultimately, I will argue that civility must be 
reconceputalized as a fundamental and necessary component of liberalism. Without a greater 
commitment to civility - and in particular civil conversation - the individual freedom so central to 
modern democracy is at risk of being lost. In order to clearly articulate this argument, it is 
particularly important to examine this issue from within the historical and contextual boundary of 
the United States, as the role of civility in American society can inform this particular moment in 
time, where the fight for civil rights is at odds with an increasingly divided political public.  
In order to argue that civility must play a more central role in liberalism, it is important to 
first consider some of the current popular rhetoric about the civil crisis in order to initiate a more 
serious exploration of the many definitions of civility, including an etymological exploration. The 
historical significance of civility, and in particular its relationship to the role of individual liberty in 
pre-democratic and early liberal democratic theory, includes the much overlooked work of puritan 
theologian and founder of Rhode Island, Roger Williams. Analysis of Williams’ work reveals an 
interesting role of civility in modern liberal democratic thought, particularly within the work of 
philosopher John Rawls. Much of the criticism of liberalism in general, and of Rawls specifically, is 
focused upon the overvaluation of the individual at the expense of the common good in modern 
liberalism, which opponents argue is the central force of the crisis of civility. Theorists such as 
Michael Sandel and Benjamin Barber argue, in different ways, that liberalism is itself inherently 
incapable of upholding the civility necessary for self-governance. Rawls himself has a difficult time 
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finding a way to compel liberal citizens toward greater levels of civility, despite its central role in his 
theory of justice. Civility, in its current liberal state, is a duty only for those who strive to achieve an 
ideal of citizenship. In order to find a way to keep individual liberty at the center of liberal 
democracy, there must be a better way to compel liberal citizens to uphold levels of civility above 
the standard common in modern liberal democracy. The best way to do this, I ultimately argue, is to 
reconnect the notion civility to individual liberty in such a way that democratic citizens are 
compelled to uphold greater levels of civil conversation in order to maintain democratic freedom. 
This means, above all else, committing to a more civil form of liberalism, while upholding ideals of 
civil rights and individual liberty necessary to maintain a fair democratic society.  
Through an exploration of civility in modern liberal democracy, the following questions 
must be addressed: in what ways is civility a component of modern democracy? Can citizens of a 
liberal democracy cultivate greater levels of civility while still maintaining individual liberty, or are 
civil rights and civil conversation at odds? Is it possible for citizens to reclaim civility while 
upholding the balance between the “many” and the “one”? How can a greater understanding of 
civility inform our democratic project moving forward? Ultimately, I hope that this essay, focused 
specifically on the American democratic experience, may be applied to democracies beyond the 
United States. Issues of civility, citizenship and individual liberty are certainly not unique to one 
nation. 
As such questions seem to affect the lives and livelihoods of all citizens, it is surprising that 
civility has not been a more popular topic in modern philosophy. Only in the last two decades has 
there been an increase in the volume of research, scholarship and discourse on civility in America in 
mainstream conversations, from political campaigns to media outlets and academic quarterlies. 
These considerations are most commonly focused on the derisive nature of partisan politics, 
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attributed to U.S. Congress but present in state and local politics as well.5 Increasingly, however, 
discussions about civility are reaching beyond the political realm to elicit greater consternation about 
the ways in which citizens treat each other. In some cases, concern over the decline in civility is 
construed as trite and inconsequential, as compared to greater human rights issues in the United 
States and abroad. Poor cell phone etiquette, aggressive drivers and tales of disgruntled workers 
quitting their jobs with fanfare, for example, may be viewed as proof of an elitist, over-privileged 
society. In a way, such complaints have complicated the conversation about civility since, as critics 
say, these are not the concerns of a society in real crisis. This is an important point, since civility is 
not always equitable to violence, and the civil crisis is not always easily linked to human suffering as 
grave as homelessness, displacement or famine. However, while complaints about etiquette may 
sound trivial, such concerns for uncivil behavior underscore the broad scope and consequence of 
incivility. At its core, the current concern about the state of civility instigates an important 
conversation about how citizens choose to treat one another, whether in politics, at rallies or 
baseball games, and in classrooms — and how these choices impact us all, as citizens of the United 
States.  
As an example, in light of the increasing debates about the role of civility in America, Krista 
Tippet, in 2011 the founder and host of National Public Radio’s On Being, embarked on a series of 
conversations to explore civility in America with a variety of political and religious leaders. In the 
introduction to the series, Tippet explained her motivation:  
My own deepest despair at present is not about the vitriol and division per se — as 
alarming as they are. It is about the fact that we seem to be losing any connective 
tissue for engaging at all, on a human level, across ruptures of disagreement.... What 
we once called the red state, blue state divide is now more like two parallel universes 
where understandings of plain fact are no longer remotely aligned. This leads to a 
diminishing sense of the humanity of those who think and live differently than we 
                                                 
5
 As an example, in December of 2010, Jacksonville’s Human Rights Commission appointed Dr. Parvez Ahmed, a 




do. And that is the ultimate moral slippery slope, for everyone on it and for the 
fabric of our civic life.6  
 
Through an exploration of the definition and evolution of civility in the United States, Tippet’s 
concern for challenging role of civility in contemporary America is be properly addressed with the 
following questions: Is it possible for liberal democracy to foster greater notions of civility while 
upholding rights of citizens who often think and live radically different lives? What does civility 
mean in a diverse civil-political environment? In modern liberal democratic society, is E Pluribus 
Unum a lost ideal? An etymological exploration of the definition introduces the slippery and 
complicated role of civility in modern history leading to a greater appreciation for its place in 
modern liberalism. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE MANY DEFINITIONS OF CIVILITY 
 
“Aristotle’s claim: Civility’s closest kin is friendship. Albeit a watered down version.” 
- Robert Pippin, “The Ethical Status of Civility” From Civility, Page 105 
 
2.1 THE ALCHEMY OF A DEFINITION  
Much scholarship on civility begins with the qualification that civility is difficult to define, 
and nearly impossible to define neatly. To appreciate the challenge of developing a succinct and 
satisfactory definition of civility, historian and feminist philosopher Virginia Sapiro notes, “it would 
take an advanced degree in alchemy, not political science to draw a tidy but reasonably 
comprehensive definition out of the literatures to which one must turn to learn about civility as it is 
understood today.”7 A search of New York Times articles easily illustrates this point. The paper’s 
headlines use the term in a variety of ways, including “Obama Calls for Civility at Prayer Breakfast,”8 
also “Facebook Wrestles with Free Speech and Civility”9 and “A Last Bastion of Civility, the South 
Sees Manners Decline.”10 
What these titles reveal about civility is not inconsequential. The term, when used in 
discussions of race, issues of free speech, and manners, links disparate subjects together with one 
thin linear relationship — the engagement (or lack of engagement) with others. Beyond this thin 
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 Miguel Heft, “Facebook Wrestles with Free Speech and Civility” New York Times, December 12, 2011, accessed 
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10 Kim Severson, “A Last Bastion of Civility, the South Sees Manners Decline,” New York Times, November 1, 2011, 




association, no single definition, regardless of its complexity, encompasses all the ways in which 
civility is conceptualized. Human rights, respect, manners, social cooperation and accountability all 
fall under the umbrella of civility in popular nomenclature. For her definition, Sapiro divides civility 
into three categories: as related to character and virtue, manners and behavior, and “as constructive 
engagement with others through argument, deliberation and discourse.”11 Definitions like Shapiro’s, 
which attempt to be simultaneously broad and nuanced, do less to fully articulate a definition than 
make it easier to identify when civility has been undermined or breached.  
Much of the disagreement about civility is argued from within the understanding that civility 
is some normative feature of a democratic society; disputes about civility rarely hinge on its 
normative significance, but revolve around what it means to be civil and how best to construct (or 
reconstruct) civility within modern democracy. However, a few important arguments challenge 
popular suppositions about civility, including the notion that civility is a necessary part of a modern 
democratic political society and that, consequently, incivility is an accurate gauge of modern civil 
society in decline.  
2.2 DEBATING THE ROLE OF CIVILITY IN MODERN DEMOCRACY  
Against popular opinion, some theorists argue that elevated levels of incivility are not a 
source of concern but a natural part of liberal society, where uncivil behavior is the consequence of a 
more equal and competitive liberal populace. Others argue, more radically, that the current civil 
crisis is a fabrication conjured by the political elite to distract citizens from concentrating on the 
greater inequalities in the United States. To that argument, the popular political magazine, The 
Nation, lead its December 1996 issue with an article titled, “Seduced by Civility: Political Manners 
and the Crisis of Democratic Values.” Its author, Benjamin DeMott, argues that the current crisis in 
civility is not the consequence of a society in moral decline, an argument often forwarded, but a plot 
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by the ruling elite in the United States, who refuse to take responsibility for the perpetuation of civil 
disparities, and instead spend their time focused on the lack of civic participation and unity. DeMott 
argues that the ruling elite animate the current preoccupation with civility, with the understanding 
that it drives citizens to concentrate on the civil behavior and ignore the more egregious threats to 
their lives, including economic inequality and other corrupt political practices. DeMott implores 
American citizens to shift their focus away from the deceptive political infighting and concentrate 
their energy on stopping the real culprits of civil strife. He states:  
The incivility railed at by the elite should be seen as a protest by Americans outside 
the ranks of the publicly articulate against the conduct of their presumed betters. The 
current orthodoxy on volunteerism and immoderacy shuts its ears to this protest, 
simultaneously beautifying the undeserving and sapping democratic energy and will. 
Sold as diagnosis or nostrum, civility is in fact a theater of operations — the classless 
society’s new class war zone.12 
 
DeMott claims that the restraints of incivility must be turned and used against the engineers 
of this falsified civil crisis. Civil discontent in the United States should not be viewed as destructive 
to the fabric of our society, but as its potential savior. It is an appropriate and necessary response by 
Americans against the wrongful acts of the political elite; fighting against this alleged incivility stifles 
the protestations of the common classes and allows the elite to continue without confrontation, 
much to the detriment of the American populace.  
While this argument is compelling, DeMott fails to recognize the greater role of civil 
behavior in modern democracy in an attempt to argue for incivility as an act of protest. Even if the 
fight against uncivil behavior is misplaced blame by the privileged upon “Americans outside the 
ranks of the publically articulate,” justice for common Americans might still be best achieved 
through a reinvigoration of civil avenues, which would undermine the political elite better than 
fighting uncivil fire with fire. Combating elevated levels of incivility may best reveal the issues of 
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inequality and prejudice stoked by the political elite. DeMott attempts to motivate discontented 
citizens by disqualifying the argument for greater civility, without recognizing that greater political 
accountability may itself require an increased commitment to civil behavior.  
 Hoping, perhaps, that The Nation article had been forgotten, political analyst and self-
described ‘paleoconservative’ Pat Buchanan more recently published a book titled The Suicide of a 
Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025? In an interview with Diane Rehm in 2011, Buchanan 
explained that he believes overvaluing diversity is to blame for our current crisis of civility in 
America. In the interview, Buchannan stated: 
We have a deadlock on Capitol Hill that is total and ideological and our politics are 
acrimonious and poisonous. But that's not the central problem to me. The central 
problem is our society is disintegrating. It is coming apart. We are Balkanizing, 
breaking down along the lines of race, culture, religion, and philosophy… I think 
that the argument that diversity is a strength is a canard, it is nonsense. What makes 
us strong is when we rise above our diversity to national unity. 13 
 
In the book, Buchanan argues that the loss of a ‘common faith’ and a decrease in assimilation in the 
United States are to blame. For Buchanan, “Diversity is another word for multiculturalism,” and the 
culprit in the disintegration of what he argues was a once-unified country. He yearns for something 
akin to the pre-Civil Rights era, suggesting that the salvation of our country depends on our ability 
to reign in the freedom and liberty of religious minorities and immigrants. According to Buchannan, 
in order to ‘survive to 2025’ we must reinstate what he calls the common principles of most 
Americans — specifically Judeo-Christian, conservative and anti-immigration ideals. These are, 
unsurprisingly, the values of Buchanan and his conservative allies.  
Buchannan does well in supporting DeMott’s argument that the political elite have 
misappropriated civility to suppress equality and equal status in the United States. Buchannan’s 
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argument is antithetical to the project of reinvigorating civility in the United States; the hard-fought 
civil rights of women, African Americans and other minorities are themselves a realization of the 
individual liberties entrusted to a society of free and equal citizens. Therefore, casting 
multiculturalism aside in the name of peace and unity is antithetical to liberal democracy.  
Still, the competing arguments of Pat Buchannan and Benjamin DeMott highlight a critical 
point in the consideration of civility. If the idea of civility is malleable enough to the construction 
and deconstruction of ideals of respect, is it dangerous or detrimental to make civility a normative 
expectation for a modern democratic society? In the book, Rude Democracy: Civility and Incivility in 
America, political scientist Susan Herbst argues this very position. She contends that the role of 
civility should be reevaluated, not as a normative value, but as a strategic communicative tool of 
public-political life. Herbst argues that constructing civility as a set of norms constrains and 
confounds its purpose and its potential; it confines it to a static definition, conflates it with culture, 
tethers it to a context and removes its connection to a communicator. She believes that the 
normative constraints of civility are not conducive to modern communication, including social 
media or the internet. Approaching civility as a strictly communicative tool, in contrast, allows it to 
be seen as temporary and changeable, easily singled out, fluid in use and a useful tool for modern 
communication. 
Removing the normative constraints on civility, Herbst argues, frees citizens from the 
unnatural bounds of civility and allows it to be used strategically and effectively. This eliminates the 
pressure on citizens to constrict their socio-political conversations, meant to be sustained by 
normative standards of civility but instead are constrained by citizens’ own inner fears of 
confrontation, discomfort and unhappiness. Limiting the considerations of civil discourse to 
individual conversations or a specific medium, such as the internet — instead of situating it within 
greater context of an era or a particular culture — eliminates what she considers the hysteria over 
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Americans’ fear that citizens are increasingly mean-spirited and confrontational and that the culture 
as a whole is disintegrating. Herbst claims that making civility a strategic tool would assuage any 
tendency toward political nostalgia and the easy sentiment that culture and language of modern 
technology is to blame for our collective civil failure.  
Herbst concludes that without civility as a normative expectation, citizens are free to engage 
in honest and often challenging conversations using a variety of tools of deliberation, including 
divisiveness and harsh language, and would allow other, highly-civil strategies such as listening to 
exist simultaneously in what deliberative theorists call “an economy of moral disagreement.”14 
Politicians and citizens would be forced to take responsibility for their actions and would no longer 
be able blame poor behavior on an ‘uncivil’ environment, or on an unaccountable culture of 
rudeness and disrespect. Understanding civility as a normative construct of a civil society, Herbst 
argues, creates an unattainable set of societal ideals and alleviates the responsibility of those who fall 
far short of such ideals.  
Herbst’s attempt to extricate civility from the confines of normativity is compelling. 
However, her argument conflates the challenges and shortcomings of modern civility with the flaws 
of a normative ideal. Herbst states, “there is no question that changes in media infrastructure, the 
rise of the Internet, and [Americans’] seemingly endless need to take our personal and collective 
emotional temperatures demand that we evaluate civility and its future in new ways.”15 Such new and 
innovative ways of communication do not necessitate the extrication of the civil ideal from its 
normative roots, however. Instead, civility must be theoretically conceptualized to fit this new era. 
Changing factors in society, such as popular media and technology, impact how citizens are 
connected to one another, but this need not change the moral, normative expectations of how 
                                                 
14
 Herbst, Rude Democracy, 23. 
  
15
 Herbst, Rude Democracy, 11.  
  
13
citizens interact. Relegating civility to a strategic communicative tool unnecessarily truncates debate 
and scholarship over how citizens want to be treated, and how they choose to treat others.  
Further, a normative ideal of civility is not incompatible with frank speech, challenging 
debates, harsh words and protests, which are qualities Herbst upholds as strengths of her theory of 
communicative civility. In fact, the Constitution of the United States and legal interpretation thereof 
generally prioritize individual freedoms such as speech, religion and association in order to protect 
the rights of citizens regardless of the popularity or acceptance of their beliefs in the greater culture. 
Liberal democracy warrants freedom through individual rights; in so doing, it supposes that citizen 
behavior will primarily be regulated through normative understandings of culture and conduct. 
Individual liberties and civil behavior are not always compatible, and situations of civil disobedience 
or uncivil acts prompt important public conversation about the relationship between human rights 
and civic engagement. As a normative ideal, citizens are able to assess and evaluate the complicated 
considerations of civility as related to citizenship, civil society and the greater good. Relegating 
civility to strategy would not elicit more honest conversation, but would lose the chance to forge 
new understandings of civility in a liberal democratic society.16  
Lastly, according to Herbst, making civility a strategic communicative tool equates civil 
behavior to strategic bargaining and negotiation. However, even when civility is most basically 
defined an act of respect, it cannot be used as a tool to gain individual or collective advantage. 
Acting in any particular way for one’s sole benefit is not an act of respect but of deceit, undermining 
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the authenticity of civil behavior. This is the argument of philosopher Robert Pippin, who contends 
that civil expectations in a society must be normative expectations. He reasons, “[Civility] would be 
misunderstood if reduced to social strategies of interest satisfaction. If I offer you signs of respect 
and trust only because I want you to offer them to me, and that only because that will simply get me 
what I want, then we are not being civil but pretending to be civil in order to gain a certain end.”17 
Against Herbst’s argument, civility contains something deeper, more fundamental to the relational 
experience of citizens. Beyond that - whether civility is best conceptualized as a virtue, a moral or 
religious code or a social expectation, as a duty of citizenship or the guarantor of individual liberty 
— is where much of the controversy blossoms. 
2.3 THE MANY DEFINITIONS OF CIVILITY 
Coming up with a succinct definition of civility applicable liberal society is where Sapiro’s 
advanced degree in alchemy would be particularly useful. In the introduction of Rude Democracy, 
Herbst considers several definitions of civility, stating:  
While some scholars and authors have been brave enough to define ‘civility’ and 
have made wonderful contributions as a result, existing definitions are imperfect, 
owing to the complexity of the concept. Some definitions seem a bit too intimate, 
focused on interpersonal interactions — how we treat our friends and neighbors, or 
even strangers on the street. Others are too impersonal, using high-flying rhetoric of 
democracy, but forgetting that citizens are living, breathing people. None of the 
definitions seem quite right, so scholars and writers have — logically — chosen to 
orient their work around definitions that make sense for the level and nature of their 
empirical or theoretical work.18 
 
Coming up with a definition to fit a broad body of work is a particular challenge. Those who 
take liberalism seriously attempt to define civility and the corresponding ideal of civil society with as 
much freedom of conduct as possible. Philosopher Lawrence Cahoone defines civil society as a 
cooperative partnership of citizens whose aim is living. He argues that civility allows citizens “to 
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regard members and their society as the logically prior and morally independent association for 
which the state exists, hence to grant society a degree of ‘autonomy’ from the state, and its members 
a degree of freedom and equality with respect to each other.” 19 Cahoone’s definition is closest to my 
own understanding of civility, however it seems to have a problem of origin. Civility rightly results in 
a free and equal liberal citizenry, separate from the state; and yet, how does Cahoone define the 
civility that constructs the free civil society? If civil society is framed as the seal upon which citizens 
are safeguarded from the state, citizens must be capable and motivated to prioritize the freedom and 
equality of others in order to live outside state authority. This ignores the permeable relationship 
between civil society and the state in liberal democracy, where civil rights are protected against the 
potential for a majoritarian rule. Cahoone’s definition of civil society rests too much on an assumed 
presupposition of civility and ignores the integral relationship of individual freedom and a collective 
common good. His civil society feels right for this project; however, he fails to answer question of 
how to construct such a civil populace.  
Those with a less liberal persuasion define civility vis à vis virtue, including acts of self-
restraint and self-sacrifice, as taught through religion, family and social customs. Juxtaposed to 
Cahoone, American law professor Stephen Carter’s work titled Civility argues that “we cannot 
construct civility in America without a revival of religion as force both in our public and private 
lives.”20 His definition calls on a substantive obligation, namely the necessity of religion, to revive 
civil behavior. For Carter, civility requires a fundamental understanding of civil behavior as religious 
behavior. In this way, Carter seems to share Buchannan’s inclination to argue for a public notion of 
civility that has substantive, and in some cases, personal value. Carter himself argues that disciplining 
children by slapping their bottoms or hands “for truly dangerous infractions” need not be 
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considered uncivil; still, parents are supposed to show self-sacrifice toward their children so that they 
will try “to act out of the same sense of sacrificial love” toward others.21 To maintain that corporal 
punishment is civil represents the often confusing and complicated understandings of the various 
definitions of civility.  
 Other examples help illustrate the complication that accompanies a more situated concept of 
civility. For example, in his article “Is Civility a Virtue?” philosopher James Schmidt offers a 
theoretical and practical definition.  
Civility is a belief which affirms the possibility of the common good; it is a belief in 
the community of contending parties within a morally valid unity of society. It is a 
belief in the validity or legitimacy of the governmental institutions which lay down 
rules and resolve conflicts. Civility is a virtue expressed in action on behalf of the 
whole society, on behalf of the good of all members of the society to which public 
liberties and representative institutions are integral. Civility is an attitude in 
individuals which recommends that consensus about the maintenance of the order of 
society should exist alongside the conflict of interests and ideals.22 
 
To argue that civility involves affirming of the legitimacy of governmental institutions and legislative 
rules suggests that for Schmidt, civility includes a commitment to a common good and the 
institutional foundations that seek to establish consensus amongst conflict. While civil virtue seems 
to naturally value consensus building among citizens, the danger for upholding governmental 
institutions as the arbiters of conflict resolution is the possibilities for majoritarianism, abuse of 
power and forced conformity. While Cahoone argues that civility generates citizen autonomy from 
the state, Schmidt contends that the state can be used as the arbiter of collective common good. 
Challenges to Schmidt’s argument are found in historical examples where the government 
perpetuated civil abuses, from Dred Scott and Jim Crow to Tuskegee and Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. 
Further, in the instance of the Civil Rights Movement, which challenged the de jure racism of the 
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American South, the state did not arbitrate conflict in the hope of establishing consensus but 
perpetuated human rights violations in the control of a morally corrupt moral majority.  
 Lastly, some definitions of civility rely on robust conceptions of moral value and virtue. Like 
Carter, philosopher Adam McLellan relies on more rigid values that one must adhere to in order to 
follow constituted rules of civility. McLellan states, “Civility is a disposition that one individual may 
have towards another, or increasing the scope, a mood that obtains a given group of individuals or a 
society with the following set of criteria: recognizes the full humanity of him/herself and the ‘other,’ 
recognizes interdependence with other, desires to make common cause with other.”23 This is one of 
the strongest and most definitive criteria for civility. However, the trouble with equating civility with 
the ‘full humanity’ of political or social adversaries and the desire to make common cause with 
others suggests that individuals cannot choose civility and not engage with others, nor can they 
respectfully articulate why finding common cause is difficult or impossible. McLellan’s argument is 
left with strong allusions to the Christian argument of self-sacrifice for the good of others, much like 
Carter. These arguments demonstrate why Herbst is so squeamish about normative definitions of 
civility. She could rightfully ask of McLellan: what does it mean to ask a diverse population to 
recognize the ‘full’ humanity, or the common cause of those with whom they share diabolically 
opposed beliefs? What if accepting the full humanity of an individual or population means 
abandoning or compromising one’s own deepest beliefs? Are greater commitments to mutuality, 
reciprocity and the common good the only possible saviors for a liberal civil project?  
  Such questions lead to a working definition of civility for the purposes of this essay. As 
considered above, definitions of civility range greatly with respect to varying ideals of scope, purpose 
and intent, moral responsibility and virtue. The thread that joins most of the above designations, 
however, can be stated most simply as respect for others and respect for oneself, where respect is defined as 
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regard for the feelings, wishes, rights, or traditions of others.24 Respect encompasses both sentiment 
and action; similarly, civility as respect can be defined both as moral virtue and as a social norm. This 
definition of civility may include social behaviors, such as politeness and courtesy, but not 
necessarily so, since civility can be respectful while still being harsh, challenging, and confrontational. 
Just as respect does not necessarily mean acting in a strictly polite manner, civility is sometimes, but 
not always, courteous. To act with civility, then, permits Cahoone’s ideal to flourish; civility allows 
civil society to maximize individual freedom and will grant a higher degree of autonomy, where 
citizens can enjoy greater freedom and equality with respect to each other. 
 Still, defining civility as respect for others and respect oneself may at first seem too vague to 
be useful and too quixotic to be informative. What it highlights is the relationship between civility, 
civil rights and citizenship. While civil rights protect the rights of citizens and civil law regulates 
interactions between individuals, they do so only to the extent that punishment can be allocated 
when the rights of citizens have been violated. However, democracy asks for a greater degree of 
civility than tepid interactions between competitive individuals who are committed to nothing more 
than following the law. Civility must act as the safeguard that further optimizes freedom for all 
citizens, beyond laws and statues. A civil society is comprised of citizens who are, at least to some 
extent, interested in their own lives and the lives of their fellow citizens; civility must be both respect 
for oneself and respect for others. Considering civility as respect introduces the question of what 
responsibility citizens’ have to each other. This is a useful point upon which to begin an exploration 
of the etymology of civility, including how liberal democracy has used, confused, and sacrificed 
notions of civil engagement in the name of individual liberty. 
                                                 
24








CHAPTER 3: THE ETYMOLOGY OF CIVILITY: FROM COURTIER TO COURTEOUS AND BEYOND 
 
“Let thy ceremonies in Courtesy be proper to the Dignity of his place with whom thou converses 
for it is absurd to act the same with a Clown and a Prince.” 
- Rule #42 of 110 Rules of Civility & Decent Behavior in Company & Conversation 
 
3.1 THE CASE FOR COURTESY 
In modern democratic structures, the relationship between individual freedom, civility as 
respect, and the state is especially relevant. In particular, the relationship of the citizen to the 
political realm informs the how citizens choose to treat each other and to an ideal of a collective 
common good. As considered above, consigning the interactions of citizens to polite gestures, 
refined manners or courteousness seems to oversimplify the complicated relationship of citizens in a 
liberal democratic society, the concepts of civility and courtesy have a strong etymological 
connection, one that shapes how we think about the relationship of citizens to each other. It is not 
surprising then that, despite the notion that modern conceptions civility are more complicated than 
common refined behavior or courteousness of citizens, the Oxford English Dictionary definition of 
civility includes, “relating to culture and civilized behavior” involving “the state or condition of 
being civilized, […] culture, refinement, good breeding; cultured refined or scholarly education,” and 
“an act or expression appropriate to civilized behavior; esp. an act or expression of politeness, a 
courtesy.”25 
The etymological connection between polite behavior and civility, as exemplified by the 
Oxford definition, underscores an evolving conception of civil behavior over four centuries of 
political thought, from the polite behavior of the renaissance courtier to current interactions 
                                                 
25




between citizens in a liberal democracy. This construction of civility highlights the complicated 
relationship of citizens to each other, as well as the tension between the good of individual and the 
greater good. Civility is at once defined as the status of citizen and a collectivity, orderly behavior by 
a citizen and the act or expression of politeness toward another. Alarmingly, perhaps it is this last 
ideal of civility that seems to have failed to evolve with modern politics. Or, more skeptically, 
perhaps civility itself was lost in the evolution. Philosopher Charles Taylor carefully traces the 
historical connection between courtesy and civility, and illustrates why the courtesy itself plays an 
important role in an understanding of the modern liberal struggle for civility.  
3.2 THE ETYMOLOGY OF CIVILITY AND THE ROLE OF THE COURTIER 
In his work, Modern Social Imaginaries, Taylor leads the definition of courtesy back to the 
Renaissance concept of the courtier, or court advisor. Prior to the Renaissance, Taylor explains, 
“courts were places where semi-independent warriors congregated from time to time for jousts and 
hierarchical displays around the royal household.”26 The turn of the sixteenth century introduced a 
rapid transition for the court warrior and the court itself. By the publication of Baldassare 
Castiglione’s Il Cortegiano (The Book of the Courtier) in 1528, the courtier had been transformed 
from independent warrior to model member of the court, “described as having a cool mind, a good 
voice (with beautiful, elegant and brave words) along with proper bearing and gestures… [to have 
retained] a warrior spirit, to be athletic, and have good knowledge of the humanities, Classics and 
fine arts.”27 
 It is these qualities of the courtier that link courtesy to civility; and it is the translation of 
Aristotle’s Politics in 1438 by the Italian humanist Leonardo Bruni that introduced the term ‘civil 
society’ into our modern lexicon. In his interpretation, Bruni used the Latin “civilis societas,” or civil 
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society, to translate Aristotle’s koinonia politke. For Aristotle, the ‘political community’ exists within 
the polis, or public - this is where men reach their fullest potential through participating in politics. 
Thus, the root of the term civility originated here, within the Latin translation of the Greek word 
polis, or civitas.  
There was a Renaissance-era revitalization of the republican civitas, motivated predominantly 
by a desire for military and economic dominance and precipitated by a highly functioning republic. 
Several key features of the Renaissance civitas are now familiar attributes of our modern statehood: 
then, leaders argued that civil society necessitated a governing body to maintain order under a code 
of law.28 In order for civil society to thrive, a functioning governing body required higher degrees of 
domestic peace and less toleration for rowdiness, unauthorized violence or public brawls. Courtly 
behavior, or the behavior of a courtier, became the model for the ideal citizen; in the civitas, citizens 
were increasingly expected to behave with courtesy toward others, for the good of the state.  
The evolution of civility from the royal court to the modern civil state took nearly four 
centuries. In its early inception, the re-initiation of Aristotelian civil society during the Renaissance 
required much reorienting of societal expectations - not just of the ‘savages’ in early America or the 
lower castes in Europe, uneducated and uninterested in the merits of self-governance - even 
members of the aristocracies were new, sometimes reluctant subjects to the political rule. Still, the 
stronger political order had great effects. In the period between the Renaissance and the early 1800s, 
Western advances in scholarship included innovations in the arts and humanities, the sciences, 
technology, and the increase of religion in society. All of these advances necessitated a society of 
men conducting themselves appropriately in public. Manners were important, and courtesy required. 
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To act civilly meant following a set of codes that dictated particular conduct in order to uphold the 
function and the stability of the civitas. This code of conduct was generated, dictated and enforced by 
the ruling elites, with increasing involvement from the Church. As a result, religion played an 
increasingly important role in civil society; Christian leaders infused the civility with restrictions of 
moral imperatives. Protestantism and its ethics represent an interesting culmination of the 
relationship between civil behavior and a relationship to God.29  
As the success of civil society relied heavily the behavioral codes of men in the public 
sphere, it is not surprising that a sixteenth century French manuscript, titled “110 Rules of Civility 
and Decent Behavior in Company and Conversation” played a role in the civic education of George 
Washington. By sixteen, Washington had copied the entire manuscript by hand and the manuscript 
has been credited as one of the “earliest and most powerful forces to shape America’s first 
president.”30 In the essay “Is Civility a Virtue?” James Schmidt begins with an anecdote about the 
1998 incoming class at Hamilton College who were handed a copy of Washington’s “110 Rules” 
upon their arrival. Schmidt explains that the book was an admirable attempt by the College 
administration to generate honest, important discussion amongst incoming students about the 
“requisite arts of listening, understanding and negotiating”31 in academia. However, Washington’s 
manuscript serves the greater purpose of highlighting great changes in civic education over the last 
three centuries than used as a tool for teaching appropriate collegiate behavior. As Schmidt states, 
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“With all due respect to the Father of Our Country… Washington’s maxims cannot but strike the 
modern reader as rather odd.”32 A few examples from the manuscript illustrate this point well:  
4th. In the Presence of Others Sing not to yourself with a humming Noise, nor Drum 
with your Fingers or feet. 
 
20th. The Gestures of the Body must be Suited to the discourse you are upon. 
  
53rd. Run not in the Streets, neither go t[oo s]lowly nor wit[h] Mouth open go no 
Shaking y[ou]r Arms [kick not the earth with your feet, go] not upon the Toes, nor in 
a Dancing [fashion].  
 
104th. It belongs to the Chiefest in Company to unfold his Napkin and fall to Meat 
first, But he ought then to Begin in time & to Dispatch [w]ith Dexterity that the 
Slowest may have time allowed him.33 
 
Such maxims provide little guidance for modern understandings of civility — they do not convey a 
sense of timelessness for Washington’s wisdom, or a universal understanding civility. Instead they 
eloquently demonstrate how the conception of civil behavior has changed over time. It is no longer 
uncivil for a university student to commence a meal before an upperclassman has unfolded his 
napkin; public humming is now permitted, as is running, drumming and dancing. Only in restrictive 
social settings, such as military academies, are constraints on casual behavior and social interactions 
asserted without a raised eyebrow. If Washington’s 110 rules were modernized for incoming college 
students to include regulation on cell phones as well as suggestions of appropriate dress and 
permissible foods to be eaten in public, such agreed-upon conventions would still be found less 
significant to conversation than concerns regarding appropriate use of language, conflict resolution, 
listening skills and tolerance practices. The modern irrelevance of Washington’s manuscript reveals 
an important point: over the history of American democracy, civility has evolved from a set of 
behavioral codes and etiquette meant to secure social hierarchy, inform civil education and control 
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social interaction in the political-public realm, to the modern understanding of civility as respect 
through fair and equal treatment of others.  
This civil evolution occurred over three centuries, as modern democracy transitioned from 
small, self-governing republics of the Renaissance to the larger, more centralized project of U.S. 
liberal modern democracy. In this transition, conceptions of civility and the civil society were 
abstract enough to survive the transition relatively unscathed; however, the civitas as the locus of 
political life changed radically.34 Washington’s 110 rules of civility were intended for men who 
understood the public behavior of citizens as directly connected to the greater political weal. In early 
America, one’s behavior reflected individual and family and position in society and civil conduct was 
practiced as a way to secure the political stability and future of the state. And yet, in the early 
foundations of democratic society, the relationship between citizens, citizenship and the state began 
to shift. Alongside it, the notion of civility experienced a transformation.  
3.3 THE ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SHIFT FROM CIVIC TO CIVIL  
In particular, the notion of civility was radically changed by the political shifts of the 
Enlightenment. The scholarship of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resulted in a transition 
in political philosophy from the Aristotelian roots of republicanism toward an ideal of respect without 
necessary shared ends, from “civic to civil, from polis to politeness”.35 Importantly, this shift is well 
documented in two particular nineteenth century works; the writing of German philosopher Georg 
Friedrich Hegel and the work of French Historian Alexis de Tocqueville. Both theorists articulated a 
split in the republican notion of civitas — a liberal division of the binary public-political and private 
spheres into tripartite realms of state, civil society, and the private realm.  
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In the 1821 publication of The Philosophy of Right, Hegel conceived of a bürgerliche Gsellschaft or 
civil society, “which stood between the private, biological realm of the family and the public, 
political realm of the state, all three constituting Sittlichkeit, the complete embodiment of ethical 
life.”36 Separate from the state, the civic domain is a largely economic endeavor where the citizen is 
free to concern himself with his own, competitive interests and where he “pursues these interests in 
a market where all other individuals are likewise concerned with the pursuit of their own interests.”37 
In Hegel’s civil realm, the citizen is burgher, not citoyen, and the interest of the state remains separate 
from the competitive interest of the citizens.  
In drafts of Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville also observed a crucial division within 
the democratic state, but with slightly different delineations. Tocqueville distinguished the partition 
as follows: first is political society, which includes the relationship between the federal and state 
government as well as the government with the citizens; second, civil society, including citizens’ 
relationship with one another; and lastly, religious society, including the relationship of clergy to the 
citizens. Because Tocqueville believed that voluntary associations were under the auspices of civil 
society, later editions of Democracy in America often collapsed religious association into the civil 
sphere.38  
With two different approaches, Tocqueville and Hegel drew similar theoretical conclusions. 
By the nineteenth century, societal delineation was no longer the division of the political-public 
(civitas) and the private realm, but civil, political and private. In the binary division of the political-
public and the private, civil behavior was the virtue of the good citizen. However, without the state 
as the center of public life, the notion of civility shifted to the non-political, economic realm of the 
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civil sphere. This new frontier of civil society had supporters and opponents; Tocqueville considered 
this a positive shift, a freedom from the confines of European aristocracy. He believed that such 
shift was the natural consequence of a new ethnically, culturally and religiously diverse society 
without old, patrician rules and limitations:  
Democratic manners are neither so well thought out nor so regular [as those 
in aristocracies], but they often are more sincere. They form, as it were, a 
thin, transparent veil through which the real feelings and personal thoughts 
of each man can be easily seen. Hence there is frequently an intimate 
connection between the form and the substance of behavior; we see a less 
decorative picture but one truer to life.39 
 
Similar outlooks on this uncharted realm of civility in American democracy were less rosy. 
Nineteenth century German philosophers Ferdinand Tönnies and Max Weber, and some of their 
European colleagues, took a dimmer view of civility in industrial societies.40 In his 1887 work 
Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society), Tönnies articulated a great shift of the 
Industrial Revolution the civil sphere of democratic industrial society is distinct from the traditional 
polis and, like Hegel’s civil state, is rooted in the increasingly competitive free-market economy. For 
Tönnies, the civil sphere was not a new center of free and honest association. Instead:  
All conventional sociability may be understood as analogous to the exchange 
of material goods. The primary rule is politeness, an exchange of words and 
courtesies where everyone appears to be concerned for everyone else and to 
be esteeming each other as equals. In fact, everyone is thinking of himself 
and trying to push his own importance and advantages at the expense of the 
rest.41 
 
Where Tocqueville argues that the new society of American democracy allowed for a plurality of 
citizens to live genuinely through open and honest dialogue between equal citizens, Tönnies feared 
                                                 
39 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. J.P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969), 607.  
 
40
 Herbst, Rude Democracy, 19.  
 
41
 Ferdinand Tönnies, Community and Society, ed. Jose Harris (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 65.  
  
27
that the great achievements of contemporary industrial society would “crush the emotional, humane 
remains of community based society.”42  
Despite their differences, both Tonnies and Tocqueville articulate an important moment in 
modern relationship between civility and democratic theory. Prior to the division of civil society 
from the political-public, the conduct and civil behavior of citizens was inextricable from the civitas. 
However, as the Age of Enlightenment shifted ideals of freedom, statehood and citizenship, and as 
the liberal democratic project began to take shape, civility was decreasingly influenced by the 
character of the courtier and increasingly defined by notions of autonomous and self-interested 
citizens of the state. Civil behavior evolved from the conscripted guidelines of citizens participating 
in the public-political realm, to the new and uncharted jurisdiction of civil society. Along with it, the 
relationship between individual freedom and collective self-governance shifted indeterminately.  
  Much of the debate surrounding political liberalism exists here, in the moment where civility 
was unhinged from the realm of the collective self-governance and placed in the non-political realm 
of the civil sphere. Critics of modern liberalism contend that the Age of Enlightenment relegated the 
political sphere from the site of common good and individual actualization to an entity dedicated 
solely to the protection of individual liberty and freedom. This move diminished the chances for 
successful democratic self-government by disconnecting individual liberty from the political realm 
and severing the relationship of individual freedom and liberty from the ideal of a collective 
common good. Consigning the once-political values of civility and citizenship to the non-political 
civil realm, critics argue, resulted in an overvaluation individual liberty and prosperity at the expense 
of common values, and misplaced the important collective-will necessary for democracy.  
The historical shift from the civic to the civil is imperative to the modern civil debate, 
particularly because liberalism now dominates contemporary democratic ideology. The ‘great divide’ 
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between modern republicans and democrats hinges on methodological, not ideological, differences 
over how to maximize individual freedom and the ideals of life, liberty and property. Regardless of 
which side of the modern politics one stands, the divided political binary rests in the apex of how 
much of one’s personal wealth or freedom is relinquished to the federal government and for what 
cause. In this modern democratic structure, a liberal citizen, even a citizen committed to self-interest 
alone, is always at once an individual and member of the populace; and yet liberalism does not 
necessarily hold the interests of each in equal balance. Critics are right to claim that liberalism 
struggles to retain a strong commitment to common good while offering priority to the promotion 
and preservation of individual freedom and liberty.  
Despite the current political climate, the relationship between the common good and the 
good of an individual need not be adversarial in liberalism. As a citizen is simultaneously an 
individual and a member of a greater community, the ideals of each are interconnected. Liberal 
theory must recognize that the stronger the commitment to a common good, the stronger the 
possibility of individual freedom for all citizens, as promulgated in the Constitution of the United 
States. The question is whether liberalism is able to induce increased levels of civility without 
collapsing the civil realm and political realm, to compel citizens to commit to greater levels of civility 
and commitment to the common good without compromising the ideal of citizen-freedom to 
pursue one’s own life, liberty and property upon which liberalism rests. Two important 
considerations, expounded nearly three centuries apart, attempt to build such an important case for 
liberalism. More recently, the contemporary theory of theorist John Rawls, struggles to find an 
appropriate place for a duty of civility in modern liberalism. First, however, the historical theologian 
and public leader Roger Williams, whose theories helped shape the ideals of tolerance and religious 
freedom, can help to inform issues of modern civility. Williams’ theories are rarely used in civil 
debates, though they offer important insight into the potential strengths and weaknesses of our 
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modern liberal structure. Because Williams’ philosophical work was part of his greater project as a 
public leader, Chapter Three begins with an examination of his works within a historical context as a 







CHAPTER 4: LIBERALISM AND THE CRISIS IN CIVILITY 
“My conscience is an avalanche; majestic, bewildering, and wholly careless…” 
-The Bowerbirds 
 
4.1 WILLIAMS AND THE FREEDOM OF HUMAN CONSCIENCE  
 
Early champions of liberty in America argued for freedom, tolerance and respect among free and 
equal citizens. Much of the credit is now extended to the classical liberal philosopher John Locke, 
whose writings, particularly the Two Treatises of Government and A Letter Considering Toleration, inspired 
James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, George Mason, Benjamin Franklin and John Adams among 
other early democratic theorists.43 Early Democratic-Republicans incited Lockean liberal ideals of a 
natural right to life liberty and property against the Federalist ideals, which Jefferson and his allies 
were concerned favored aristocratic elitism and social privilege. Democratic-Republicans were 
committed to principles of universal civic duty in opposition to political privilege and corruption. 
Ensuring individual freedom and liberty, they believed, would best guarantee that the power of 
government remained in the hands of the farmers and ordinary citizens, the ‘plain folk of the old 
south’. Securing citizens’ freedom to participate in government meant constructing a system of rules 
and regulations that granted all citizens equal protection under the law. The project of creating a 
unified nation of states committed to liberty and equality required a nation of participants 
committed to common freedom of citizens. As such, the traditional notion of citizenship, liberated 
from the behavioral constructions of European aristocracy and state interest, shifted away from 
socially ‘appropriate’ behavior and toward an ideal of a plurality of citizens freely enjoying equal 
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rights and access to property and prosperity. The new American ideal of civility among citizens 
evolved from politeness to respect for individual rights; or from the interest of the state to the good 
of the people. 
One of the earliest and most provocative crusaders of tolerance and civil respect is often 
excluded from the great civility debate. Roger Williams (c. 1603-1683), founder of the Providence 
Colony and one of the forefathers of the Baptist faith in America, is remembered best as a radical 
and often unpopular Puritan leader. His rigid interpretations of religious ideology isolated him from 
the ruling elite in the Massachusetts Bay Colony and buried much of his scholarship in controversy. 
When Williams is referenced at all, it is often for his unyielding stance on the separation of church 
and state, though the more eloquent writings of Jefferson and Madison eclipse even this work. In 
error, historians assume that Williams’ writings on the separation of church and state represent his 
role an incorrigible democrat and contentious figure in early America and a precursor to 
transcendentalism. It is widely understood that his advocacy of religious tolerance that resulted from 
his distaste for the religious orthodoxy of Puritanism and his sympathy for the pagans and agnostics 
with whom he became friendly.  
In recent years, reassessment of Williams’ contribution to the discussion of liberalism and 
civility has surfaced, much owed to the theologian James Calvin Davis who has transcribed and 
analyzed Williams’ prolific, emotional and often impenetrable works. Davis, along with philosopher 
Martha Nussbaum, reveal Roger Williams as a man who was foremost a theologian and public 
servant, dedicated to one inspiring political project: creating a society built on freedom of 
conscience, conversation and mutual respect. Examining the life and lifework of Roger Williams in 
the context of early American Democracy reveals a clearer and more substantial ideological 
relationship between liberal freedom and civility.  
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Roger Williams and his wife arrived on the shores of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1630. 
A child of English merchants, Williams’ precociousness earned him the early attention of Sir 
Edward Coke, chief justice of the King of England’s Bench. Coke arranged Williams’ education, first 
at Sutton’s Hospital in London and then at Cambridge University. Williams received a degree in the 
Classics focused on Stoicism, popular in the early part of the seventeenth century. Upon graduation, 
Williams accepted orders in the Church of England and was appointed a chaplaincy in Essex.  
At his post, Williams earned a reputation for strong criticism of the Anglican Orthodoxy and 
a contentious devotion to the Stoic ideals of individual sovereignty and freedom of conscience. 
Williams was an outward supporter of the separatist movement of the Anglican Church, which 
argued for a break from the corruption. In 1629, Williams witnessed the imprisonment and torture 
of another leading Puritan reformer. Fearing his own safety, Williams fled England for the New 
World.44 Williams and his wife were warmly welcomed in Massachusetts, and Williams was offered 
an assistant ministerial position at the prominent Church of Boston. He displeased the colonial 
leadership by declining the post, citing his disapproval with the congregation’s continuing 
connection with the Church of England; many early leaders of the Massachusetts Bay Colony were 
members of the ‘non-separatist’ movement, who believed reform was best implemented from within 
the Church. Several neighboring communities were sympathetic to Williams’ arguments, and offered 
him a ministerial post. Williams spent several years in Salem where he sermonized freely, wrote 
political pamphlets and cultivated relationships with the local native tribes, learning several of their 
languages.  
As a leader in the church, Williams was particularly critical of the Massachusetts colonists’ 
claims to all Indian Territory. He published literature sarcastically commenting, “Christian kings (so 
calld) are invested with Right by virtue of their christianitie to take and give away the Lands and 
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Countries of other men.”45 Eventually Williams’ radical sermons, open criticism of the King of 
England, and his kindliness with native peoples earned him the ire of the Massachusetts authorities. 
In 1635, Williams was tried in the General Court, convicted of “diverse, new and dangerous 
opinions” and sentenced to banishment.46 Williams was outraged by what he believed to be an 
outright attack on his religious ideology, which he argued was a direct violation of conscience.47 John 
Cotton, pastor of the First Church of Boston, who would become a lifelong adversarial 
correspondent of Williams, justified such religious persecution as an act of civil order. Nussbaum 
states, 
It was [ ] God's will, Cotton said, in order to separate the diseased element of society 
from the healthy element. Heretics and dissidents are like Satan in our midst. Even if 
they behave peaceably, they are enticements to sin. Cotton urged imprisonment, 
banishment, and other harsh penalties for the unorthodox.48 
 
Williams was alerted to his forthcoming punishment by an ally, and in the winter of 1636 
fled to the shores of the Narragansett River with a small following of loyal supporters. Welcomed by 
the Narragansett Chief Canonicus whom he had befriended during his tenure in Salem, Williams 
established Providence Colony, named for his deliverance from the unchristian treatment of the 
Massachusetts Bay. Later, Providence and neighboring communities were chartered as the Rhode 
Island Colony and Providence Plantation. As the leader of Rhode Island, Williams finally achieved 
liberty from the Anglican orthodoxy and commenced what would become his lifework: developing a 
fair balance between the sacredness of individual liberty and a tolerant, peaceable society.  
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Early examples of Williams’ commitment to freedom and liberty are well documented. The 
Charter of Rhode Island was the first case of an official policy of religious liberty, stating: 
[N]oe person within the sayd colony, at any tyme hereafter, shall bee any wise 
molested, punished, disquieted, or call in question, for any differences in opinione in 
matters of religion, and doe not actually disturb the civill peace of sayd colony; but 
that all and every person and persons may, from tyme to tyme, and at all tymes 
hereafter, freely and fuly have and unjoye theire owne judgments and conscicnecs, in 
matters of religious concernments, throughout the tract of lande hereafter 
mentioned; they behaving themselves peaceablie and quietlie, and not useinge this 
libertie to lycentiousnesse and profanenesse, nor to the civill injrye or outward 
disturbance of others; any lawe, statute, or clause, therein contained, or to be 
contained, usage or custome of this realme, to the contrary hereof, in any wise, 
notwithstanding.49 
 
In 1652, Rhode Island was the first colony in North America to ban black and white chattel 
slavery, following earlier bans on witch-hunts and capital punishment. As word spread of Williams’ 
tolerant practices, Rhode Island increasingly became a haven to persecuted peoples including 
Baptists and Quakers, who sought the freedom to pursue religious practice. In 1658, fifteen Jewish-
Portuguese families arrived in Rhode Island and were granted full religious sovereignty — 
astounding given that Jews in Britain were granted full civil rights nearly two centuries later.  
Historians inaccurately attribute Williams’ commitment to individual liberty and tolerance as 
a break from his own religiosity or a theological disillusionment with the Church of England. In fact, 
Williams remained deeply committed to religion and spent the full duration of his life as a Christian 
theologian and dedicated public leader. His support for a statehood rooted in religious freedom and 
individual liberty was not a desertion of faith, nor was it an indication of his valuation of human 
atomism at the cost of community. Williams pursued an ideal individual liberty, not at the expense of 
the common good but defended the integrity of the freedom of human liberty and toleration as the 
foundation upon which to build a strong community. At a time when the powerful hand of the 
Church of England reached across the Atlantic to threaten religious proliferation and freedom of 
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speech and religion, Williams’ commitment to religious pluralism was unprecedented, and for the 
political elite in Massachusetts, quite unwelcome.  
This was the foundation of Williams’ lifework, an ideal upon which he focused with 
unwavering commitment. He believed, above all else, in the dignity and value of the human 
conscience. Influenced by his scholarship on Stoicism, Williams contended that human beings were 
endowed with a capacity for moral knowledge and ethical reasoning, accessible through exercise and 
education of the human conscience. For Williams, the “conscience played the same role that faculty 
of moral choice plays in Stoicism; conscience […] is a seat or faculty of searching and choosing… It 
is, Williams holds, the main source of our identity as agents: it is ‘indeed the man.’”50 
Combining Christian theology and natural law theory, Williams argued that God endowed a 
“most precious and invaluable Jewel” to all humans: liberty of the conscience and the natural 
capacity for moral knowledge. Similar to the Stoic ideal of faculty of conscience, Williams believed 
the human conscience exists in the virtuous and non-virtuous alike, in those whom he deemed 
believers and ‘anti-Christians’, pagans and Jews. All persons possess a type of moral goodness, even 
if they do not appeal to God; and because every human is capable of exercising a basic level of 
morality, they are also capable of civility. In other words, according to Williams one need not be 
Christian to be a good moral citizen. 51  
Williams argued this ideal both theologically and empirically. His understanding of the 
human capacity for civil morality was underscored by his personal experience with persecution. 
Williams wrote “…I observe to prove that a Subject, a Magistrate, may be a good subject, a good 
Magistrate, of civil or morall goodnes which thousands want, and where it is, it is commendable and 
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beautiful, though Godlines which is infinitely more beautiful, be wanting…”52 Throughout his 
writings and letters, Williams often recanted stories of persons, societies and tribes who were wholly 
ignorant of Christianity but idyllically peaceable, nonviolent and mild-mannered. He challenged 
those who argued that civility thrived solely in Christian cultures to recall “so many stately 
Kingdomes and Governments in the World [who] have long and long enjoyed civill peace and quiet, 
notwithstanding their Religion is so corrupt…”53 
Three critical conclusions were drawn from Williams’ conviction that humans are universally 
capable of moral knowledge. First, if all humans contain equal potential for freedom of conscience 
than citizens are inherently equal and must be treated as such. As Nussbaum eloquently states, 
Williams imagined that “everyone has inside something infinitely precious, something that demands 
respect from us all, and something in regard to which we are all basically equal.”54 Second, because 
of the equal status of humanity, Williams argued that all citizens rightly deserved the freedom and 
opportunity to pursue the realization of their individual conscience, which required space for the 
conscience to grow without threat of coercion, persecution or imprisonment. Here, Williams made a 
break from the Stoics who argued that the inner conscience is an unmovable being, held within the 
soul of an individual and unharmed by outside influence. For the Stoics, this meant that the inner 
conscience is always safe from outside forces, giving individuals the fortune of personal freedom 
irrespective of circumstance. Williams rejected this ideal, arguing that the faculty of the human 
conscience is instead a fragile component of the human spirit, an entity needing protection and 
expansiveness in order to thrive. While the Stoic ideal of inner freedom is attractive, an argument for 
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an untouchable conscience does not support a reasonable argument against enslavement or for 
egalitarianism. Stoics fell mostly silent on matters of citizen equality and freedom.55  
Williams’ case for the fragility of human conscience strengthened his third argument: that 
appropriate space for the freedom and dignity of all citizens must be rigorously protected. All 
citizens have an equal capacity for freedom of conscience and such capacity, critical to the expansion 
of humanity, requires philosophical space and physical expansiveness unthreatened by persecution in 
order to thrive. Because the human conscience must be protected in order flourish, Williams found 
it an indefensible crime against humanity to allow civil and religious freedom to some but not to all. 
Such a violation of the human conscience is equitable to imprisonment and “rape of the soul,” an 
act to which he states “no Uncleanness, no Adulterie, Incest, Sodomie, or Beastlitie can equal, this 
ravishing and forcing (explicitly or implicitly) the very Soules and Conscience of all the Nations and 
Inhabitants of the world.”56 It is insufficient to merely declare such persecution immoral; Williams 
shuddered at the individual who spoke “so tenderly for his owne, [yet] hath yet so little respect, 
mercie, or pitie to the like consciencious perswasions of other Men[.]” His dismay lead him to ask 
two further questions: “Are all the Thousands of millions of millions of Consciences, at home and 
abroad, fuell only for a prison, for a whip, for a stake, for a Gallowes? Are no Consciences to 
breathe the Aire, but such as suit and sample his?”57  
To complement his philosophical arguments for the freedom of individual conscience, 
Williams argued an additional procedural point. Individual persecution does not only jeopardize the 
“most precious and invaluable Jewel” of human conscience, it is also an ineffective strategy to 
inspire an internal shift in belief. An individual forced to falsely affirm a set of mandatory beliefs 
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without a soul conversion will not transform their own ideals to satisfy their oppressor, but rather 
harden their commitment to their own inner ideology, making it less likely that they will amend their 
inner ideological principles upon deliberation. This argument later becomes central to the case of 
toleration made by John Locke.58 This point is well avowed but less significant for Williams; as a 
theologian he was most invested in saving the precious conscience of the soul, not shifting ideology 
through argument. In the colony of Rhode Island, Williams sought to create a society of religious 
tolerance and individual freedom where individuals were treated equally and where individual 
conscience flourished in the absence of persecution.  
These ideals formed the foundation of Williams’ argument for which he is best known: the 
separation of the church and the state, or what he called a “hedge or wall of separation between the 
garden of the church and the wilderness of the world.”59 Williams argued this model as a rebuttal to 
the Massachusetts theologian John Cotton, who contended, “The established Church must hold high 
authority in the civil realm, and should be superior to all civil magistrates, if peace is to be 
preserved.”60 Williams argued that such the allowance of church authority in a civil society would 
necessarily threaten citizens with religious domination. Allowing one religious ideology authority 
over all citizens jeopardizes the freedom of individuals by confining ideology and practice. In the 
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interest of safeguarding individual freedom and liberty of all citizens, a just society cannot rightfully 
endorse a state religion, but instead must cultivate a sense of peace and a shared ideal of the 
common good through other means. 
Williams expanded upon his ideal of a ‘model’ society beyond the separation of church and 
state. He argued that human activity falls into two particular realms, the civil and the spiritual, with 
corresponding jurisdictions. The civil authority is responsible for protecting the rights of citizens in 
pursuit of the liberal ideals of life, liberty, property and security. Citizens elect civil magistrates, and 
authorities are permitted to use force when necessary in order to compel the freedom of the 
citizenry. The spiritual realm, on the other hand, is non-democratic. It is the place of “soul and 
safety.”61 In the spiritual realm, use of coercion and punishment is both inappropriate and 
dangerous. Williams states, “civill weapons [are] not only improper, but unnecessary in spirituall 
cases.”62 Williams believed the Church and its clergy should maintain authority in the spiritual 
domain, but they should not use force and should govern by persuasion only. The two realms would 
live peaceably together as long as this divisional relationship was appropriately maintained and the 
boundaries between the civil state and the religious realm were not blurred. Thus the religious realm 
could not appropriately interfere in civil law or restrict an individuals’ pursuit of individuals’ right to 
life, liberty and property. 
Williams’ work predates that Enlightenment tripartite division of state, civil and private 
realms but his theory shares relevant connections to later political models. Most obvious is his ideal 
of the separation between religion and the civil sphere. For Williams, the hedge dividing the ‘garden 
of the church’ from the ‘wilderness of the world’ was not intended to be an impassable divide; 
instead, the civil sphere was charged with constructing a boundary around ‘the garden’, in order to 
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protect the location of spiritual flourishing and the sacred space of the human spirit. Any civil force 
in the spiritual sphere was most unwelcome for Williams, so the civil sphere became the site of laws 
protecting the freedom of citizens, including the free exercise of religion and the oversight of 
appropriate punishment for religious intolerance, violence and coercion. Thus the civil realm was 
charged with defending the rights of individuals in both domains, not through statements of 
judgment or religiosity, but through acts intended to protect civil freedom. Williams explains: 
Laws respecting Religion may be such as merely concern the Civill State, Bodies and 
Goods of such and such persons, professing these and these Religions viz. that such 
and such persons, notorious for Mutinies, Treasons, Rebellions, Massacres, be 
disarmed: Again, that no persons Papists, Jewes, Turkes or Indians be disturbed at 
their worship (a thing which the very Indians abhor to practice any)… These and 
such as or of this nature, concerning the bodies and goods of such and such 
Religious persons, I confesse are merely Civill.63 
 
This exchange does not work in reverse. Religious laws and policies, including regulations of 
worship practices and appointments of religious leaders, must not be introduced or regulated within 
the civil realm. Religious policies must regulate only religious spheres and cannot be forced upon 
citizens who choose to follow religious practices. Religious institutions and leaders may preside over 
the spiritual realm but only insofar as they lead by persuasion and argument, not by force, meaning 
that they cannot force citizens in the civil realm to follow their religious teachings. For Williams, 
then, civil laws were never meant to be religious in origin, or as Nussbaum references Williams, “To 
say that [religious laws] should be civil laws ‘is as far from Reason, as that the Commandments of 
Paul… were civil and earthly constitutions.’”64  
Without religious laws to guide civil laws, the civil sphere was no longer the center for 
human flourishing for Williams, but the site where individual freedoms were mean to be protected 
by magistrates and by a citizenry committed to freedom and equality. The separation of the church 
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and the civil realm was not intended to keep the values of individuals out of the public realm; 
Williams recognized that it would be “weird and tyrannical,” as Nussbaum argues, to expect citizens 
to extract the moral standards they agree to in the civil realm from their own comprehensive 
religious doctrines. Ethical principles and ideals agreed upon in the public realm may be, for many, 
deeply embedded with religious meaning and justification. However, Williams’ argued that freedom 
of conscience would be preserved only when a plurality of citizens agreed upon a set of ethical 
standards without expecting that the origins must also be shared. Nussbaum puts it plainly, “All we 
need to do is to acknowledge that someone might actually have those ethical virtues, in the way that 
is relevant for politics, while not sharing our own view of life’s ultimate meaning.”65  
Williams concluded that the ideal of individual freedom and liberty could only be achieved 
when social cooperation was actualized, and this was only possible when open and honest 
conversation was allowed to occur in the public sphere. Again, the public realm was the place where 
citizens chose how best to safeguard personal freedom and liberty, to live well together. In order for 
social cooperation to be realized, the civil realm necessitated an open dialogue between citizens all of 
whom must be allowed to articulate their most valued religious and moral convictions without threat 
of disqualification or persecution. “Williams’ principle of tolerance was not intended to sanitize 
religiosity in public, but instead encouraged the freedom to hold, develop, change and articulate 
beliefs in public forums, and respect for this freedom was a procedural requirement upon which 
civility depended.”66 Williams sought to prevent any one particular religious authority from 
monopolizing the moral truth of a society, which would disallow open discourse in the public 
sphere. Instead, with deference to individual freedom of conscience, Williams encouraged citizens of 
Rhode Island to engage in honest deliberations in the public sphere.  
                                                 
65
 Nussbaum, “Equal Respect,” 13.  
 
66
 Davis, “A Return to Civility,” 692.  
  
42
With the division between the civil and spiritual clearly realms revealed, Williams’ ideal of 
civility is better understood. Without a particular religious ideology to hold ‘high authority’ over the 
civil sphere, citizens of a society must agree to a set of moral norms to guide the spirit of the public 
realm. The best way to ensure that the individual conscience of each citizen is protected from the 
‘wilds of the world’ was to construct the civil state on moral foundations that did not originate under 
the jurisdiction of one particular religious ideology. Williams recognized that a plurality of citizens 
would not and should not necessarily agree on a complex set of norms, but argued that all citizens, 
capable of moral citizenship and committed to individual liberty and freedom, would be compelled 
to discover some mutually agreed upon standards, including courteous conversation, listening with 
integrity, respect for one’s opponent, refraining from personal insults.67  
Williams recognized that the New World was already a plurality of communities with diverse 
religions, cultures and ideologies. This was the new uncharted reality of American democracy, 
articulated later in the writings of de Tocqueville. In a society of citizens with divergent ideologies, 
values and commitments, it seemed immoral, illogical and counterproductive to demand that all 
citizens accept one particular core ideal or set of moral truths. Instead Williams’ ideal of civility 
meant to respect the individualism of all citizens, cultivating a commitment to human equality and 
motivating a civil community to form a public space, where freedom and individual liberty were 
maximized. The civil sphere was not to be the space where profound ideals of truth and 
enlightenment were to be discovered, neither alone nor with a community of like-minded 
individuals. Such ideals were relegated to the private gardens of religion. The public sphere was the 
place where the values of individual freedom were agreed upon and protected by the strong bond 
between disparate citizens. In other words, common commitment to a public sphere was not the 
place to actualize a set of common truths that would constitute the ideal of a ‘good society’; the 
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purpose of the public sphere was to safeguard the individual freedom of all citizens who could in 
turn discover and actualize a good life for themselves. In order to ensure freedom of conscience for 
all citizens, the civil sphere included an agreed-upon set of ideals, a common respect for others, a 
commitment to individual freedom, and full equality of all citizens in the public realm. These are the 
very core foundations of Williams’ ideal of civility. Civility was the commitment and actions of a 
society where diversity was respected, civil conversation was courteous, and “the tasks of living 
together as a civil community [were] engaged in a cooperative spirit.”68 Thus, religious tolerance, the 
ideal attributed most to Roger Williams, was not intended as a particular ideology but meant as a 
norm of civil behavior.  
The ruling elite in Massachusetts represented the antithesis of Williams’ robust and 
cooperative civil sphere, where tolerance was primary and the protection of individual freedom was 
foundational. Not only was the Massachusetts Colony corrupt, Williams argued, societal construct 
dominated by one powerful congregation destroyed any possibility of a peaceable, pluralistic civil 
sphere. He feared that any society where religious authority reigned over the civil sphere would lead 
to a culture of power politics and undermine a common cooperative civil movement. As Davis 
articulates, Williams rightly worried that power politics inherently breeds incivility: 
Intolerance in public discourse short circuits conversation, handicaps the powers of 
persuasion and genuine consent, and ultimately threatens violence and political 
chaos. Civil exchange disappears, hope for consensus evaporates, and political 
interaction dissolves into dangerous wrestling for the loyalty of whatever political 
machinery will allow one to ‘win’. Thus, those who successfully obtain the allegiance 
of political institutions employ them as the ‘executioners’ of their own intolerance 
while those without such friendships in high places are led to believe that violent 
disruption is the only way for them to achieve freedom. From both directions 
intolerance brings civil conversation to an end and threatens a society’s political 
stability.69 
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While the current levels of incivility in the United States have not yet descended into 
violence, Williams’ concern over the cost of a civil structure relegated to the power politics of a 
‘political machinery’ is suggestive of the current civil climate. For Williams, the ideals of religious 
tolerance, respect for individual freedom and liberty are not only the ideals that solidify the qualities 
of a common civil sphere, but they are the foundation of a peaceable, successful pluralistic society.  
Whether the civil principles Williams espoused in Providence colony influenced the 
foundation of democracy in America beyond the idea of a separation of church and state is 
unproven. However, threads of Williams’ arguments for individual freedom of conscience were 
extant in early American constitutional ideals. The founders of the United States argued for 
individual freedom as a primary and prioritized right; today the U.S. Constitution protects citizens 
against the civil authority of any religious doctrine, and citizens are free to defend themselves against 
a dictatorial or oppressive government. At a time when individual religious freedom was 
unprecedented, Williams wrote early statues protecting the freedom of individuals in the civil sphere. 
In Rhode Island, “Jews did not have to testify on Saturday; sects that objected to oaths did not have 
to swear; Quakers and Mennonites were exempt from military conscription.”70  
Boston pastor John Cotton forwarded two important challenges to Williams, which 
reverberate through contemporary critiques of liberal civility. First, Cotton claimed that peaceful 
civil society ultimately fails without a common bond to incite citizens’ commitment to civil 
behavior.71 Moral behavior, dictated by religious belief, is the most stable foundational construct of a 
successful civil sphere. Without a common bond and with opposing ideologies, citizens easily 
become adversaries. Citizens cannot be bonded by law or boundary but by common cause, and such 
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unification occurs only when citizens have reason to trust and commit to one another through 
religiosity and faith.  
Williams was an early champion of the realities of pluralism, where the greatest hope for 
civility was not unity through faith, which would have forced non-Christian communities to 
relinquish their own beliefs, but a common respect for individual freedom of conscience and 
religion. Williams argued that the greatest threat to peace and tranquility in the civil sphere was 
indeed not pluralism itself but threat of persecution, brought upon a society by a dominant religious 
orthodoxy. “…[A] breach of civil peace may arise, when false and idolatrous practices are held forth 
& yet no breach of civil peace from the doctrine or the manner of holding forth but from that 
preposterous way of suppressing, preventing, and extinguishing such doctrines or practices by wrath 
and blood whips stockes death &c by which men commonly to convert Heretickes and to cast out 
uncleanne spirits which onely the finger of God can doe…”  
Cotton’s second argument draws closer to the issue of moral truth and civil leadership. 
Against Williams’ notion of civil magistrates, Cotton argued, “Being a good citizen and being a good 
civil magistrate are inseparable from having the right religion. We simply do not want our public life 
to be run by sinners, because they are making very important decisions, and if they are sinners they 
will do so sinfully, and badly.”72 As with his response to Cotton’s first objection, Williams’ rebuttal is 
founded by commitment to humanity and civil goodness irrespective of religion. He uses the 
aforementioned anecdotes about non-Christian civil societies as evidence that citizens in the public 
realm will choose to act civilly and in the best interest of all as long as individual freedom and liberty 
remain primary. Williams’ argued eloquently that the authority of the magistrate must not be 
“Religious, Christian, &c. but natural, humane and civil.”  
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Whether or not there is a right religion inseparable from moral goodness is a difficult debate. 
More important to Williams was the reality of a diversely religious colonial America. Even if Cotton 
successfully argued that a society could only be civil if all citizens share religious beliefs, the process 
by which the colonial leadership in Massachusetts chose to regulate and compel the beliefs of non-
Anglicans could not be defended as civil. Even under moral auspices, persecution, imprisonment 
and banishment, like that to which Roger Williams was subjected, were not a display of common 
humanity or respect. For Williams, civility was both an ideologically and procedurally right.  
Williams’ concluded that commitment to moral truth must not be the basis of respect in a 
pluralistic public. Where moral truth is personal and private, civility is procedural and public. In his 
own life, Williams remained highly devoted to Christianity and debated publically with other 
religious sects, including the Quaker community in Rhode Island, that the holy practices of other 
faiths were morally erroneous.73 Williams welcomed such disagreement and debate; he believed that 
tolerance, as a procedural foundation of civil behavior, was the best way to allow for fundamental 
disagreements while preserving the liberty and freedom of all citizens. He argued that a plurality of 
individuals, mutually committed to civility, provides the space for honest and open conversation in 
public without fear of coercion, corruption or persecution. Williams maintained that allowing a 
singular orthodoxy to reign over the civil lives of others through force not only undermined the civil 
project of peace and prosperity, but it vainly attempted to do the work of God.  
This is an essential building block in the consideration of a liberal argument for civility, as 
introduced by Williams. If moral truth is rightly separate from respect for others, commitment to the 
notion that the freedom to pursue one’s individual spirituality must be at least equally as important 
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as moral truth itself. Civility based on the ideals of respect for the freedom, tolerance and 
accommodation of all citizens will safeguard society against any authority that limits such freedom 
and liberty. This ideal is not unique to Williams; unfortunately, his argument for tolerance as the 
common value that protects individual freedom and liberty is too often ignored.  
Williams’ convictions are a profound example of how tension between a moral right and 
citizen freedom is rooted in the foundation of American history. As Williams’ theory tried to 
convey, democratic ideals must be primarily committed to safeguarding the individual liberty and 
freedom of all citizens. However, ideals in the public realm are often adjudicated against the spiritual 
and religious ideals of a majority religion, or even mainstream cultural beliefs. This creates the 
dilemma of how to reconcile public reason with personal doctrine: if citizens are required to 
suppress moral truths from their personal beliefs for the benefit of public weal, then individual 
freedom is undermined and the liberal project is diminished. Likewise, if a society sets policy based 
on beliefs established and supported by a comprehensive doctrine, then the rights of citizens will be 
limited by religious ideology with which they may not agree, and the liberal ideal is again violated. In 
both instances, the rights of some are sacrificed and hope for freedom and equality is broken.  
The tension between moral truth, personal liberty and a commitment to the common good 
is a central issue for the role of civility within liberalism. Unfortunately, the contest between 
individual liberty and the public weal is often only tangentially considered. A major thinker in the 
tradition of liberal political philosophy who shares important intersections with Williams in 
considering the relationship between civility and individual liberty is the contemporary American 
philosopher John Rawls. His work, written nearly three centuries after Williams, is considerably 
more sophisticated than the emotional writings of his philosophical predecessor. Still, comparison 
between Rawls and Williams offers important insight into the potential reconciliation between the 
primacy of individualism and a liberal commitment to civility. It may help to illuminate the reasons 
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for the prevalence of incivility in liberal democracy, and better unite ideals of individual freedom and 
a liberal commitment to civil behavior in the United States.  
 
4.2 JOHN RAWLS AND THE DUTY OF CIVILITY  
The theories of both John Rawls and Roger Williams originate from the right of human 
equality, and both argue for principles that guarantee extensive autonomy. In the introduction to 
Political Liberalism, Rawls presents the following dilemma, particular to Rawls relevant to both 
theorists: “The problem […] is to work out a political conception of political justice for a 
constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and 
nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand 
its virtues.”74  
Rawls argues, similar to Williams, that citizens in a constitutional democracy inhabit two 
worldviews, categorized as political and comprehensive. The comprehensive conception includes 
notions of “what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of 
friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our 
conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.”75 Religious and cultural doctrines vary in conceptual 
scope, but the comprehensive sphere encompasses what Rawls considers all nonpolitical values and 
virtues. Like Williams’ ‘garden of the church’, the realms of comprehensive doctrines are the messy 
venues of citizen development, where the deliberation can take place freely and growth takes on 
whatever form it requires, civil or otherwise.  
The political conception, on the other hand, aims at the much narrower scope of public-
political life. A political conception has justification by reference to one or more comprehensive 
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doctrines and is neither presented as, nor derived from, a doctrine applied to a basic structure of 
society. Rawls assumes that all citizens affirm a comprehensive doctrine to which the political 
conception they accept is somehow related. Still, “a distinguishing feature of a political conception is 
that it is presented as free-standing and expounded apart from, our without reference to, any such 
wider background.”76 The set of political values that comprise the political conception and to which 
citizens may appeal in the political realm are what Rawls considers a family of political conceptions 
of justice.  
The relationship between the nonpolitical comprehensive realm and the public-political 
realm is critical to Rawls’ theory of political liberalism. A set of political ideals, agreeable to all 
regardless of their comprehensive doctrine, must be used as the basis of the explanations that 
citizens offer one another in public discussion; they must be must reasonable and rational, and 
immediately related to matters of public concern. For Rawls, this political conception of justice is 
generated as a fair system of cooperation, one that offers citizens the actualization of freedom and 
liberty without fear of outside oppression or coercion. The reasons individuals offer in public must 
be agreed upon under conditions of pluralism, recognizing the likelihood of “persistent 
disagreement among citizens about basic matters of fundamental value.”77 Because of the unfamiliar, 
non-coercive and diverse relationships among citizens in a political structure, Rawls, like Williams, 
argues that it is iniquitous and impracticable to force a plurality of citizens to comply with any one 
particular comprehensive doctrine.  
Here, Rawls confronts a fundamental argument; similar to the challenges forwarded by John 
Cotton to Roger Williams. Cotton argued that a peaceful civil society ultimately fails without the 
common bond of a comprehensive doctrine to motivate a citizen-commitment to civility. Further, 
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he argued that being a good citizen is inseparable from having the right morality or religion, and 
citizens should not be required to share power with those with whom they do not share a common 
moral commitment. In a way, Cotton asks of liberalism: is a political realm built upon the 
universalizable doctrine of the ‘right’, strong enough to create a viable commitment to a common 
good?  
This challenge reveals an important point of divergence between Williams and Rawls. For 
Williams, the fundamental argument for equality derived from a theistic conviction that God created 
every human with a capacity for moral knowledge, allowing all citizens the capacity for civil 
behavior. Williams argued, “a Christian, a Captaine, Christian Merchant, Physician, Lawyer, Pilot, 
Father, Master and (so consequently) Magistrate, &c. is not more than a Captaine, Merchant, &c. of 
any other Conscience or Religion.”78 It is not a commitment to Christian faith that grants citizens 
the moral fortitude to act civilly, but the intrinsic capacity for civil knowledge, even in the absence of 
spirituality. Thus for Williams, granting citizens freedom of conscience is to honor the holy integrity 
of all persons, the diversity granted by God. It is possible that citizens could agree with Williams’ 
ideal of individual conscience without sharing his religious justification. However, if a citizen’s 
comprehensive doctrine contradicts Williams’ conception of justice, or if citizens do not agree that 
humans are capable of civil behavior without a commitment to a specific religion or ideology, 
Williams’ ideal of civil society falls into jeopardy.  
Rawls attempts to elude the pitfall of justifying equal treatment for all citizens through 
comprehensive doctrine, which he argues is illiberal in that it jeopardizes civil treatment for all 
citizens. According to Rawls, even iconic theorists such as Mill and Kant fail to avoid appealing to a 
comprehensive doctrine entirely. Both Kantian and Millsian theories of justice possess ideals about 
morality and the good life not necessarily shared by all persons. “Mill justifies the idea of toleration 
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by reference to the value of a life of continuing questioning and experimentation, and Kant by 
reference to the principle of acting only on principles that the individual has rationally chosen for 
himself.”79 Individuals and communities whose comprehensive doctrine embrace cultural and 
religious norms as epithets of a good life may find such justifications problematic and thus not 
supportable as a “basis of respect for mutual agreement on political values.”80 In order to do this, 
Rawls creates a liberal argument for justice and equality without roots in any one comprehensive 
doctrine in order to justify fair terms of cooperation. In Political Liberalism, Rawls introduces a 
narrowly structured theory of liberalism, which he argues “can be justified purely by reference to the 
internal moral characteristics of the basic structure, that is, the vast majority of citizens in a liberal 
society can affirm liberal political values by reference to certain basic moral features of liberal 
political institutions which do not belong to any particular comprehensive doctrine.”81  
Rawls argues that political liberalism, as a political conception of justice and equality, is 
narrow enough to be compatible with most reasonable comprehensive doctrines without relying on 
or adhering to any particular one, and therefore secure enough to ensure long-term political stability, 
even in a culture of shifting comprehensive doctrines and beliefs. Liberalism does not seek 
justification through consensus, but instead through common commitment. It is a political view that 
aims at being acceptable to all citizens who are reasonable and rational as well as free and equal and 
therefore it is not about coercion or persuasion. In fact, Rawls states, “If justice as fairness were not 
expressly designed to gain the reasoned support of citizens who affirm reasonable although 
conflicting comprehensive doctrines — the existence of such conflicting doctrines being a feature of 
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the kind of public culture that liberal conception itself encourages — it would not be liberal.”82 The 
political liberal model is not reasonable unless it is able to earn the support of citizens by addressing 
shared moral truths as situated within the comprehensive framework of all reasonable and rational 
doctrines.  
Thus, Rawls answers Cotton’s first challenge to Williams, how a political society can be 
constructed without the shared foundation of one comprehensive doctrine but applicable to most 
reasonable and rational doctrines, and further, how this is necessary to ensure justice and equality of 
all citizens in a liberal society. Cotton’s second challenge for Williams — why citizens should choose 
set aside the moral truths of their comprehensive doctrines for the sake of public deliberation and 
risk being led by those whose moral truths are misguided, or worse, morally deplorable — this is 
what Rawls calls the paradox of public reason. The resolution of the paradox is found in a common 
commitment to the ideal of liberal citizenship and, most importantly, a duty to respectful, civil 
behavior.  
Rawls begins Lecture VI, section 2 titled “The Idea of Public Reason” with an articulation of 
the paradox of public reason:  
[Citizens] ask: why should citizens in discussing and voting on the most fundamental 
political questions honor the limits of public reason? How can it be either reasonable 
or rational, when basic matters are at stake, for citizens to appeal only to a public 
conception of justice and not to the whole truth as they see it? Surely the most 
fundamental questions should be settled by appealing to the most important truths, 
yet these may far transcend public reason!83  
 
If left unresolved, the paradox of public reason undermines the liberal political project that 
Rawls seeks to construct. With the paradox in place, citizens “have no reason to refrain from 
appealing to the idiosyncrasies of their comprehensive doctrines when voting or deliberating on 
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public matters.84 For Rawls, this would be disastrous. This sentiment echoes Williams’ trepidation 
that without civil behavior as the primary foundation of a diverse public, the political sphere would 
devolve into power politics and civil unrest. Allowing the paradox of public reason to stand 
unaddressed presents citizens with an irreconcilable conflict between two values: first, a citizen’s 
“own attachment to some part of her comprehensive doctrine (or the whole of it) and the political 
conception’s values of liberalism that she sincerely affirms.”85  
More critically, allowing the paradox to stand unresolved could cause citizens to publically 
argue issues from within their comprehensive doctrines, eroding the cohesion created by an 
overlapping consensus, and jeopardizing stability. Rawls argues that a duty of civility saves citizens 
from the paradox of public reason. The duty of civility is “an overriding value which would decide, 
on universally acceptable grounds, the conflict between the two values of the citizen’s 
comprehensive doctrine and the political conception, and would provide a publicly recognizable 
moral standard that would serve the purpose of sustaining stability.”86 Therefore, a commitment to 
civility is critical to Rawls’ thesis. Without a duty to civility, citizens’ commitment to the liberal 
project could disintegrate along ideological and religious lines. Rawls argues that a commitment to 
the duty of civility through the ideal of citizenship can resolve the paradox of public reason and 
sustain the liberal political project.  
Therefore, Rawls’ argument for the success of political liberalism necessitates the duty of 
civility. Despite the central importance of civility to his liberal theory, Rawls’ discussion of civility is 
limited to one section of a chapter in Political Liberalism, where he confronts the paradox of public 
reason, resolves it quickly with a justification for the duty of civility through the ideal of citizenship, 
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and moves on. In an article titled “Rawls and the Duty of Civility,” philosopher Eric Brown creates 
a comprehensive argument for Rawls’ duty of civility and its integral role in political liberalism, and 
ultimately challenges Rawls’ contention that the duty of civility, as connected to the ideal of 
citizenship, can resolve the paradox of public reason. This, Brown argues, has potentially dire 
consequences both for public reason and civil engagement, and threatens the sustainability of 
political liberalism in its entirety.  
Brown outlines the scope of the argument for the duty of civility with five elements of 
political liberalism, and then constructs a fully considered, cohesive definition for civility as it relates 
to the liberal ideal of citizenship. The five elements are as follows: first is the ideal of citizenship. 
The liberal ideal of citizenship is inscribed to individuals who are reasonable and rational, have a 
sense of justice, the moral capacity for a conception of the common good, and who are “normal and 
cooperating members of society over a complete life.”87 Second, the duty of civility relates to context 
in which civility is exercised, namely a democratic framework in which citizens accept political 
power as always coercive and shared by citizens as a body; it is a context in which a common 
commitment to the democratic project is presupposed and where ideas of emigration and secession 
are eliminated.88 The third is the liberal principle of legitimacy, or the notion that “political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to 
them as reasonable and rational.”89  
The fourth element is the relationship between the reasonable and the principle of legitimacy 
in a democratic society. Political power must be restricted by a reasonable constitution that 
                                                 
87
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 81.  
 
88
 Brown, “Duty of Civility,” 6. Also, see Rawls, Political Liberalism, 216.  
 
89
 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 217.  
  
55
incorporates liberal principles such as freedom of conscience. Liberalism therefore relies on ideals of 
reason, including the criterion of reciprocity, which argues that political power is proper only when 
citizens offer reasons for political action that can be accepted by all. In other words, political 
legitimacy relies on citizens’ commitment to the ideal of citizenship including the desire to be 
reasonable. The last element is the duty of civility itself, which includes “a willingness to listen to 
others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be 
made.”90 
Brown uses these five elements to argue for Rawls’ duty of civility, which works summarily 
as follows: the ideal of citizenship is the reason for citizens to desire to and make an effort to be 
reasonable and rational. Rawls considers it an ideal for two reasons, first, because it is admired for its 
excellence and inspires citizens to achieve its qualities in such a way that it is preferred over other 
wants and desires; this is what Brown calls an ‘attractive ideal’. Second, since citizenship as an ideal is 
the best possible scenario, above all other possibilities, it has legitimate claim to be more like itself. 
Citizens act on the reasons of an ideal of citizenship under the constraints of a liberal democratic 
framework, in which citizens are committed to the democratic process. Power is regulated by the 
principle of legitimacy and is only proper when citizens are treated equally. Further, it is compatible 
with liberal values as specified by the criterion of reciprocity, as the exercise of power occurs via 
public discussion and voting on the part of public officials and citizens, respectively. The basis of 
public reason is related to the criterion of reciprocity, therefore citizens act on reasons provided by 
the ideal of citizenship in public discussion and vote by appealing to the liberal values in public. In 
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order to do so, citizens must comply with the duty of civility and explain to others how the policies 
for which they advocate can be supported by public reason.91  
From Brown’s explanation, the burden for Rawls’ duty of civility rests upon the principle of 
legitimacy and the ideal of citizenship. The principle of legitimacy serves as a template for Rawls 
drawing the limits of public reason, and he relies on the duty of civility even more so.92 In order for 
the duty of civility to succeed, the ideal of citizenship must be more attractive to citizens than the 
other ideals to which a citizen may be obligated, such as private moral or religious ideals; in a 
normative sense, it must prove itself as an ideal to which citizens are always obligated, in some way, 
to live up to above all others. If the ideal of citizenship cannot achieve one of these requirements, 
then Rawls’ argument ultimately fails. As Brown states, “This is so because Rawls claims to have 
shown that there is a duty of civility — an unconditional obligation. If the ideal is not necessarily 
overridingly attractive to a citizen, then the duties that are associated with that ideal do not apply to 
that citizen any more than the duties of a NASCAR pit crew member apply to a brain surgeon who 
is not attracted to autoracing.”93  
If the ideal of citizenship is not sufficiently compelling, then the parameters upon which the 
principle of legitimacy is founded are also undermined. Thus, the ideal of citizenship must provide 
an overriding reason for citizens to commit to a duty of civility, to compel citizens to abide by the 
parameters of public reason. Public reason ascribes values like equal opportunity, social equality and 
liberal guidelines for public inquiry, reasonableness and a readiness to honor the duty of civility. If 
an ideal of citizenship is undermined, then citizens have no motive to follow limits of public reason, 
and the liberal legitimacy of political power is compromised.  
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Brown recognizes two qualifications to the limits of public reason as they pertain to the duty 
of civility. The first is an allowance for what Rawls calls an ‘inclusive view’ on the limit of public 
reason. An ‘exclusive view’ is consistent with extrapolating the political from comprehensive 
worldviews in the public realm, however, Rawls concedes that an idea of an ‘inclusive view’ is a 
more reasonable approach to a diverse and unconstrained ideal of public reason. An inclusive view 
allows citizens “in certain situations, to present what they regard as the basis of political values 
rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of 
public reason itself.”94 Rawls argues that the inclusive view is suitable for liberal democracy, since 
under different political and social conditions with different doctrines and practice, the ideal of 
public reason will be advanced in different ways. An inclusive view allows for greater flexibility and 
variation, and can better achieve the ideal of public reason.95 Brown proposes that this allowance is 
not so much a qualification of the duty of civility but “rather the idea that we can violate an 
obligation (the duty of civility) for the sake of furthering some set of values and norms that includes, 
supports, or enjoins fulfillment of the obligation itself.”96 The inclusive view, therefore, does not 
reinforce Rawls’ argument for public reason but suggests a weak point in the ideal.  
The second qualification is that Rawls argues that much of what is commonly considered 
political discussion is not political per se, but important to the nonpublic-political realm or what he 
calls the “background culture” of civil society including church communities, associations, 
universities, professional societies, clubs and teams. Political discussion that occurs in the 
background culture remains outside the boundaries of the duty of civil discourse, allowing for 
citizens opinions and ideals to be formed and challenged in constructive ways. In the political realm, 
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citizens may introduce the content of background culture in a public deliberation as long as they are 
“ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each could reasonable expect that 
others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.”97 Rawls argues that the ideals of 
public reason need not be isolated from comprehensive doctrines, but that the very principles that 
comprise a civil society are so fundamental, and so narrow in scope, as to be agreeable to citizens 
without specific reference to one doctrine or belief. This is similar to Williams understanding that 
citizens can share principles of freedom and equality in a way that is relevant for politics, while not 
necessarily sharing life’s ultimate meaning. However, for Rawls this exception still does not allow 
citizens to argue from the vantage point of their comprehensive doctrine, and therefore, even with 
the allowed qualifications, a duty of civility is still necessary to uphold the principle of public reason 
and the legitimacy of liberal democratic structures. How to compel citizens to aspire to the ideal of 
citizenship and the duty of civility is left unanswered.  
Ultimately, Rawls relies on the moral motivation of the ideal citizen to resolve the paradox 
of public reason. Rawls addresses the moral psychology of citizens in a section of Political Liberalism 
titled “The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation”. The moral psychology Rawls speaks of is 
philosophical, not psychological; it is drawn not from the “science of human nature but from a 
scheme of concepts and principles for expressing a certain political conception of the person and an 
ideal of citizenship.”98 The relationship between the moral psychology of the citizen and the ideal of 
citizenship is fundamental to Rawls’ argument for duty of civility, and ultimately vitiates his ability to 
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resolve the paradox of public reason; this jeopardizes the very foundation of a liberal political 
project.99  
Concerning the moral sensibility of the reasonable and rational citizen, Rawls argues that 
there are three kinds of desires that inform an ideal of citizen. First are object-dependent desires, 
which are objects of desire or affairs that can be described without moral conceptions, reason, or 
rational principles. Most desires are object-dependent: for example, the desire for food, drink and 
sleep, as well as social desires such as aspirations for status, property, power and wealth and 
affections, loyalties and devotion of all kinds. Second are principle-dependent desires. The difference 
between object and principle desires “is that the object or aim of the desire, or the activity in which 
we desire to engage, cannot be described without using the principles, rational or reasonable as the 
case may be, that enter into specifying that activity.”100 Only those who can understand and apply 
reason have the capacity for principle-dependent desires. Rational desires include the desire to adopt 
the most effective means to ends, and to select the best option, all things considered. Rational 
principles guide citizens in a single rational deliberation. Reasonable principles include how a 
plurality of citizens conducts themselves in relationship with each other. This includes principles of 
justice and fairness, as well as principles associated with moral virtues such as common sense, 
truthfulness and fidelity.101 
 The most important desires to liberalism are the third-tier desires, or conception-dependent 
desires. These desires “can be described by saying that the principles we desire to act from are seen 
as belonging to, and as helping to articulate, a certain rational or reasonable conception or a political 
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ideal.”102 Conception-dependent desires rely on an ordering of principle-dependent desires, and thus 
they have priority over principle-dependent in that citizens form principle-dependent desires and 
then act upon them with consideration of a greater conceptual context. If citizens desire to conduct 
themselves in the manner of persons who are reasonable and rational, they will first act from a set of 
principle-dependent desires and not simply from object-dependent desires, which are habitual and 
customary. Further, they will form a corresponding conception of actions and consider how to order 
their principle-dependent desires in such a way as to conduct allow them to be a reasonable, rational 
citizen. Rawls states: 
When we say […] that not only are citizens normal and fully cooperating members 
of society, but further they want to be, and to be recognized as, such members, we 
are saying that they want to realize in their person, and have it recognized that they 
can realize, the idea of citizens.103  
 
Citizens with ‘good moral will’ are able to order her principle- and conception-dependent 
desires in accordance with the force of the principles to which they are attached. The hierarchical 
categorization of desires is dependent upon an antecedent hierarchical categorization of the 
principled reasons.104 Principled desires are not ordered by what is most convenient or more 
rewarding but by what is most appropriate, and the weight of principle- and conception-dependent 
desires is attributed entirely to the force of the principle to which the desire is attached and not to 
the psychological strength of the desire itself. Therefore, in the case of the ideal of citizenship, 
citizens will order their principle-dependent desires in order to be recognized as good citizens and to 
be viewed as rational and reasonable. Not only does the ideal of citizenship hold normative weight 
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above lesser desires, but the psychological strength of the desire to be a good citizen should 
outweigh all lower desires, including private, religious and object-dependent desires.105  
An attractive ideal of citizenship encourages citizens to satisfy the ideal of citizenship, to 
engage in a political relationship with others. Compelled by the duty of civility, the ideal citizen is 
motivated by the ideal of citizenship and orders her principles in accordance with the concept of a 
liberal democracy. Citizens will uphold the principles of public reason and present their principles in 
a way that treats others as free and equal, as long as they are assured that others will do the same. A 
group of ideal citizens will work cooperatively to share in equal power in a liberal democracy, which 
itself reinforces the principle of legitimacy. Ideal citizens understand that “trying to meet [the] 
condition of [public reason] is one of the tasks that this ideal of democratic politics asks of us. 
Understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen includes understanding an ideal of 
public reason.” 106  
The ‘attractive’ ideal of citizenship, then, is an idealization. In reality, not all citizens in liberal 
society find the ideal of citizenship important enough to give its corresponding principles, including 
reasonableness and fair-mindedness, overriding weight above all matters of private concern. To 
uphold the attractive ideal of citizenship, citizens must uphold conception-dependent principles 
above the individual principle-dependent desires of faith and religion, and the object-dependent 
desires of money, property and power. This seems unrealistic—and current front-page news stories 
suggest that it is. It also seems overly demanding of a liberal theory to assume that a singular ideal of 
citizenship must include strong self-referential motivation to fulfill an ‘attractive ideal’ of citizenship.  
Rawls has two counterarguments against this claim. First, similar to Williams, Rawls asserts 
that the political values that exist in the public sphere are “very great values and not easily 
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overridden and the ideal they express are not to be lightly abandoned.”107 The ideal of citizenship 
should be attractive to citizens, in part because of the limit of its scope; it is supposed to be a 
minimal set of agreed upon values, applicable to all reasonable doctrines. Because of the 
fundamental nature of the values exercised in the public sphere, citizens are not asked to give up 
their comprehensive doctrines entirely in the public sphere, but remain partially situated within them 
while fulfilling requirements of public reason in deliberation and dialogue. As Rawls states,  
Citizens affirm the ideal of public reason, not as a result of political compromise, as in 
a modus vivendi, but from within their own reasonable doctrines…Political liberalism 
relies on the conjecture that the basic rights and duties and values in question have 
sufficient weight so that the limits of public reason are justified by the overall 
assessments of reasonable comprehensive doctrines once those doctrines have 
adapted to the conception of justice itself.108  
 
To resolve the paradox of public reason, Rawls argues that liberalism asks only that citizens provide 
answers for questions so fundamental to the idea of justice and equality as to be reasonably 
extrapolated from all comprehensive doctrines. However, the moral psychology of ideal citizenship 
requires citizens to privately order their conception-dependent desires into rights and duties 
necessary to the ideal of liberalism, making them universalizable. Thus, the ideal of citizenship 
requires more of citizens than simply the extrication of basic rights and duties from their 
comprehensive roots but asks citizens to first choose which rights and duties should be included in 
public reason and which ideals must remain in the nonpolitical realm of comprehensive doctrines. 
Citizens who want to argue first from within their comprehensive doctrines in order to decide what 
rights and duties will be universalizable are no following the ideal of citizenship and do not uphold 
Rawls’ duty of civility.  
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Importantly, the second argument proclaims that citizens, who do not embrace the 
‘attractive’ ideal of citizenship and do not follow the ideal of public reason, must not understand 
what it means to be a citizen, “and therefore do not understand that their status as a citizen… 
commits them to the ideal of citizenship.”109 The ideal of citizenship could be an obligation of 
citizenship if it had a normative claim — if it could be argued as the best possible solution to the 
paradox of public reason, it could be understood as the normative ideal of citizenship, one that 
citizens, as such, would be compelled to follow. Brown argues that a normative argument for an ideal 
of citizenship is also an idealization, not of the moral psychology of citizens as is the attractive ideal, 
but of the social conditions fostered by the moral psychology of ideal citizens. Under ideal 
circumstances, the ideal of citizenship would inspire a political-public in which individuals were 
reasonable and rational and in which a sense of justice cultivated a robust conception of a common 
good built from the equal treatment of all citizens. 
This is far from the social conditions of our political public. Instead, the modern democratic 
reality of the United States is an amalgamation of citizen participation in accordance with, and in 
direct violation of, the ideal of public reason. This stresses a further weakness in Rawls’ duty of 
civility. The ideal of pubic reason itself presupposes the criterion of reciprocity, by which citizens are 
expected to be reasonable only when they believe that others will do the same. The criterion of 
reciprocity is what Brown calls an essential reference to actual social conditions that make the 
elevation of reasonableness and the normative ideal of citizenship binding only under the idealized 
social condition in which the principle of reciprocity is widely acknowledged. Under realistic social 
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conditions, the principle of reciprocity is in effect much more a principle of impartial altruism — a 
principle to which Rawls himself does not think citizens should be held.110 
There is a critical distinction in political liberal theory between altruism and reciprocity. 
While the practice of selfless concern for others may play an important role in comprehensive 
religious and ideological doctrines, it is categorically antithetical to liberal theory to support a notion 
of altruism at the risk of subjugation or disrespect. Liberalism cannot ask citizens to suffer the risk 
of incivility and exploitation, even for a principle as great as such as civil peace. Brown explains: 
Only if we idealize our social conditions and assume a false predicate of society —
that the principle of reciprocity is widely acknowledged —do the principle of 
reciprocity and the normative ideal of citizenship hold. But under realistic conditions, 
I would risk becoming the victim of other people’s assertion of their comprehensive 
doctrines in public discussion. For some this may be a reason to not aim at the ideal 
of citizenship. For others, it may be a reason to act on a rather different conception 
of citizenship, or simply in their own rational self interest.111 
 
Citizens may only be expected to uphold the criterion of reciprocity — to propose fair and 
reasonable terms and uphold liberal values — when others can reasonably be expected to do the 
same. The catch lies in the fact that, as Brown aptly argues, the discussion of and agreement upon 
fair terms precludes cooperative action. If citizens cannot be trusted to act reasonably and on fair 
terms, this undermines any reason for offering and discussing fair terms of social cooperation.112 
Therefore, a normative ideal of citizenship based on reasonableness and reciprocity cannot be an 
unconditional or overriding reason in a hierarchy of reasons for citizens. This undermines the 
argument for a normative claim on an ideal of citizenship. 
In the introduction to the section of Political Liberalism, “Public Reason and the Ideal of 
Citizenship,” Rawls asks the following questions: when may citizens exercise coercive political 
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power over one another when fundamental questions are at stake? Under which principles and ideals 
must we exercise such power in order make our actions justifiable to others as free and equal? To 
which political liberalism replies: political power is proper and justifiable only when it is exercised in 
accordance with a constitution, the essentials of which are accepted by all citizens as rational and 
reasonable. Since the exercise of political power must be legitimate, the ideal of citizenship imposes 
a moral duty of civility on all citizens to respect one another by explaining how the principles they 
advocate and vote for can be supported by the values of public reason.113 
In a liberal democracy, citizens may ideally accept the basic constitutional principles of 
liberty and equality as a basic political structure. However, not all citizens strive for or achieve the 
ideal of citizenship. There are times when there will be “conflicts of value encountered in the 
practical reasoning of citizens between the demands of reasonableness, which are in some non-
overriding form often acknowledged by citizens, and other values unique to the citizen’s 
comprehensive doctrine.”114 In reality, citizens may choose their comprehensive doctrine over the 
value of public reason. In this case, if the duty of civility is offered as the only possibility for rational 
resolution of such conflicts, then the conflicts become rationally unviable and the duty of civility is 
broken.  
4.3 THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILED DUTY OF CIVILITY  
Because of the failure to resolve the duty of civility within his own theory, Rawlsian 
liberalism as it stands may not be the paramount theory of liberalism in the modern democratic 
United States. Still, Rawls provides the best insight into current tensions between liberalism and civil 
behavior. While little conversation is dedicated to the risks associated with the failure to engender 
greater civility in citizens, the consequences of such a failure are calamitous. Without a commitment 
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to civil behavior, citizens are indifferent to the idea of engaging others in rational political discourse, 
the criterion of reciprocity is violated, political power is illegitimated and the liberal political project 
is undermined.  
Rawls seeks to create a political theory justified purely by reference to the internal moral 
characteristics of the basic structure so that a society of diverse citizens can affirm liberal political 
values without reference to one particular doctrine. Rawls does not root the duty of civility in 
religious belief, as does Williams, or in natural law, as does as Kant, but uses liberalism itself to argue 
for the duty of civility. In order to maximize their freedom and independence, citizens must commit 
to the ideal of citizenship to ensure that public reason will be upheld and power is legitimated. Thus, 
as citizens we must comply with the duty of civility to fulfill the purpose of liberalism, which is the 
maximization of individual freedom and liberty.  
Absent from Rawls’ attempt to resolve the paradox of public reason is an understanding of 
the reason for civility itself, including a consideration of the consequences of compromised or broken 
civil engagement. In Rawlsian liberalism, any citizen unmotivated by the ideal of citizenship is 
unbound by the duty of civility, and as a result, citizens who strive for the ideal of citizenship are 
confronted by those who chose not to abide by the principles of public reason, nullifying the 
criterion of reciprocity and the duty of civility. Committing the duty of civility to the self-referential 
ideal of citizenship undervalues the importance of a common commitment to civil behavior for the 
preservation of the liberal ideals of freedom and equality of all citizens, and endangers the project of 
liberalism itself. Rawls at once overvalues individual commitment to civility and underestimates the 
role civility must play in maintaining the principle values of liberal democracy, including freedom 
and equality. 
As a consequence, citizens in the United States want to argue that civility is essential to the 
democratic project without full understanding or agreement about what civility means and how it 
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must be protected. As exemplified in the previous chapter, the notion of civility is most often 
considered and used as a vehicle for citizens to articulate the difficulties of living in a diverse and 
competitive political structure, and as an explanation for how a citizenry with such vast allowances 
for liberty and freedom can or cannot exist without a commitment to one unified moral or religious 
project. Citizens criticize one another for a lack of civil behavior, and thus may feel justified in their 
subsequent lack of civil conduct since, as Rawls contends, civility in the absence of civility is 
altruism. Civility is discussed as a set of uncertain, dynamic ideals, and yet there is constant criticism 
that civility is diminished, lost or destroyed. This is where an ideal of civility as respect for others 
and respect for oneself may be too broad without a greater context; in the context of the current 
political climate, respecting others may too-often be rightly considered an act of self-sacrifice.  
Rawlsian liberalism leaves citizens without a road map for civility in liberalism and without a 
way of engaging in a constructive dialogue about what it means to respect individual liberty and to 
construct a collective common good in a diverse citizenry. According to Rawls, citizens are 
supposed to be self-motivated to be respectful to others with whom, in certain circumstances, they 
share little more in common than a set of laws and a physical border. Civility without greater context 
means that citizens are asked to strive for an ideal of citizenship without the greater understanding 
that a duty to civility ensures citizens the very freedom that enables them to make such a choice.  
Critics of liberalism are therefore quick to condemn the liberal democratic project for 
overvaluing the individual at the expense of community. Rawlsian liberalism, in particular, has 
received increasing attention from critics, as it has become what Michael Sandel calls “the theory 
most thoroughly embedded in the practices and institutions most central to our [modern] public 
life.”115 Critics of Rawlsian liberalism claim that it is not the failure of liberal theory to compel 
                                                 
115





citizens to the duty of civility, but it is the very expectation that citizens are able, and will ultimately 
decide to put the right prior to the good that is fallacious. A brief survey of communitarian criticism 
of liberalism in Chapter Four will argue that the priority of individual freedom at the expense of the 
greater good has led to a particular crisis in civility, and conclusively, how the alternative of collective 
common good is not the appropriate resolution. Ultimately, integrating Williams’ understanding of 
civility in a modern Rawlsian liberal democratic structure, closest to current theories of deliberative 
democracy, will create strongest a sense of community and common good among individuals, as it is 
the best insurance that individual freedom and liberty will not be compromised for the sake of the 








CHAPTER 5: THE CRITICS OF LIBERAL CIVILITY 
 
“Political community is more than an association for residence on a common site, or for the sake of 
preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange. The end and purpose of the polis is the good life, 
and the institutions of social life are means to that end.” 
- Aristotle, from Justice: A Reader, by Michael Sandel 
 
5.1 THE NEW CRITICS OF LIBERALISM 
In the essay “Is There a Common American Culture?,” philosopher Robert Bellah proclaims 
Williams’ Rhode Island the birthplace of American individualism and that the religious toleration, 
found in the groundwork of American democracy, led to modern obsessions with individual 
prosperity, material excesses and a depleted sense of the common good in the United States. Bellah 
argues that any political theory with a primary commitment to individual freedom and liberty 
precludes interdependence and commonality and jettisons the possibility for a guiding spirit of civil 
behavior between citizens. Primacy of individualism erodes a sense of a common political will and 
the hope of a shared civil project. Bellah considers the consequences of Williams’ Rhode Island:  
[Williams’] inattention to public identity and solidarity created a void in [his] own 
colony to which economic individualism quickly filled, establishing a marriage 
between moral and economic atomism that threatened Rhode Island’s political 
stability and ever since has eroded appreciation for collective destiny and 
interdependence in American Society…Rhode Island under Williams gives us an 
early and local example of what happens when the sacredness of the individual is not 
balanced by any sense of the whole or concern for the common good.116 
 
As outlined above, the accusation that individualism is to blame for the mangled ideal of a 
collective good is a common refrain among critics of modern liberalism. Bellah considers Williams’ 
ideal of toleration as the chasm in modern political thought that eventually degenerated the entire 
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democratic political project. In particular, Williams’ commitment to toleration elicited two effects 
that coxswained American democracy toward its current state of incivility: first, prioritizing the 
rights of individuals allows personal conviction and individual conscience to trump standards 
relative to which even long-established practices can be overturned.117 This overinflates the value of 
the individual at the risk the greater good by altering social norms and cultural practices without 
consideration for the society that such standards protect and secure. Second, as citizens are drawn to 
value individualism over the common good, commitment to the commonweal is supplanted by a 
devotion to individual prosperity and its promise of individual happiness. In particular, the 
competitive nature of the modern free-market economy creates disharmony, perpetuates false ideals 
of individualism and arouses adversarial attitudes toward fellow citizens. Common culture becomes 
a baseless proposition as conceptions of wealth and wellbeing are increasingly perceived not as 
communal but individual. As a consequence, state regulation is increasingly needed to referee 
between adversarial and competitive entities. Echoing the earlier concerns of Hegel, Bellah argues 
that the priority of individualism in modern liberal society, inspired by Williams and proliferated 
through liberalism, produced a nation of reluctantly cooperative adversaries, civil only for the benefit 
of self-interest and absent of any commitment to the greater good of society as a place of common 
life. Society built primarily upon an ideal of individual liberties is destined to descend into 
antagonism and individually-motivated competition.  
The reinvigoration of a shared sense of common good must therefore be generated from a 
core commitment to religious and civic institutions. For Bellah, this is the greatest chance the United 
States has to revitalize a notion of civility, respect and a shared commonality. To answer his title 
question, “is there a common American culture?” Bellah argues that the reinvigoration civic and 
religious institutions, which are structures of shared community and a commitment to others, must 





take charge of cultural commonality. Such venues represent the intersections of community in 
American culture, and must be strengthened and expanded. Otherwise, Bellah predicts, radical 
individualism as represented by fracturing civic and religious institutions, will usurp any potential for 
a shared American culture. The United States will lose the last scraps of cultural connectivity and any 
chance at a revitalized common culture.  
Bellah’s argument condemning Williams as the early architect of a democratic shift from an 
ideal of citizenship for the good of the republic to a state responsible for protecting the individual 
rights of citizens is both a poor representation of Williams’ theory of individual liberty and an 
unfortunate overvaluation of the role of the Rhode Island colony in the future of American political 
thought. However, it represents a view that in different ways has found affirmation and support in 
the work of influential communitarian, republican or other critiques of liberalism. Before 
considering the elements of an account of liberal civility, it seems important to first give such 
criticisms proper consideration. To do so, I will examine three versions of the critique of a liberal 
approach to civility: the communitarian views of Michael Sandel, the theory of participatory 
democracy of Benjamin Barber, and the multicultural theory of a civil society associated with Iris 
Young. In proceeding in this way, I wish to do more than review each of the three positions. I plan 
to use the positions of the latter two thinkers to forward serious criticism of the first; their proposed 
alternatives underscore the weaknesses of liberalism with regard to civility, and ultimately reveal how 
Rawlsian liberalism must turn to the theories of Roger Williams order to create a notion of liberalism 
that will allow civility to exist while upholding the tenets of individual liberty and freedom so central 
to modern democratic ideals. Only here is Williams’ theory fairly recognized; contrary to Bellah’s 
argument, it was not the theories of Williams that introduced liberal ideals into American 
democracy, but those of the Enlightenment, which share ideological ties to Williams but produced 
distinct consequences for the future of American democracy.  
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Through Enlightenment thinkers such as John Locke, ideals of individual liberty and 
freedom proliferated through early American political theory. The Lockean ideal that "no one ought 
to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions,” was so fundamental to early American 
democratic thought that a derivative of this principle is offered in the first lines of the Declaration of 
Independence.118 This was not due to the direct propagation of Williams’ theories, however his 
advocacy for religious toleration and individual freedom has made him a favored target for modern 
critics of liberalism generally, and particularly those who find the separation of religion from civil 
institutions to be detrimental to the greater ideal of civil behavior and a shared common good.  
5.2 THE LIBERALISM-COMMUNITARIANISM DEBATE 
Bellah’s analysis of Williams’ influence on the role of individualism in modern liberal society, 
while misrepresented, reveals important insight into modern criticisms of liberalism. In particular, 
Bellah represents a movement in modern political thought that philosopher Amy Gutmann calls the 
“revival of communitarian criticism of liberal political theory”. This revival confronts issues of 
individualism with arguments distinct from earlier communitarian critiques. According to Gutmann, 
the first communitarian critics of modern liberalism, originating in the 1960’s and inspired by the 
radical Marxist critiques of individualism and statehood, argued for collective property ownership 
and equal political power. Early critics condemned patriotism as “an irrational sentiment that stood 
in the way of world peace” and “defended deviations of moral majoritarian morality in the name of 
nonrepression”.119 Such philosophical ideals reflected the sociopolitics of the sixties and included the 
philosophical views of Hume as well as Marx, specifically the notion that human beings necessarily 
must exist as a community. Embedded in these early ideals was an understanding that life is only 
made possible through the mutual dependence of social and economic relationships, despite the fact 
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that such relationships are rarely acknowledged in modern society. Marx claimed that any illusion of 
citizenship through state power or religion is capable of transcendence only when a genuine 
community of social and economic equals is created.120 Early communitarians challenged the role of 
the individual in liberalism for its failure to recognize the consequences of the loss of collective 
common ideals such as shared property rights and political power, for leaving “no other nexus 
between man and man than naked self interest”.121 Likewise, they condemned modern divisions of 
civil and political spheres for allowing the political to interfere with the civil realm through false 
competition, damaging social convention and social and economic repression.  
The second wave of communitarian critics emerged in the 1980s and culminated into a 
movement in the early nineties, producing an assortment of social and political organizations still 
active today.122 New communitarian critics are not galvanized by Marx, but reference the earlier 
theories of Aristotle and Hegel. As Gutmann explains, “whereas the good society of old critics was 
one of collective property ownership and equal political power, the good society of the new critics is 
one of settled traditions and established identities.”123 Ideals reviled by 1960’s communitarians, such 
as traditional family values, patriotism and moral majoritarianism, are now defended by a new 
generation of communitarians as integral to the recovery of civic engagement and civil society.  
The implication of communitarian critiques on the liberal subject is of particular importance. 
Specifically, the new critics of liberalism recognize that the Hobbesian notion of the natural state of 
life for man as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short is no longer the primary focus of liberal 
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theory. Instead, “the new critics recognize that Rawls’ work has altered the premises and principles 
of contemporary liberal theory. Contemporary liberals [no longer] assume that people are possessive 
individualists; the source of their individualism lies at a deeper more metaphysical level.”124 This new 
notion of individualism is what theorists such as Edward Shils has argued is the lasting hallmark of 
the Enlightenment Period, an ideal intended to free the individual “from the obligation of 
unquestioning obedience and of a self-derogatory deference to its his betters… to make the human 
being into a personality, into a ‘true individuality’” - what Shils calls the elevation of the subject into 
a citizen.125 Motivated by liberal ideals of human autonomy, new critics argue that the slow 
extrication of the citizen and civil realm from under the auspices of the political, as first observed by 
Tocqueville and Tönnies among others, eventually gave way to modern era of Rawlsian liberalism 
that has flourished in democratic theory since the later half of the twentieth century.  
Of the many faults in the foundation of modern liberalism, it is the construction of the 
liberal notion of the self, the ‘true individuality’ of personhood, that is the most calamitous to 
notions of civility, citizenship and a shared common good for modern communitarians and civil 
republicans. Arguments forwarded by critics of liberalism, and their subsequent quests to reinstate 
certain republican ideals of citizenship and collective common good, contain important implications 
for discussions about the current state of civility in modern democracy. New communitarian critics 
contend that the relationship of the liberal subject to modern conceptions of justice has forced what 
Shils calls “substantive civility” out of the political realm: in order to preserve the ‘true individuality 
of personhood’ for all citizens, substantive civility has been detached from the political sphere, and 
citizens are now asked to uphold ideals of individual freedom without publically engaging in 
conversation about the principles, liberties and rights worthy of preservation. Such critics argue that 
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the Rawlsian construction of the citizen as subject relegated necessary political conversations about 
the good life to the private realms of religious and associative communities. Substantive civility for 
Shils and his fellow critics is about more than just the preservation of individual liberty; it is about 
introducing conversations about citizenship, community and the common good back into the realm 
of the political in order to create a citizenry committed to the levels of civic engagement and civil 
behavior that liberty itself requires. For the critics, then, it is liberalism’s commitment to the ‘true 
individuality of personhood’ that undermined the entire liberal civil project.  
This is a particularly attractive argument for a citizenry preoccupied with dismal state of 
civility in modern democracy. But what does this mean for modern liberalism? Constructive 
responses to Sandel and Bellah reveal that an attempted communitarian resolution for the civil crisis 
in America fails to appropriately undermine the liberal political project. More importantly, Sandel 
and Barber both argue for a type of participatory civil engagement that may threaten the rights of 
individuals that democracy so carefully seeks to defend. Still, Gutmann and Young recognize that 
these critics reveal important shortcomings within modern liberal theory, inadequacies that must be 
appropriately addressed in order to repair civility in modern democracy. Taking such criticism 
seriously, the potential for Williams’ understanding of civil liberalism to inform a more constructive 
modern relationship between civility, citizenship, and the liberal state must be considered. In fact, a 
synthesis of Williams and Rawlsian liberalism may be the best way to create greater levels civility 
within liberal democracy; such an amalgamation would share important and interesting ties with 
deliberative democracy. First it is imperative to understand what Gutmann calls the deeper, more 
metaphysical conception of the individual as proliferated by Rawlsian liberalism, and the 
consequences that such ideal has had on modern conceptions of civility. This is where Michael 
Sandel’s criticism of Rawls begins.  
5.3 SANDEL AND THE QUANDARY OF TRANSCENDENTALISM 
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At the center of modern liberalism, Sandel argues, is the notion of the right over the good. 
This ideal argues that a just society must not seek to promote any one particular conception of the 
good but must enable citizens to pursue their own conception of the good, consistent with a similar 
liberty for all. To do this, the regulative principles of liberalism are built on a concept of justice that 
does not intend to “maximize general welfare, or cultivate virtue, or otherwise promote the common 
good, but rather […] conform to the concept of the right, a moral category given prior to the good, 
and independent of it.”126 In other words, what comprises a just liberal society is not the purpose or 
ends for which it aims, but its agnosticism regarding any particular set of shared ends. This allows, 
“in its constitution and its laws… a framework within which its citizens can pursue their own values 
and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others.”127 
Such an understanding of justice departs from the earlier political ideals, which argued for a 
particular conception of human purposes and ends. Enlightenment thinkers, including John Locke 
and Thomas Hobbes championed a new ideal of political sovereignty as freedom from harm in life, 
health, liberty, and possessions.128 This shifted political theory away from the republican ideal of the 
state as the site of human flourishing and closer to an ideal of the state as the executor of individual 
liberty. A reconceptualization of individualism by German idealist Immanuel Kant shifted this ideal 
further. Kant’s late eighteenth century philosophical works influenced notions of individual liberty in 
political theory and radically changed the liberal conversation, most notably through the ideals found 
in the 1971 publication of John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.  
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls bases his argument for the conception individual freedom upon 
the Kantian notion of the self as an inviolable being, prior to and independent of the elements that 
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situate one in the world. Kant’s notion of the self allowed Rawls to argue that individuals are free 
moral agents, subjects above ideology, situation, position and relationships. This understanding of 
the self replaces the conception of the individual as a collection of ends to an end in itself, and gives 
an individual the power to choose for him or herself the ends worth pursuing and the desires worth 
having. The central notion for Kant is autonomous self-legislation, where freedom is understood in 
opposition to heteronomy. Freedom for the transcendental self is integration into the world in a way 
that “enables the individual to participate in an ideal, unconditioned realm, wholly independent of 
[…] social and psychological inclinations.”129  
While Kant’s ideal of the self formed a foundational conception upon which to build his 
theory of justice, Rawls argues that traditional transcendentalism itself had theoretical limits in 
modern political theory. Rawls’ greatest concern is that transcendentalism fails to free itself from the 
moral contingencies it rejects, as Kant’s principles of justice are themselves founded by “acting only 
on principles that the individual has rationally chosen for himself.” 130 For Rawls, Kantian 
metaphysics cedes too much to the transcendental understanding of self, making justice primary 
only by denying the human situation. Instead, Rawls seeks to create “a viable Kantian conception” 
of justice, where “the force and content of Kant’s doctrine [is] detached from its background in 
transcendental idealism and recast within the canons of reasonable empiricism.”131 Rawlsian 
liberalism seeks to place the core of Kant’s moral and political theory within modern democracy and 
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to replace the “Germanic obscurities with a domesticated metaphysic more congenial to the Anglo-
American temper.”132  
The result is Rawls’ theory of liberalism as described above, where justice is the first virtue of 
social institutions, and where the principles used to govern are derived from the original position, a 
political vision that “tries to provide what Kant’s transcendental argument cannot — a foundation 
for the right that is prior to the good but still situated in the world.”133 In order to construct a theory 
for justice that does not presuppose any particular ends, the original position asks citizens to imagine 
the principles they would choose if they did not already know their status in the world, and to 
govern with such principles, separate from one’s own circumstances and so thin as to be agreeable 
to all reasonable and rational citizens. “By requiring us to abstract from our particular but not our 
shared interests, the original position with its ‘veil of ignorance’ and ‘thin theory of the good’ avoids 
reliance on both existing preferences and a priori considerations in reasoning about justice.”134 If 
successful, such principles do not presuppose any particular ends, but allow citizens to choose the 
ends they believe best. For Rawls, understanding citizenship as separate from one’s constitutive 
identity is intended to be used as a hypothetical device to spell out basic principles, or what Rawls 
considers the basic structure, of a democratic society. However, Sandel argues that a political 
structure that allows citizens to choose their own ends and desires with similar freedom for all has 
become the ultimate promise of the liberal ideal.  
Rawls recognizes that a political public without a common commitment to a good or a set of 
goods must commit citizens to each other through different means. Rawls argues, “among 
individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice establishes the bonds of 
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civic friendship; the general desire for justice limits the pursuit of other ends. One may think of a 
public conception of justice as constituting the fundamental charter of a well ordered human 
association.”135 The notion of civic friendship for liberalism, then, is a common commitment to 
Rawls’ two principles of justice: the first principle of basic equal liberties for all citizens, and the 
second principle, called the difference principle which argues that all social and economic 
inequalities must benefit the least advantaged. Intended to exist somewhere between utilitarianism’s 
failure to respect individual liberty and libertarianism’s “failure to recognize the arbitrariness of 
fortune,” the difference principle argues that as the liberal self is antecedent to one’s ends and 
desires, all constitutive qualities of personhood must be considered, at least in part, the product of 
moral luck.136 Citizens cannot be denied their just deserts for the good of the whole, as argued by 
utilitarianism, yet if one’s position in life is at least partially arbitrary then it is reasonable to ask those 
“who have been favored by nature” to “gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve 
the situation of those who have lost out. In justice as fairness, men agree to share one another’s 
fate.”137  
This, Sandel argues, is the great quandary of liberalism. Liberal citizens cannot at once view 
themselves as individuals whose constitutive ends are always descendent from their identity and at 
the same time be required to share their ends with citizens who are substantively and necessarily 
other. Rawls’ attempt to reconstruct the transcendental vision of an external vantage point for a just 
theory from which to assess social issues — what he calls his Archimedean point — means that 
individuals are left with morality that lacks both social context and implication and undermines the 
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very conception of the self.138 Theorist Peter Critchley furthers Sandel’s point: “[The Rawlsian] 
account of identity is metaphysically questionable in its assumption that individuals can abstract 
from their particular attributes and still exist as significantly distinct individuals, since these identities 
are constituted by the social attachments that individuals form.”139 For Sandel, citizens without 
constitutive attachments are not ‘unencumbered’; they are persons wholly without character.  
Sandel argues that the Rawlsian commitment to Kant’s ideal of freedom requires the citizen 
subject to always be antecedently individuated, beyond relational experiences. Otherwise, “were I a 
wholly empirical being,” Sandel argues, “I would not be capable of freedom, for every exercise of 
will would be conditioned by the desire for some object. All choice would be heteronomous choice, 
governed by the pursuit of some end.”140 In order to maintain a commitment to freedom, the subject 
must always be prior to and independent of one’s experience. In opposition, Sandel contends that 
self-knowledge is untenable without the socio-relational context that connects individuals to each 
other; that an individual’s sense of self is dependent upon the constitutive ties that situate one within 
family, congregation, community and nation. The individual in modern liberalism is so separated 
from the qualities of that make one human that Sandel argues it is difficult to conceive of an 
individual at all within Rawls’ ideal of a ‘veil of ignorance’.141  
And yet the liberal self, so liberated, is concurrently expected to support the difference 
principle, which asks citizens to share their lives with others. The difference principle then becomes 
a system of social and economic redistribution since, Sandel argues, the ‘unencumbered’ self is too 
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thin a moral entity to uphold a political-public structure that embodies both moral notions and 
constructive community. Justice as fairness is never rooted in a shared sense of commonality or 
collective common good, but dependent upon a set of procedures created by rational agents in ‘the 
original position’. For Rawls, the notion of civic friendship is found in a common commitment to 
the fair procedures in a just society; for Sandel, such an ideal is impossible in a political model where 
individuals are only free when they are separate from, and yet indebted to, others. Thus, Sandel 
argues, Rawls is unable to successfully argue a version of Kantian metaphysics that overcomes the 
conceptual nature of transcendentalism. Instead, the Rawlsian theory of justice undermines citizens 
as moral agents and inhibits genuine reciprocity between citizens by relying too heavily on 
abstractions of individualism and the instrumental rationality of modern society. The greatest 
mistake for Rawlsian liberalism, Sandel argues, is supposing that individuals as rational-egoistic 
agents will choose to follow the fair principles of justice.142  
Despite its philosophical failings, this liberal promise of individual freedom is the reality in 
which we live today. According to Sandel, the ideals of early liberal theorists aligned more closely 
with the arguments of modern communitarians; they “looked to the nation, not as a neutral 
framework for the play of competing interests, but rather [as] a formative community, concerned to 
shape a common life suited to the scale of modern social and economic forms.”143 However, liberal 
promises of negative freedom and individual prosperity, central to early American democratic ideals, 
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eventually usurped any quest for a formative community committed to a common life and gave way 
to the liberalism now dominant in modern democracy.  
The shift within liberalism away from small democratic communities committed to self-rule 
to a large federal government structure charged with protecting the rights of citizens has much to do 
with the historical trajectory of the American economy, according to Sandel. Early American 
communities were interested in maintaining a level of freedom and autonomy from centralized 
power. However, in the nineteenth century the United States federal government rapidly expanded 
in order to keep up with the proliferation of private wealth incurred throughout the American 
industrial revolution. Yet despite efforts by the federal government to control wealth accumulation, 
underregulated markets led to the devastation of much of the poor and middle class during the 
Great Depression. In response, President Franklin D. Roosevelt fronted expansive federal 
programs, including social security and a federal minimum wage in post-depression America, 
promising Americans safety from the prospect of another financial collapse and avowing greater 
opportunities for individual prosperity through better access to public education, fair wages and 
other federal programs. While Roosevelt himself believed in the possibility of a national republic 
with shared ends, his social policies shifted the course of American politics over the next century. 
Eventually, Sandel argues, the American public accepted the relegation of power away from small 
self-governing communities, assured that the federal government could best promote liberty, 
freedom and equality for all citizens.  
Sandel argues that by the late twentieth century, the possibility of such a strong liberal 
republic had all but run its course. “Except for extraordinary moments, such as war, the nation 
proved too vast a scale across which to cultivate the shared self-understandings necessary to 
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community in the formative, or constitutive sense.”144 Increasingly dislocated from their 
communities and disempowered by an expansive federal government, modern civil communities are 
increasingly relegated to small gestures of democracy, no longer connected through practices of 
democratic self-governance but connected through a commitment to a political system that 
promises nothing more than to keep the moral lives of citizens out of the public realm. By the time 
Rawlsian liberalism entered onto the political scene in the early 1970s, any hope for a strong national 
republic had been eclipsed by a federal government nearly indistinguishable from the large economic 
institutions it originally set out to control. Evermore disempowered, the modern political public 
failed to return to small bodies of self-governance, and instead has increasingly pursued modern 
ideals of liberal freedom. For Sandel, Rawlsian liberalism’s greatest atrocity is its inability to make 
good on its promise of civic friendship through a shared commitment to justice. Instead, in an era of 
citizens feeling disconnected from the national community, Rawls solidified the connection between 
radical individualism and liberal freedom within the American democratic psyche with great 
consequences for a civil political public.  
The struggle to connect citizens to a shared common good was never completely 
abandoned, according to Sandel. Prominent politicians, from Senator Robert Kennedy to Presidents 
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Regan, tried in different ways to resuscitate the ‘unencumbered self’ from 
an ever-increasingly powerful procedural republic. However, any attempt to rejuvenate a public-
political spirit has fallen victim to liberal ideals now too strong in modern democratic thought to be 
forsaken by the dominant and partisan political parties. Now, Democrats cling too closely to the 
ideal of distributive justice as a human right to challenge federalism, and conservatives remain too 
closely aligned with free-market capitalism to challenge big business. In all instances, the possibility 
of political recommitment to common good, or the return to a decentralized civic life has fallen 





drastically short. As a result, Sandel argues, citizens in the United States now grapple with a republic 
that continues to ratify civil rights legislation while alienating citizens with promises of life free from 
interference and thus absent of the moral capacity and constitutive ties necessary to create a vibrant 
and civil political community capable of upholding such rights.  
Thus, the incivility “now rampant in American life” is a direct result of America’s democratic 
communities in decline. In a short chapter titled “The Problem with Civility” Sandel argues that 
America’s small civil communities have been completely separated from, and subjugated by, the 
political realm in American democracy. “Americans’ worries about incivility express a deeper fear 
that the moral fabric of community is unraveling around us. From families to neighborhoods to 
cities and towns and schools, congregations and trade unions, the institutions that traditionally 
provided people with moral anchors and a sense of belonging are under siege.”145 Sandel argues that 
beyond their role as places of scholarship, religion, work, camaraderie and leisure, these institutions 
have traditionally been sites of civic development. Such institutions are contributory in teaching 
citizens “to think about the good of the whole, how to exercise responsibility for others, how to deal 
with conflicting interests, how to stand up for our views while respecting the view of others” and 
above all, to “draw us out of our private, self interested concerns and get us in the habit of attending 
to the common good.”146 Sandel fears that the decline of small American institutions, motivated by 
the Rawlsian division between the individual and the greater community, has truncated American 
civic education and endangered the qualities Tocqueville once called the “habits of the heart” upon 
which American democracy depends.  
It is interesting that Sandel cites Tocqueville here. In his nineteenth century work, Democracy 
in America, Tocqueville observed the early beginnings of the inversion within the political structure 
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of society, a construction directly counterpoint to arguments supported by the new communitarian 
critics of liberalism. He observed the civil realm shifting out from under the jurisdiction of the 
political, where citizens galvanized by Enlightenment ideals and no longer constrained by the 
aristocratic rules of their European counterparts were at liberty to engage in a civil sphere that 
promoted social and economic interactions between citizens in a free and competitive civil society. 
To maintain such freedom, the civil realm was charged with limiting the scope and power of the 
political realm; this was the new responsibility of the democratic citizen.147 The ideal of the citizen 
was no longer about upholding civil ideals for the good of a constructive political realm, but about 
maintaining a democratic political structure that allows individuals the freedom to pursue their own 
ends with similar freedom for all. Therefore the ‘habits of the heart’ Tocqueville cited were less likely 
about the formative civil associations that perpetuated the good of a constructive political realm, and 
more about upholding the liberal freedom of liberty and association.  
It is not Tocqueville with whom the new communitarian critics of liberalism most closely 
align; instead, the theories of Aristotle and Hegel inform the new critics’ argument for the 
reformation of civil society, civility and citizenship - each theorist connects the good of the citizen to 
the good of society in different ways, and Sandel and his communitarian associates closely follow 
suit.148 Like his republican predecessors, Sandel argues that just as an individual cannot be 
understood outside of a socio-relational context, separating the civil society from realm of the 
political leaves citizens without any substantive connection to the virtues and behaviors necessary 
for democratic ideals of self-governance. Political theorist James Schmidt explains, “Within the 
republican tradition, civic virtues aim at taming individual avarice and the building of individuals into 
a political community. But when civil society is no longer understood as political society, the virtues 
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that are to restrain individual idiosyncrasy can no longer be civil ones.” 149 For communitarians, 
civility is the act of forwarding interests and ideals that pertain to the commonweal; incivility is thus 
the assertion of particular interests and ends over the community, drawing an impetus from 
skepticism of the ultimate goodness of the collective common good.  
Sandel argues that as democracy dislocated civil society from the political realm, the value-
laden communities once at the epicenter of moral education and civic engagement are now 
constantly undermined by the degradative properties of an unchecked civil realm, including the 
coarsening effects of popular culture, big government and the welfare state, and most of all, “the 
corrosive power of an unfettered market economy.”150 The liberal political realm cannot secure 
liberty because it upends the very roots that compel citizens to commit to civic commitment and 
civil behavior. Compounding the problem, the loss of intermediary places of community-building 
such as town hall meetings, and the abandonment of public spaces are primarily the consequence of 
a liberal public fearful of majoritarianism and cooption in small self-governing communities; history 
makes this argument all too easy for liberals. “Too often such communities [were] pockets of 
prejudice, outposts of intolerance, places where the tyranny of the majority held sway. And so…the 
liberal project was to use federal power to vindicate individual rights that local communities failed to 
protect.”151 In liberalism, the individual and the federal government advanced together, leaving the 
binding forces of the civility and civic engagement behind.  
Despite the fact that Sandel seems to choose particular moments of history to assess the 
consequences of the liberal division between the political and civil realms, his concern resonates 
well. Without political sites of citizen and community development, individuals are now left to 
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struggle between the promise of radical independence and a level of deep-seated engagement, 
neither of which promote a commitment to civility or civil discourse.152 As a consequence, citizens 
increasingly choose to engage in private sphere, where political conversations occur almost entirely 
between those with similar moral and religious philosophies. Communitarians argue that civic 
engagement and civil behavior have become primarily privatized; in the few arenas were public 
deliberation still occurs, scenes of citizen collaboration and cooperation for the greater good have 
become rare. Philosopher and political theorist Ronald Dworkin proclaims that now “[Americans] 
disagree, fiercely, about almost everything. We disagree about terror and security, social justice, 
religion in politics, who is fit to be a judge, and what democracy is. These are not civil 
disagreements: each side has no respect for the other. We are no longer partners in self-government; 
our politics are rather a form of war.”153  
Sandel contends that the only way to rebalance the value of individual liberty within a notion 
common good, to save civility from the brink of disaster, is to situate the citizen back into the world, 
and to subsequently reinstate the priority of individual freedom back in the republican ideal of 
liberty through shared fate. Returning citizen engagement and a commitment to common values 
back to the political realm will recommit citizens to a sense of shared fortune. Communitarians want 
the good of the individual to be connected to a greater concern for the common good; arguments 
for traditional family values and more conservative ideals, such as religious piety, are now lauded as 
ways to stimulate greater levels of civility by promoting the good of the community over individual 
prosperity. Releasing the public from the procedural confines of liberalism allows citizens to reinvest 
in the dialogical processes that shape communities through shared commitment to common values 
and instills the virtues of citizenship through civic engagement. Importantly, communitarians such as 
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Sandel argue that such civil ideals have returned to the political realm, if they ever left at all. Instead 
of denying their relevance within an ethically dislocated political community, they should be 
addressed with constructive measures and substantive engagement. Former Secretary of Education 
William J. Bennett, recapitulates this point: “A set of issues once thought beyond the purview of 
politics — the social issues, the moral issues, the family issues — is now […] driving the public 
debate…public policies [must] once again make the connection between our deepest beliefs and our 
legislative agenda.”154 
For a citizenry struggling to realize even a small version of civility in the midst of paralyzing 
political vitriol, returning civility back to the political realm through substantive moral and civil 
values is an attractive proposal. In certain ways, this is the political vision of both the far right and 
the far left. Communitarians contend that the radical political ideologies, galvanized by corporate 
financial contributions, political lobbyists and politically radicalized movements, are increasingly 
polarized because the force of their ideology is stoked by the monocular focus of the private realm. 
In the private spheres of modern liberalism, opinions and ideals are garnered without any 
constructive conversations with the opposing side.  
Such arguments of new communitarian critics of liberalism are worthy of serious 
consideration; they are not, however, without fault. In an article titled “Communitarian Critics of 
Liberalism,” philosopher Amy Gutmann reveals two important shortcomings in Sandel’s case 
against Rawls. First, Gutmann argues against Sandel’s interpretation of the metaphysical 
requirements of the liberal subject. Her second point is practical: Sandel does not appropriately 
recognize the impetus for the split between the civil and the political realms in modern democracy 
and why such a division is imperative to the liberal ideal. Gutmann concludes that Sandel’s political 
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project fails to appreciate the importance of the liberal ideal of individual freedom and risks 
jeopardizing the rights of citizens in the name of a collective common good.  
First, Gutmann finds fault in Sandel’s argument that Rawls fails to extricate liberalism from 
Kantian metaphysics. For Sandel, this is “the core conviction Rawls seeks above all to defend, the claim 
that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions.’”155 According to Rawls, this is meant to convey a 
normative conception of justice as the primary responsibility of liberal institutions. Sandel interprets 
this further, arguing that Rawls is also “making a metaethical claim: that the foundations of justice 
must be independent of all social and historical contingencies without being transcendental.”156 For 
Gutmann, Sandel’s subsequent reading of Rawls is mistaken. Surely, Rawls argues that within the 
principles of justice is an ideal of the liberal citizen that provides an Archimedean point for judging 
the basic structures of society. This does not mean, however, that the grounds of justice must 
necessarily be noncontingent. In fact, such an assertion ignores the greater purpose of Rawls’ 
Archimedean point: principles of justice, including the ‘original position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ 
allow for reasoning about justice without any reliance on a priori considerations. Gutmann explains: 
The resulting principles of justice, then, clearly rely on certain contingent facts: that 
we share some interests (in primary goods such as income and self respect), but not 
others (in a particular religion or form of family life); that we value the freedom to 
choose a good life or at least have the freedom from having one imposed upon us by 
political authority. If we do not, then we will not accept the constraints of the 
original position.157  
 
The contingent nature of the Rawlsian principles of justice, including the original position 
and its veil of ignorance, are constructed to be upheld only if they accommodate citizens’ firmest 
convictions. Rawls’ rationale for justice as fairness is that it is a “common sense conviction,” an ideal 
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that is universal enough to exist simultaneously inside and outside citizens’ a priori considerations. 
Gutmann argues that for Rawls that there is not, and need not be, a greater claim for justice as 
fairness than “given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the most 
reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better charter for our social world.”158 
Instead of arguing against Rawls’ assertion that liberalism is the best option for democratic 
citizens, or contending that such principles of justice are derived from faulty understandings of 
citizens’ social and political particularities, Sandel charges that Rawls must prove that claims of 
justice are always non-contingent, prior to the citizen experience. However, Gutmann argues that if 
this is what constitutes Kantian metaphysics, then it is a metaphysics Rawls adamantly denies. 
Instead, Rawls argues that a theory of justice does not presuppose one particular comprehensive 
morality, but is intended to be a theory that is narrow enough to be agreeable to reasonable and 
rational persons, including those who have competing interests. 159 Gutmann argues that Rawlsian 
liberalism “regulates our social institutions, not our entire lives. It makes claims on us ‘not because it 
expresses our deepest self-understandings,’ but because it represents the ‘fairest possible modus vivendi 
for a pluralistic society.’”160  
While Rawlsian liberalism does not adhere to one particular belief or moral system, it does 
not mean that it applies to all metaphysical or metaethical views. Sandel is right in arguing that 
Rawlsian liberalism is not compatible with a metaphysical conception of the self that is radically 
situated, that is, a conception that makes the makes “the good of the community… so 
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thoroughgoing as to reach beyond the motivations to the subject of motivations.”161 Instead, 
liberalism is dependent upon the ideal that liberal citizens are committed to the freedom to pursue 
one’s own comprehensive doctrine in such a way that they can maintain their doctrinal beliefs while 
upholding the rights of all citizens to do the same. Rawls must admit this much metaphysics — that 
liberal citizens are situated in life in such a way that our sense of justice is not reliant on “an order 
that is antecedent to and given to us” but is consistent with a deeper understanding of the self and 
our subsequent aspirations.162 
If Sandel means to argue that Rawlsian liberalism is incompatible with the metaphysics of 
the radically situated self, but compatible with other rational and reasonable doctrines, then he fails 
to successfully argue that the liberal political project is unsuitable for a pluralistic political public. His 
failure lies in the fact that he does not successfully argue that the radically situated self, incapable of 
a conception of justice outside of one’s own personal experiences, is the only comprehensive 
doctrine for a successful modern democratic society. Gutmann concludes, “If [the radically situated 
self], rather than Kantian dualism, is the metaphysics that liberal justice must admit, Sandel’s critique 
collapses. Rawls need not (and he does not) claim that ‘justice is the first virtue of social institutions’ 
in all societies to show that the priority of justice obtains absolutely in those societies in which 
people disagree about the good life and consider their freedom to choose a good life an important 
good.”163 If citizens in modern pluralist democracies recognize that the freedom to choose one’s 
own ends with similar liberty for all is better than the possibility that a singular shared good or set of 
goods then Rawls’ ideal of justice as fairness stands.  
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What does this mean for Sandel’s argument for civility in modern democracy? Sandel 
contends that Rawlsian liberalism undermines civility by abolishing democratic communities with its 
monocular vision of the citizen as subject and the only way to recommit citizens to a more civil 
democracy for communitarians is to reinstate the ideal of the civil realm back into the political 
sphere, to allow substantive civility back into the political public. In a brief positive argument for 
communitarian politics, Sandel suggests that communitarians do not support such liberal institutions 
as the free market or the welfare state; instead they are likely to defend the freedom of small, self-
governing communities to instantiate the best policies for their community. Sandel picks a 
controversial example, claiming that communitarians might support a local community banning 
pornographic bookstores “on the grounds that pornography offends their way of life and the values 
that sustain it.”164 Gutmann responds: “[Sandel’s] answer to the liberal worry that such a policy 
opens the door to intolerance in the name of communal standards is that ‘intolerance flourishes 
most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, traditions undone.”165 For Sandel and 
others, citizens are more likely to support policies that promote greater levels tolerance, community 
and civility in a small political-civil realm. Such a commitment to the greater good reinvigorates 
republican possibilities once implicit in the American political tradition, but that has faded over time. 
This line of reasoning leads to Gutmann’s second reproach against Sandel’s communitarian 
argument: there is little historical support for the forwarding of republican ideals in the name of 
increased civility and greater freedom for all.  
Surely, Gutmann argues, Sandel must not mean the earlier republican traditions in the 
United States, a politics dominated by a white, protestant male upper class that subjugated the 
working poor, women, and religious and ethnic minorities. For Gutmann, there is “little reason to 
                                                 
164
 Sandel “Morality and the Liberal Ideal,” The New Republic, (May, 1984): 17. 
 
165
 Gutmann, “Communitarian Critics,” 318.  
  
93
doubt that the liberal politic of rights is morally better than that kind of republicanism.”166 In The 
Virtue of Civility, Shils suggests that more recent constructions of a republican political project 
embody greater levels of inclusion, recognizing that the common good can be realized only when a 
more inclusive collectivity is represented. Still, he argues, when two antagonists reach a compromise 
through recognition of common interests they redefine themselves as members of the collectivity, 
“the good of which takes precedence over their particular objectives.”167 To suggest the good of the 
community is more important than the interests of each individual sounds suspiciously utilitarian; as 
a caveat, Shils argues that the good “accorded by [such a] decision might be no more than the 
continued existence of the collectivity in which they both participate.”168 At least minimally, 
adversaries committed to engaging in substantive conversation support an ideal of the collective 
common good. Still, such an argument does not support Sandel’s thesis that a community 
committed to a collective common good will better tolerate differences in speech, race, religion and 
orientation of other, minority citizens. Gutmann follows:  
A great deal of intolerance has come from societies of selves so ‘confidently situated’ 
that they were sure repression would serve a higher cause. The common good of the 
Puritans of seventeenth century Salem commanded them to hunt witches; the 
common good of the Moral Majority in the twentieth century commands them not 
to tolerate homosexuals. The enforcement of liberal rights, not the absence of settled 
community, stands between the Moral Majority and the contemporary equivalent of 
witch hunting.169 
 
 Sandel fails to prove that liberal civility is unachievable because the premise of the ‘right over 
the good’ requires individuals to uphold implausible metaphysical views of the self, counterpoint to 
a commitment to the collective common good. Still, Sandel’s argument highlights important 
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shortcomings in modern liberal democracy. Most importantly it exposes the possibility that 
liberalism, which does not successfully argue for a commitment to civility separate from one’s 
comprehensive doctrine, may rely on certain communitarian values, such as commitment to family 
and community, in order to compel an ideal of civility above the liberal construction of a “society in 
which no one does more or less than respect everyone else’s liberal rights.”170 Sandel aids in the 
argument that liberalism must do a better job of inspiring greater civil commitment among liberal 
citizens in order to achieve the levels of civility necessary to maintain a constructive democratic 
ideal. Before considering in the concluding chapter how liberalism can compel greater civility 
without the substantive connections of Sandelian communitarianism, it is first important to highlight 
a second line of criticism against liberalism, one that is distinct from the new communitarian ideal, 
but that shares interesting and important intersections with Sandel and others. Political theorist 
Benjamin Barber espouses a concept of strong democracy that does not focus its criticism on the 
metaphysical promises of the unencumbered self, but forwards a theory of participatory democracy, 
opposed to the ideals of liberty that liberalism currently supports.  
5.4 THE PROMISE OF CIVILITY IN STRONG DEMOCRACY 
In his work, Strong Democracy, Barber centers his criticism of liberalism on the promise of 
negative liberty in modern democracy, reasoning that such a conception of freedom has had 
calamitous effects on citizenship, civility and the democratic ideal. Like Sandel, Barber argues that 
constructions of citizenship and civic engagement cannot be relegated to the private spheres of 
associations and personal relationships, as they are in the current liberal democratic model. Instead, 
Barber contends that civic participation must be re-grounded in the public environment of a strong 
democratic community, which “grows out of participation and at the same time makes participation 
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possible; [and] educates individual how to think publicly as citizens even as citizenship informs civic 
activity with the required sense of publicness and justice.”171  
Barber argues that the current liberal political realm is a weak system without a citizenry 
committed to self-governance; a small-minded theory of citizenship with a poor relationship to civic 
participation and disregard for the importance of civic responsibility. Much of the blame for this, 
according to Barber, must be placed upon the liberal commitment to negative liberty, as it equates 
freedom with the notion of being left alone. Barber argues that this ideal of non-interference has 
become “what liberal democracy does best… When it must interfere or interdict, it does so in the 
name of leaving alone. Protection, preservation, and the security of private interests, including life, 
liberty and property are the entirety of the modern liberal agenda.”172 Liberalism’s constructed 
dialectic between power and freedom restricts productive engagement and self-governance by 
citizens, as any movement of the political realm beyond its role as the arbiter of liberty can be 
interpreted as an act of oppression, or at worst, as a move towards despotism. Liberal citizens have 
accepted the role of political representation as the best protection of liberty, believing that such a 
structure forwards freedom for all individuals without recognizing that it instead undermines the 
potential for strong self-governance, including a commitment to citizenship, community and civility.  
This liberal commitment to negative liberty, for Barber, is rooted in the radical overvaluation 
of individualism, “with its myths of solitary beatitude (godliness) [which] has persistently underrated 
the human need for association, community and… identification” and undermined potential for 
strong democratic self-governance.173 The conviction that citizens are both capable and desirous of 
being atomistic has created a system intended to protect the rights of individuals, without civil 
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conversation over what rights and freedoms are worthy of protection.174 In liberalism, citizens are 
the subjects but not the authors of their rights, making liberalism incompatible with liberal 
democratic principles, including freedom, equality and justice. For Barber, freedom in liberal 
democracy is undermined because representational government means that citizens have limited 
access to self-legislation; equality is compromised by the abstract nature of a politics that disconnects 
citizens from the issues and ideals particular to them; justice is denied when citizens and 
communities are not allowed to participate directly as instruments of fairness and equality. Any 
attempt to construct a democracy that allows citizens to live without directly engaging in the political 
process is, according to Barber, not just false advertising; it is anti-political and undemocratic. 
As an alternative, Barber constructs a theory of strong democracy where a political 
community committed to public dialogue and self-rule is strengthened by notions of collective 
common good. Strong democracy is not intended to be a representative politics but a strictly 
participatory democracy. It is a theory that involves citizens committed to resolving conflict through 
strong democratic self-governance. In this way, strong democracy intends to transform the notion of 
dependent, private individuals into active, participatory citizens, and converts partial and private 
interests into public goods.175 Collapsing the division between citizens and the representative 
political realm allows Barber to argue for a system of self-governance that is strongly rooted in 
participation. In strong democracy there are no preconceived notions of a democratic ideal and no 
political experts; it is a politics of amateurs. Such ideals reflect the sentiments of the earlier, 
progressive president Theodore Roosevelt, who stated in a 1912 address that “the majority of the 
plain people of the United States will, day in and day out, make fewer mistakes in governing 
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themselves than any smaller class or body of men, no matter what their training, will make in trying 
to govern them.”176 
Barber distinguishes the positive liberties of strong democracy from the negative freedom of 
liberalism with two critical differences; the construction of the self as it relates to others, and the role 
of conversation in shaping political community. Both differences inform the ideal of civility for 
strong democracy. First, the understanding of the self as citizen is different in strong democracy 
than in liberalism, which equates citizenship with the freedom to pursue one’s own interests and 
desires with similar freedom for all, and which, Barber argues, has led to the deteriorative effects of 
negative liberty. In strong democracy, the ideals and interests of the self as juxtaposed to others are 
dissolved when citizens are no longer assigned their rights by a political sphere, but are collectively 
responsible for defining the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. Such an ideal of citizenship is 
no longer not static, nor is it an abstract notion conceived of and handed down by a political elite. In 
strong democracy it is intended to be a fluid concept, continuously defined, debated and amended 
through citizen-participation in the political realm. Barber argues that such constructive political 
conversation inspires a sense of community, and through this community, citizens come to 
understand their own identity qua citizens. Thus, although “citizenship by no means exhausts 
people’s social identities,” for Barber, “it takes moral priority over all social activities in a strong 
democracy. The pursuit of particular interests… must take place within the framework of 
community and common vision established by the public realm.”177 When citizens’ identities are 
created through the formation of community, freedom cannot be defined as non-interference, as it 
is in liberalism, since identity is constructed through engagement with other citizens.  
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Beyond constructing the identity of the citizen through self-legislation, the universality of 
participation in strong democracy alters the role of community itself. When citizens are joined in 
political conversation through the process of achieving goals and resolving conflicts, community is 
no longer a group of individually motivated citizens invested in their own freedom, but a venue with 
which to develop a sense of mutuality and civility necessarily for the strong democratic processes of 
bargaining and negotiation. Barber argues that the vagaries of notions of ‘me’ and ‘you’ develop into 
a sense of ‘us’ when community is invested in self-legislation. For Barber, then, constructive 
democratic conversation allows the roles of kinship and friendship as well as the relationship of 
adversaries and antagonists to be properly conceptualized and demarcated in the public realm. This 
make the public sphere not only a place to forward one’s own interests and uphold the negative 
freedoms of citizens, but the site of community and individual will formation.  
The role of political conversation in creating community for strong democracy underscores 
the importance of deliberation for the strong democratic ideal, and redefines the relationship 
between citizens and civil behavior. While the emphasis on dialogue in democracy is not unique to 
strong democracy, Barber stresses the purpose of dialogue in a particular way. For him, the false 
ideal of human autonomy in liberalism has allowed talk to be reduced to symbolic exchange between 
“materialistic but prudent beasts,” which radically undermines the possibility of a strong civil 
commitment in a liberal democratic society. Interest-based liberalism constructs a political-public 
realm intended to maximize the free exchange of personal interests in free-market, encouraging 
primary allegiance to selfhood without the necessary connection to the greater community. Barber 
argues that this has led to a civil public willing only to engage to tepid, artificial conversation 
between citizens intent only on forwarding their own interests in the civil sphere. Conversation for 
the purpose of individual gain sacrifices community at the hand of individual freedom and creates an 
environment where any attempt to use language to forge a democratic community is consistently 
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overshadowed by liberalism’s allowance for “speech reduced to the articulation of interest by 
appropriate signs.”178 In this way, Barber articulates the concerns of Ferdinand Tönnies, who feared 
that the exchange of kinship and community for a free-market would eventually leave citizens to 
mimic civil behavior for self-gain. Conversation without a commitment to the greater political 
project, argues Barber, is doomed to perpetuate adversarial relationships and restrict citizen-freedom 
to state-regulated engagement between citizen-antagonists.  
In order for strong democracy to succeed, for Barber, civility must reach beyond liberalism’s 
definition as the reticent forwarding of one’s own interest and the interest of others, to incorporate a 
greater commitment to a collective common good. Here he argues that liberal democratic theory is 
missing, in particular, the critical elements of self as defined through the commitment community and 
the universality of participative democracy. Where the political realm of liberal democracy promises 
to do nothing more and nothing less than leave citizens alone, in so doing it dismantles the collective 
common good and compromises democratic communities and limiting individual freedom. For him, 
civility means a citizen commitment to constructive dialogue and an enhanced democratic project 
that will “build community as well as maintain rights and seek consensus as well as resolve conflict” 
and will offer, “along with meaning and significations, silenced, rituals, symbols, myths, expressions, 
and solicitations, and a hundred other quiet and noisy manifestations of our common humanity.”179 
Citizens must recognize that there is no definitive conception of the individual juxtaposed to the 
others, and that shared ideals of citizenship and freedom must originate within the political dialogue 
before processes like negotiation and deliberation can safely occur. A rare allusion of civility in 
Barber’s work furthers this point: 
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World leaders meeting at a summit will frequently devote an initial session to getting 
to know one another in very much [an informal, casual] fashion, before they get 
down to the business of bargaining and exchange. And it is much more than 
protocol that motivates them; indeed, even protocol is a form of ritual in which 
civility is given its due, where there may be little more than civility to hold 
adversaries together.180  
 
Though rarely mentioned in Strong Democracy, it is clear from this passage that civility is the mortar 
that enforces the foundation of the democratic process, the ideal that compels citizens to the public 
realm and create a system of governance about more than the reticent leaving alone of citizens, but 
about developing a level of freedom discovered only through direct and participatory self-legislation. 
Although Barber’s theory shares similar criticisms of liberalism with communitarianism, 
Barber is careful to distinguish strong democracy from its communitarian counterparts. In particular, 
Barber criticizes communitarian theorists, like Sandel, for making the fatal mistake of forcing 
conformity in order to uphold ideals of unanimity. At first communitarianism seems to avoid the 
pitfalls of representative government, along with strong democracy, by allowing decisions to be 
made not through an interest-based political structure, but through communal will formation, which 
is intended to include the interests of a symbolic collectivity. However, according to Barber, 
communitarianism fails to actualize such a participatory system because communitarians focus on 
the import of a singular, collective common good. This has allowed room for demagogues, rather 
than citizens, to determine the destiny of the populace. Communitarianism’s failure to generate 
universality of participation thus undermines its ability to support genuine discourse and 
deliberation. Therefore it is not truly political, since it eliminates conflicts not through inclusion, but 
through conformity obstruction and exclusion. In opposition, strong democracy is not about 
unanimity nor is it conformist in nature. Barber makes it clear that strong democracy is first and 
foremost about self-legislation through dialogue.  
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Yet despite their differences, Barber’s ideal of strong democracy finds similarities in Sandel’s 
communitarian ideal, particularly through commitment to the republican notion of a “civic minded” 
political public. Both theorists wish to collapse the political and the civil realms back together, both 
argue that the civil and political spheres must be constructed in such a way so that citizenship and 
civic activity exist on one hand, and the private realm of particular identities, roles, affiliations, and 
interests exists on the other.181 Otherwise, both theorists argue, citizens will understand freedom and 
liberty as individual rights prior to and independent of the greater community, and as a consequence, 
will not be motivated to uphold the civic strands of political discourse. For both Barber and Sandel, 
civility in the public sphere will be reconciled only when it means more than the reticent respect for 
others. Civility for both theorists represents a common commitment to a formative political project 
of democratic self-governance; it is the purposes of each project that differ. For Sandel and Barber, 
it is only when is an inextricable connection between civic engagement and personal freedom has 
been created will civility be reinstated as tantamount to the public good. Otherwise, reliance on 
representation and a commitment to market-based competition in liberalism makes democracy ever 
vulnerable to corruption by corrosive interest groups, further threatening the future of civic life in 
the United States.  
Beyond the practical issues of scope, size and uncertainty, there are challenges for 
reinvigorating Barber’s robust conception of a communal good in the modern, pluralistic and free-
market society of liberal democracy. However, the most critical questions of strong democracy are 
similar to the criticisms Barber argues against Sandel. In a heterogeneous society like the United 
States, where minority voices have gained salience only within the last century, it is imperative to ask 
if there is a risk of homogenization and marginalization of minorities collapsing the public and civil 
realms. Barber’s strong democracy is meant to oppose unitary democracy, where conflicts and 
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“dissensus” are constitutive parts of the never-ending processes of a problem-solving community’s 
deliberation and decision-making. However, it is unclear how, in this strong democratic process, the 
voices and lives of minorities are to be protected in public conversations about the destiny of the 
political community. If political participation is meant to be the very instrument by which individual 
liberty is realized, how can a country with a long history of marginalizing citizens guarantee that 
public political conversation will remain accessible to all? Participants in self-governance must be 
guaranteed both full agency and fair representation in the political realm. Barber argues that placing 
the constructions of civic engagement, citizenship and civility back into the political realm is the best 
formula for self-governance leading fair democracy; he claims that universal participation in political 
conversations is the best way to allow citizens greater opportunity to express ideals and exercise 
their freedoms, especially when the interconnectedness of individuals is recognized and individual 
freedom is understood as dependent upon self-rule. However, liberalism split the political and civil 
realms to guarantee that the individual freedom for all citizens would be upheld by a limited political 
structure. So, where is the guarantee in strong democracy that collapsing the political and civil realms 
back together will not return the political structure to a time when the dominant political class 
controlled the political-civil domain? Such questions are at the center of feminist theorist Iris Marion 
Young’s criticism of Barber. In particular, in her work “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of 
the Ideal of Universal Citizenship” Young uses the criticism of Barber to develop a theory of 
representation that she argues allows for greater levels of democratic inclusion without the potential 
for losing the voices of the underprivileged and marginalized in a political-civil sphere.  
5.5 YOUNG AND THE PROMISE OF GROUP REPRESENTATION  
These are some of the concerns of feminist theorist Iris Marion Young, who argues, against 
Barber, that any ideal of citizenship based on dialogical structures of citizen participation leaves the 
rights of individuals vulnerable to coercion from the enfranchised few who control the public 
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sphere. For her, citizenship can too easily become the voice of the privileged, unreachable to those 
without the political power to access the conversation. To this line of criticism, Barber’s 
counterargument is clear: if citizens are defined by and existent within personal and political 
relationships with others, then such a reevaluation of citizenship must leave greater room for them 
to address all aspects of freedom and liberty through civic engagement, in contrast to the 
“protection, preservation and the security of private interests [in modern liberalism]… a small 
agenda tailored to the small men its theories portray.”182 Strong Democracy does not bracket the 
concentricity of the civil and political realms, and as stated above, Barber argues that an attempt to 
construct a democracy that allows citizens to live without engaging in political dialogue is anti-
political and undemocratic.  
Young remains unconvinced. In the article “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the 
Ideal of Universal Citizenship” she argues that despite his best efforts, Barber seeks to realize an 
ideal of citizenship that ignores or denies certain minority groups by asking citizens to “assume the 
same impartial, general point of view transcending all particular interests, perspectives, and 
experiences” in a civil-political public. Strong democracy asks citizens to transcend their particular 
interests for the good of the public; otherwise, Barber argues, a participatory citizenry cannot 
function “if its members are concerned only with their private interests.”183 Such line of reasoning 
leads to the ideal of universal citizenship, which divides the personal interests of individuals in the 
private realm from the public-spirited political civil realm. Young argues that Barber makes a critical 
error by confusing the qualities of a pluralistic citizenry with the detrimental effects of privatism. As 
Young contends, it is one thing to ask citizens to be public spirited and willing to engage in dialogue 
more ardent than ‘speech reduced to the articulation of interests by appropriate signs’; it is quite 
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another to suggest that the only way to construct a more civil and civil political public is to ask 
citizens to subordinate their own personal identity and group affiliation to the realm of the political 
public. She follows, “The repoliticization of public life should not require the creation of a unified 
public realm in which citizens leave behind their particular group affiliations, histories and needs to 
discuss a general interest or a common good.”184 Such ideology perpetuates an important failing in 
republicanism and its modern civic and communitarian counterparts; the expectation that citizens 
who choose to engage in public life must be willing to accept a dichotomy between public and 
private realms, where ‘publically minded’ citizens are assessed by standards too often defined by a 
dominant political class unaware of, or unconcerned with the interests of minorities.185  
This argument reveals important implications for the role of civility within a civil-political 
public. In The Virtue of Civility, Edward Shils argues that a well-organized, repoliticized civil society 
maintains freedom for all citizens by upholding certain democratic institutions, including competing 
political parties, representative electorates, and a free press to safeguard civil society from the 
potential overreach of state power; in this way, a politicized civil society does not embody the state 
but presupposes its existence and dictates its limits. To succeed in its role as the arbiter of freedom, 
civil society is also responsible for imposing limits on individuals, organizations and movements that 
may potentially subvert or undermine the political project. Shils argues that a politicized civil society 
encourages personal gain and allows for criticism of the social and political order, but must prohibit 
any actions “which would abrogate the civil order of society by breaking laws and acting to establish, 
gradually or suddenly, an uncivil society.”186 Civil republicans locate freedom in the act of 
participating in a politicized civil realm, where the parameters of civility and citizenship are decided 
                                                 
184
 Ibid.  
 
185
 Young, “Polity,” 251.  
 
186
 Shils, Civility, 333-334.  
  
105
by public deliberation. Here, civil behavior becomes synonymous with civil order; incivility the 
moral violation of the laws of civil society.  
For Young, the question of access to public deliberation, including the establishment and 
perpetration of the civil realm, is paramount. The creation of civil precedent by a dominant political 
class without the input of minorities threatens the ability of citizens or groups to challenge the 
constructed laws of civil society without being censored, silenced or persecuted for acting in 
opposition to the collective common good. For Young, there is an essential difference between the 
extension of rights and liberties by a dominant political class and equal access to the political public 
realm where such decisions are made. This is why, she argues, “the extension of equal citizenship 
rights has not led to social justice and equality.”187 The repoliticized civil public of Strong 
Democracy and Shils’ republicanism, committed as they are to universal understandings of the 
common good, risks confusing gestures of civility with the preservation of standards upheld by a 
dominant hegemony, and risks homogenizing the ideal of citizenship at the exclusion of or 
discrimination toward minority groups. 188 
Still, Young agrees that the current depoliticized structure of modern liberal society is not 
the better alternative. She forwards Barber’s argument that the liberal construction of a narrow 
political realm, separate from civil society, has succumbed to interest group pluralism, privatizing 
public policy and relegating much of the political process in the United States to “back room deals 
and autonomous regulatory agencies and groups.”189 To protect the rights of all citizens, liberal 
politics seeks only to defend the right for citizens to pursue ends and desires with similar rights for 
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all. According to Young and others, this has failed to create greater equality in the United States, 
despite the passage of civil rights legislation. Instead, the narrow political realm left the political 
process to issue-driven partisanship, which invites corporate, military and other powerful interests to 
reign above the interests of the general populace. The interest group-based politics of modern 
liberalism encourages a system that truncates civic participation, encourages ideology above 
inclusivity, values individual avarice over the greater good and allows an egoistic, self-regarding view 
to mire the political process. The dire state of democracy “requires that citizens of welfare corporate 
society awake from their privatized consumerist slumbers… and collectively take control of their 
lives and institutions through processes of active discussion that aim at reaching collective 
decisions.”190 
As an alternative to Barber’s strong democratic model, Young seeks a theory of a 
participation in the political public that does not “require the creation of a unified public realm in 
which citizens leave behind their particular group affiliations, histories, and needs to discuss a 
general interest or common good.” Instead of the ideal of universal citizenship, Young proposes a 
theory of “group differentiated citizenship and a heterogeneous public,”191 arguing that a true 
democratic republic will succeed only when minority and other underprivileged groups are equally 
represented within the political civil-public sphere. She follows:  
A general perspective does not exist in which all persons can adopt and from which 
all experiences and perspectives can be understood and taken into account… No 
one can claim to speak in the general interest, because no one of the groups can 
speak for another, and certainly no one can speak for them all. Thus the only way to 
have all group experience and social perspectives voiced, heard, and taken account of 
is to have them specifically represented in the public.192 
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Young’s project seeks to reengage citizens in the political realm in order to counteract the 
polarization and privatization of liberalism, including arguments for impartiality and generality. To 
do this, Young argues for a participatory democracy centered on group differentiation and equal 
representation, or as she states, a democratic public that provides the “mechanisms for the effective 
representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent 
groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged within it.”193 
 Young’s theory of a politicized participatory public realm with priority for differentiated 
groups and fair representation offers important implications for conversations about the 
construction and understanding of civility in modern democracy. In a way, Young’s democratic ideal 
expects more of citizens than even its civil republican counterpart. Both theories recognize that 
responsible citizens must be concerned with more than their own interests, or the interests of their 
immediate community, but must recognize greater conceptions of justice and equality, 
acknowledging that others’ needs are as important as one’s own and that “the needs and interests of 
everyone must be voiced and be heard by the others, who must acknowledge, respect and address 
those needs and interests.”194 The problem for universal citizenship, of course, is that the 
expectation of transcending individual interests for the good of the community allows Barber and 
others to promote an ideal of civility that ignores or denies the rights and needs of other citizens and 
consequently repudiates any protestations of inequality as a violation of civil code. Forwarding the 
civil republican ideal of generality in the political public fails to uphold even a minimal 
understanding of civility as respect for oneself and respect for others.  
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In opposition, the explicit structural inclusion of differentiated groups in a participatory 
democracy requires that citizens engage with each other in ways not yet seen in modern democracy. 
For Young, civility is not the passive acceptance of a political structure that preserves the freedom 
of all citizens through rights legislation, but rather requires the active inclusion of disenfranchised 
groups in shaping fair procedures and policies in a politicized civil realm. Enfranchised citizens of a 
dominant political class must be willing to recognize the benefit of including ideals of differentiation 
and particularity into democratic procedures; most importantly, they must be willing to step out of 
their place of privilege and recognize the voices of those who have traditionally been silenced. This 
means that civility can no longer support the tacit acceptance of a civil-political realm that caters to 
interest-group politics, nor retain the virtues of a political public committed to unified citizenship. 
For Young, civility is the recognition of civic plurality and the willingness to allow preferential 
representative status for groups to engage in policymaking, alongside the traditional forms of 
democratic representation. The intention is not create greater chasms in our political structure nor is 
it to pit one group’s interests against another; on the contrary, Young argues that incorporating the 
reality of difference into our political structure does not embolden expressions of narrow self-
interest, but creates “the best antidote to self-deceiving self-interests masked as an impartial or 
general interest.”195 For her, interest group politics wanes when enfranchised and disenfranchised 
groups are equally required to argue just cause for their interests or desires, and where policies are 
decided by those who are most affected.  
Young confronts what she calls a problem of origin that no philosophical argument is 
capable of solving.196 In order to succeed, group affiliation requires a guarantor, an individual or 
body to choose what groups are entitled to fair representation in the politicized civil sphere of 
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participatory democracy. To do so, a political public must already be configured to decide what 
groups deserve representation. Who is entitled to such authority, and who must decide on the set of 
procedures to make such a decision? A predefined jurisdictional body would undermine the self-
generating project of participatory democracy, yet Young argues that it would be both less than ideal 
and impractical to open up the opportunity to all groups. So who gets to participate? Here, Young 
makes an important clarification: the self-organization of groups is only one aspect of group 
representation. Members of a group must meet together in democratic forums to discuss relevant 
issues and formulate positions and proposals. Group development and representation is meant as 
part of a greater reformulation of the democratic model, where increased participation in 
neighborhood meetings and district assemblies also allows greater opportunities for citizens to 
participate in democratic discussion and decision-making. In a participatory democracy, separate 
assemblies would also be offered to members of oppressed groups in order to delegate group 
representatives for the local meetings, ensuring that all voices are heard.197 
However, if participatory democracy is the representation of different, and often competing, 
social groups in a political public, it is difficult to comprehend how differentiated citizenship is 
unlike a slightly more egalitarian version of the interest group pluralism Young and others so fiercely 
reject. The differences, according to Young, are found in the definition and purpose of such 
differentiated groups. Young argues that group representation describes the “major identities and 
major status relationships constituting the society or particular institution… which are oppressed or 
disadvantaged.” Groups such as the Friends of Whales and the National Association of 
Advancement of Colored people do not have the equal status in participatory democracy, as they do 
in interest group pluralism. Secondly, in participatory democracy social groups do not have a 
particular agenda or goal, but must encompass a comprehensive identity and way of life that gives 
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the group a distinct perspective or understanding of society and social issues. The groups Young 
considers “groups” are assembled solely because of shared experiences of social injustice. As she 
explains, invoking Heidegger, they are people who are “thrown” into an identity; because of their 
“thrownness,” they are in a position to address broader elements of societal justice. Lastly, where the 
interest groups in the current democratic structure choose to forestall or interfere with public 
discourse and decision-making in order forward a singular agenda, they do seek the insight or 
perspective of the greater community. Instead, Young’s ideal of a heterogeneous public “is a public, 
where participants discuss together the issues before them and are supposed to come to a decision 
that they determine as best or most just.”198  
This may be an adequate argument to differentiate between Young’s participatory democracy 
and interest group pluralism, however two additional points are important for the consideration of 
the argument against liberal civility. Young’s commitment to participatory democracy may succeed 
in arguing for greater participation for underrepresented minorities than her communitarian and civil 
republican counterparts. Still, limiting group representation to those who describe major identities 
within a constitutive society and who are oppressed or disadvantaged seems to limit the scope of her 
theory in ways Young is attempting to avoid. Why limit the engagement of social groups who share 
comprehensive identities and ways of life? Why strike the Friends of the Whales — or, the advocacy 
group, Parents, Friends and Families of Lesbians and Gays — from the democratic conversation? In 
a true participatory structure, eliminating interest groups or affiliations from the public conversation 
limits open dialogue before citizens have the opportunity to choose for themselves what 
perspectives are worthy of consideration. Further, affinity groups and advocates are important allies 
for underrepresented minorities and the disadvantaged in democratic conversation, particularly for 
those who cannot or do not represent themselves, including infants and children, and some adults 
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including those with severe developmental disabilities. Young wants to dodge the pitfall of interest-
based pluralism, particularly instances of private interest groups that use fiscal resources to sway 
policy. Still, the liability of choosing who is allowed in public conversation should be left to the 
citizens, who in turn, must exercise their commitment to the democratic political project to decide 
what individual of groups deserves a voice.  
5.6 A LIBERAL RESOLUTION  
The issue of citizen commitment to the common good raises a second, more central point 
about civility and the critics of liberalism. Sandel, Barber and Young each argue that liberalism failed 
its citizens with the depoliticization of the civil sphere. Such division between the civil and political 
realms resulted in a weak political sphere committed to nothing more than the achievement and 
preservation of fair and equal citizenship. Critics of liberalism agree that the liberty and freedom 
promised to individuals has failed to elevate the status of minority and marginalized citizens to equal 
status in the political public or lead to greater levels of social justice and equality in modern 
democracy. While each critic proposes a different resolution to the liberal problem, they similarly 
constructs an ideal for repoliticizing individual liberty by collapsing the civil and political realms and 
returning the preservation of individual rights back to the realm of the political, connecting to 
freedom of citizens to their participation in the public shaping of collective life. This way, critics 
argue, citizens develop as a feature of individual freedom a greater civic sentiment, and perhaps even 
a greater sense of mutual respect and obligation. Where liberalism went wrong was in allowing 
individuals to regard the state as a necessary instrument only to mediate conflict and regulate state 
action in order to allow individuals the freedom to pursue their private ends. Freedom and 
autonomy must be relocated in the substantive public activities of citizenship. Critics of liberalism 
seek to return the virtues of the citizen back to the polis where it originated and where good of the 
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individual is inextricably connected to the good of other citizens as well the good of the greater 
political project. This, they claim, is how civility will be revived.  
However, each alternative ideal for repoliticizing the civil public as outlined above potentially 
jeopardizes the individual liberty and freedom promised to modern democratic citizens in its own 
way. Returning to the traditional republican values is certainly not the answer, nor is an ideal of 
universal citizenship that risks compelling marginalized and minority citizens to shelve their identity, 
perspectives and group affiliation in order to transcend a collective common good. Even Young’s 
group differentiation gets stuck with substantive arguments for the inclusion and exclusion of 
certain groups into the political public. Still, the most salient criticism of modern liberalism is that in 
its failure to incite the duty of civility, citizens have chosen instead to maximize personal prosperity 
at the expense of a civil realm committed to greater levels of civility, respect and protection for all. 
Much of this criticism compels Eric Brown’s argument against Rawls: that the duty of civility as well 
as general commitment to the well-being of others in a pluralistic society cannot be left to the ideal 
of citizenship, since few citizens are interested in achieving such an ideal. In order to not throw the 
civil baby out with the liberal bathwater, as republicans are wont to do, modern liberals must find a 
way to compel citizens to commit to greater levels of civility, while allowing each citizen to maintain 
the ‘true individuality’ of personhood, and to preserve the separation between the political and civil 
realms meant to ensure that citizens will remain free to pursue their ends and desires, with similar 
liberty and freedom for all.  
In order to do this, Rawlsian liberalism must look to Roger Williams. In the concluding 
chapter, I will argue that Williams can best inform a more robust conception of civility within 
liberalism, with an ideal of democracy that weighs the preservation of individual liberty and freedom 
in citizens’ capability to engage in strong and civil conversations. This ideal of a heightened civil 
democracy shares important intersections with Habermas’ deliberative democratic theory, which 
  
113
argues for political participation that limits the political structure and preserves a free civil society. 
The ideal for civil liberalism is not to create political institutions as the means to a collective 
understanding of the good life, as Aristotle contends, but to preserve the freedom to pursue the 











CHAPTER 6.  CONCLUSION: THE QUEST FOR CIVIL LIBERALISM 
 
Knowing what America stands for is not a genetic inheritance. It must be learned, both by the next 
generation and by those who come to this country. In this way, a nation founded on an idea is 
inherently fragile. And a nation that celebrates the many ways we are different from one another 
must remind itself constantly of what we all share.  
— Bradley Report, 2008  
 
 
In an address to the Town of Providence on August 31, 1648, Puritan theologian and 
founder of Rhode Island, Roger Williams, made the following statement:  
Worthy friends. That our selves and all men are apt to differ is no new thing in all 
Former Ages and All Parts of this world in these parts and in our deare native 
Countrey and mournful state of England. That either part or partie is most right in 
his owne eye, his Cause Right, his Carriage Right, his Argument Right, his Answeres 
Right is as constantly true as the former.199 
 
Williams recognized in the early days of a burgeoning America that differing but equally confident 
convictions would persist among citizens. In his writings, Williams sought a society that would find 
unity, not through consensus or by following one moral or religious doctrine, but through common 
commitment to protecting the freedom of all citizens to forward their own religion and beliefs. In 
fact, as John Calvin Davis argues, “This common task of living peacefully and fruitfully, despite 
diversity, was Williams ultimate concern.”200 Williams believed that a commitment to civility would 
allow for some consensus among a diverse citizenry, creating a framework for healthy public 
discourse.  
In 2014, we as a nation seems to have all but lost this ideal. While civil rights legislation 
continues to advance in the United States, increasing partisan politics and a cultural divisiveness 
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leaves citizens to wonder what it means to be civil in a liberal democracy, and how to motivate 
politicians, opponents and neighbors to commit to the unifying principles of a robust civil sphere. 
An examination of Rawlsian liberalism reveals that Rawls recognized the importance of a robust civil 
sphere, but fails to account for a disposition on the part of citizens to uphold the duty of civility. A 
return to Williams’ writings introduces an ideal of civility that protects the freedom of individuals by 
requiring an emphatic commitment to mutual respect and a citizenry prepared to reflect on 
conditions needed to ensure such respect. This collective reflection itself serves to forge common 
bonds between citizens, not based on communal values or ethical self-understanding, but on the 
interaction of free and equal liberal citizens. Williams’ theory of the sanctity of human conscience as 
tied to Rawlsian liberalism shares important ties with Habermas’ theory of deliberative democracy. 
Comparing the two theories helps to further highlight the importance of a liberal theory committed 
first and foremost to civility for the preservation of individual rights.  
In Political Liberalism, Rawls argues that the ideal of citizenship compels citizens to participate 
in the public realm without using the vantage point of private or personal opinion. According to 
Rawls, “the union of the duty of civility [combined] with the great values of the political realm yields 
an ideal of citizens governing themselves in ways that each thinks others might reasonably be 
expected to accept;” and in turn will “be supported by the comprehensive doctrines that all 
reasonable persons affirm.”201 Rawls argues that the aspects of political self-understanding — how 
citizens view themselves as members of a community and a nation, how they choose to treat others 
and in what sort of society they desire to live — are important to the political realm and must not be 
denied to any citizen. However, he argues that in a diverse public, such constitutive values may 
conflict with one another without any prospect of resolution, creating the potential for “persistent 
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disagreement among citizens about basic matters of fundamental value.”202 Thus, in order to allow 
citizens the freedom to uphold their own comprehensive ideals in a constructive and peaceable 
political society, such values must be counterbalanced in a way that is not affected by ethical 
discourse, but are instead governed by the principles of public reason.  
This ideal of public reason serves to distinguish Rawls’ version of liberalism from earlier 
theories. Citizens respect one another by publically arguing issues in a universalizable manner, 
understanding that to do otherwise would potentially violate the interests and values of others.203 To 
do so, citizens must be “ready to explain the basis of their actions to one another in terms each 
could reasonably expect that others might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality.”204 
For Rawls this maintains a well-ordered liberal society; in striving for the ideal of citizenship, citizens 
willingly come together in the public sphere to choose a set of rights based on universalizable 
principles that maximize the freedom of all. Citizens will use public reason because they understand 
that the ideal of citizenship is the best, and perhaps only, way to forward the interests of a free and 
equal liberal democracy.  
Rawls commits this robust public sphere to an ideal of civility, and principles of reciprocity 
and mutuality shape his idea of public reason. He argues that citizens will commit to principles of 
justice as more than a modus vivendi; unlike earlier liberals, Rawls contends that a political society is 
stable because citizens uphold principles of civility and reciprocity for more than their own self-
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interest, because they understand that shared public values are the best way to advance such liberal 
ideals. In fact, Rawls argues, the concept of public reason shares important similarities with the 
republican theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who argues that in the political realm citizens must not 
choose from their own personal preferences, but decide “which [alternative] best advances the 
common good.”205 Unlike republicanism, however, Rawls’ political liberalism is not intended to 
create a unified general will but is meant to protect the nonpolitical values and virtues of private 
citizens, including the freedom to choose “what is of value in human life, and [the] ideals of personal 
character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much 
else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole.”206 According to Rawls, 
citizens find motivation to uphold the ideal of citizenship and its associated principles, because in 
prioritizing the right over the good, citizens recognize that it is not a common ethical ideal but a 
shared conception of justice that establishes the bonds of civic friendship.  
The greatest liability for Rawls, as Eric Brown argues in “Rawls and the Duty of Civility,” is 
not that he does not support a robust civil public sphere; instead, Rawls’ commitment to public 
reason fails to compel citizens to uphold the public values of liberalism because it lacks a strong and 
justifiable reason to commit to the duty of civility. Rawls wants to argue that citizens are self-motivated 
to uphold the ideal of citizenship because they have both the psychological capacity and reasoning 
to do so.207 However, citizens who choose not to endorse an ideal of citizenship may find the duty 
of civility and the ideal of public reason less compelling than advancing their own private interests. 
In fact, by making civility a ‘duty,’ liberal citizens may consider the notion to be in direct contrast to 
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their own self-interest, which calls into question how any citizen would be motivated to accept its 
premise. As a result, the idealization of citizenship fails to compel citizens to follow the duty of 
civility and Rawls is unable to advance the principles necessary to support the civil public sphere to 
which he aspires.  
Without a clear reason to uphold the duty of civility, Rawlsian liberalism cannot properly 
account for the reason and motivation to uphold “the great values of the public realm.” As a 
consequence, liberalism risks slipping into a more traditional model of citizenship, based upon 
individual rights vis à vis the state and other citizens. This is perhaps evidenced best in conversations 
about the current state of civility in modern democracy. Most worrisome is the notion that 
individuals are increasingly failing to consider the lives and livelihoods of others when making 
political, personal and economic decisions.208 Lack of commitment to an ideal of citizenship and a 
weak commitment to an ideal of public reason leaves a modern democratic political public to 
wonder if liberalism cannot be at once committed to self-interest and self-respect as well as 
vigorous, honest and compassionate respect for others.  
Conversations about how to correct this civil shortcoming too often fall to rhetoric and 
idealization, since there is little popular agreement about what we mean when we talk about civility, 
and how it may best be forwarded within liberalism. As a result, definitions of civility often rely on 
ideals found within comprehensive doctrines, including religious, ethical or personal ideology, which 
serve to challenge the principle of public reason. Theorist Stephen Carter exemplifies this point well, 
arguing, “We cannot construct civility in America without a revival of religion as a force both in our 
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public and private lives.”209 Definitions like Carter’s support critics of liberalism, who argue that the 
very instinct to invoke comprehensive ideals signifies that a commitment to civility requires unifying 
the civil and the political realms so as to forge a stronger positive relationship between citizens and 
the political community to which they belong. For these critics, a greater commitment to civility 
means that the formative questions, including how citizens view themselves as members of a 
community and a nation and how they choose to treat others, must be shared publically and 
constitutively. For them, shared common ethical ideals and not a shared conception of justice form 
the bonds of civic friendship and allow civility to flourish. However, for Rawls and other liberals, 
including Williams, tying civility to any particular set of shared ethical ideals risks limiting the 
freedom of citizens to choose what ideals have fundamental value. If civility is respect for oneself 
and respect for others, for liberalism this also includes the freedom for citizens to choose for 
themselves what ideals are worth following.  
The challenge for liberal theory, then, is to create a more reflexive relationship between a 
notion of civility and the maximization of individual liberty and freedom for all citizens. Rawls 
expects that citizens will uphold the duty of civility because they understand that the ideal of 
citizenship and its related principles, including public reason, are the best way to forward liberal 
ideals. Given that this view does not seem credible, there must be a better way to connect civil 
discourse and civic engagement to its central place within liberalism. Otherwise, civility will continue 
to falter, leaving political structures vulnerable to individual private interests that threaten individual 
freedom and undermine the common good in modern democracy. The writings of Roger Williams 
help to inform a conception of civility that at upholds individual liberty and the commitment to the 
collective common good. 
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In a recent review of John Calvin Davis’ work On Liberty: Selections on the Work of Roger 
Williams, philosopher Martha Nussbaum refers to Williams as “important, above all, as a 
conversation partner whose humane insights can inform our own divisive debates.”210 In particular, 
Nussbaum highlights three aspects of Williams’ writings that help form a foundation for 
conversations about the state of civility in modern democracy. First, Williams possessed a distinct 
view of the human conscience as the center of individual emotion, imagination, and ethical choice, 
through which each individual seeks meaning. This notion of individual conscience was what 
Williams considered the source of human equality, and as such, was worthy of equal respect. This 
ideal became the premise for Williams’ doctrine of liberty, which argued that all political principles 
must be based upon equal respect for all individuals. This ideal of individual freedom of conscience 
was rooted in Williams’ own religiosity and, as such, may be considered a religiously inspired version 
of natural law theory. In this way, Williams’ theory differs greatly from Rawls, whose political 
liberalism was constructed so as to not be based in any one comprehensive doctrine, particularly one 
that appeals to an ideal of human conscience.  
Still, Williams’ ideal is useful because it emphasizes something that other theorists fail to 
recognize: the human conscience is delicate, and its fragility requires protection by a public engaged 
in securing its safety. Williams argued, against the Stoics, that the human conscience was not 
invulnerable but could “be prevented from acting, and it can also, more deeply, be damaged or defiled 
by what happens to it.”211 He believed that this protection required social resources as well as a 
citizenry actively attentive to the conditions for such protection. This shaped his theory of freedom, 
which combined the sanctity of the individual conscience with a robust view of the common good. 
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In other words, individual freedom for Williams required an emphatic commitment to mutual 
respect as well as a citizenry willing to reflect on the conditions needed to ensure such respect.  
This leads to Nussbaum’s second point: “Williams believed that equal respect for conscience 
[entailed] protecting an extensive sphere of freedom around the individual, and that this protection 
must be impartial, imposing no [one particular] orthodoxy.”212 Despite his own particular religiosity, 
Williams argued that individual liberty required a rich and engaged public sphere committed to the 
individual liberty and dignity of all citizens, and maintained that civil peace among citizens who 
differ in religion, status and ideology required a moral consensus that is itself was impartial, giving 
ascendancy to no one particular creed or doctrine. Williams argued that this was possible because 
citizens have access to a moral sphere separate from competing personal, religious and philosophical 
realms. This concept of shared moral goodness — not related to any one doctrine but shared by all 
— meant that citizens could “respect one another's freedom and equality, the deep sources of 
conscience that lead us through life… But we must base that life on ethical principles that, for many 
of us, also have a religious meaning and justification.”213 To join peacefully with others in a common 
political life meant that citizens must recognize the possibility of sharing morals and virtues relevant 
to politics, while not necessarily sharing the same constitutive view of life's greater meaning. As 
Williams stated, “A Christian Captaine, Christian Merchant, Physician, Lawyer, Pilot, Father, Master 
and (so consequently) Magistrate, &c. is not more than a Captaine, Merchant, &c. of any other 
Conscience or Religion.”214 In other words, the moral virtues upheld in the civil sphere may be 
supported by many different religious doctrines.  
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Here, Rawls and Williams share important similarities. In fact, Nussbaum notes that certain 
aspects of Williams’ philosophy anticipated the later works of Immanuel Kant, which provided the 
transcendental template for Rawls’ theory of justice. Public reason, as well as concepts of 
universalizability, autonomy and humanity are found in Williams’ writing, particularly “the duty to 
respect humanity as an end wherever we find it; and the duty to be fair, [and] not to make an 
exception for one's own case.”215 Like Rawls, Williams acknowledged that within a diverse polity, 
ensuring equal freedom meant that the ability to develop and express one’s own individual 
conscience must be at least equal to the values held within.216 For Williams, this meant that in order 
to uphold a fair and reasonable ideal of freedom, the civil realm must rigorously protect the private, 
internal sphere of the human conscience.  
Historians often attribute Williams’ argument against a reigning orthodoxy in the political 
realm as the foundation of the modern separation of church and state. However, when Williams 
wrote about the "wall of separation" between citizens’ religion and their political principles, the ideal 
was more nuanced than a strict divide between religion and the public sphere. Williams sought 
separation of jurisdictions between church and state, but where citizens were concerned, he intended 
to construct the moral values of public life as one part of all comprehensive doctrines — the part 
that citizens might share with others without trying to convert others to what they believe to be the 
one true religion. 
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 Similar to Rawls, Williams did not want to wholly separate private doctrines and individual 
religiosity from the public realm. Instead, he argued that the best way to preserve a public realm that 
preserved the freedom of individuals was to welcome debate in the political public, where citizens 
might uphold and advocate for their own individual ideals. The public realm for Williams was not 
meant to be a site of common ethical self-understanding but instead was intended to be the location 
where citizens engaged in the preservation of freedom through civil debate, deliberation, and a 
common commitment to individual liberty. An important distinction between this ideal and Rawls’ 
theory is that Rawls’ ideal of public reason is the product of theoretical self-reflection. Rawls argues 
that citizens will privately and personally choose to uphold the ideal of citizenship and duty of 
civility, along with the help of the veil of ignorance and other theoretical practices, in order to decide 
which universalizable political values can be shared by all reasonable and rational citizens. The 
choice to be an ideal citizen is first made through theoretical constructions.  However, Rawls begs 
the question by arguing that citizens will choose to overcome the paradox of public reason and set 
aside their own comprehensive doctrines for the sake of public deliberation because they, qua citizens, 
choose to embody the ideal of citizenship and its virtues. By contrast, Williams seems to argue that 
civil conscientiousness flows from the notion that most reasonable and rational citizens understand 
that freedom of individual conscience is basic to the individual human experience, and are therefore 
willing to engage in civility and civic dialogue in order to protect it.  
For Williams, then, the product of public reason was meant to be constructed, not through 
idealizations or hypotheticals, but through the actual act of forging civil bonds. Williams argued that 
citizens would make a principled commitment to a minimal set of universalizable moral norms — 
what he called “civility” — not as an idealization of citizenship, but because a minimal commitment 
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was the necessary basis upon which to set the ideals of individual freedom and equality.217 Citizens 
engaged in the political sphere in order to guarantee that the public and private realms did not usurp 
one another, which protected individual liberty. For Williams, the concept of civility was based upon 
deliberations of human conscience and the product of public discourse; in this way, civility was 
meant to bridge individual interests with the greater public good.218  
This last point highlights Nussbaum’s third argument: Williams’ appeal to toleration. Because 
individual conscience was a delicate and corruptible source of human dignity and needed to be 
protected by a civil state that had a moral foundation but not a primarily religious one, Williams’ 
principle of tolerance “encouraged the freedom to hold, develop, change, and articulate beliefs in 
public forums, and respect for this freedom was a procedural requirement upon which civility 
depended.”219 In his writings, Williams set a precedent for the respect for individual liberty upheld 
by a commitment to civil community and engaged deliberation. Davis argues that Williams 
“recognized the need to guard against both the excesses of individual liberty that comprise the 
common good and the unjustified extension of public interest at the expense of personal 
freedom.”220 Williams believed this balance to be possible because he argued that a universalizable 
civil morality and individual freedom were mutually reciprocal. In this way, civility was Williams’ 
recognition that a set of shared moral norms and values must construct the foundation of a durable 
and civil public society. Davis argues that according to Williams, 
Civility preserves public peace and maintains a semblance of order to civil cohabitation. It 
enables human beings to engage in the cooperative relationships necessary to live together. 
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In short, the shared moral norms of civility are, according to Williams, society's way of 
promoting the common good.221  
 
Williams, like Rawls, recognized that a diverse population of citizens would not necessarily 
agree on a complex set of moral norms, but believed that a general respect for pluralism and 
freedom of conscience required a commitment to “appropriateness of tolerance, common courtesy, 
friendship, and truthfulness as parameters for the very act of engaging in public conversation.”222 
Again, Williams argued that this individual freedom of conscience was delicate and vulnerable to 
external forces and therefore individuals in the public realm could best protect individual freedom 
through a set of social and moral norms — what Williams considered civility — which included 
agreeing to uphold the norms of individual respect and tolerance.  
What Williams’ highlighted in his theory, and what I believe liberalism can learn from his 
writings, is that individual liberty is not invulnerable to persecution, derision or violence and risks 
being jeopardized if there is not a minimal commitment to civil behavior in the public sphere. Rawls 
agrees with this, but ultimately leaves the work to theorists and individuals to choose to uphold the 
principles of public reason, and to demonstrate “a willingness to listen to others and a fair-
mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.”223 For 
Williams, maximizing individual liberty and freedom required a recognition that individual liberty 
was not possible without at least a minimal set of shared moral norms that constituted civil behavior, 
particularly respect for pluralism and respect for individual freedom of conscience. The notion of a 
collective common good was grounds for arguing for the toleration of citizens’ individual freedom 
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and the “boundary condition on the individual freedoms that toleration protects.”224 Williams argued 
that civility balanced the priorities of the state and the pursuit of individual interests, understanding 
that the overvaluation of one was a direct threat to the other.  
Like Rawls, Williams believed that the value to choose one’s own ends was as valuable as the 
ends themselves. To uphold one’s own liberty and the liberty of others, citizens must participate in a 
civil public realm that protects individual freedom and creates the boundary conditions that 
maximize the liberty and freedom of all. This ideal does not rely on the appropriate moral 
psychology of citizens, nor does it require citizens to uphold an ideal of common good that extends 
beyond the preservation of their own freedom. Instead, Williams’ theory of civility is based upon the 
notion of tolerance that encouraged a political community committed at least minimally to public 
deliberation and civil engagement. Citizens agreed to civil behavior, including appropriateness, 
common courtesy, friendship, and truthfulness as parameters for the act of engaging in public 
conversation, not for collective ethical self-understanding, nor to uphold a particular ideal of 
citizenship, but because they recognized that their own individual freedom depended on it.  
Williams’ argument for toleration as the boundary condition for individual liberty highlights 
a few important points. Williams recognized, as Davis states, that civility must be “the governing 
principle of public participation,” however he did not argue for a pacification of individual 
conviction in the civil realm, nor did he require that citizens disconnect the values of civility — 
including tolerance and respect — from their comprehensive doctrines when arguing in the public 
realm. By separating “the garden” of ethical self-understanding from “wilds” of the public domain, 
Williams wanted the public sphere to be free of citizen-coercion or forced religious conformity. 
Instead, the public realm was intended as a place where citizens, bound by the principles of 
toleration — including mutual respect for the opinions and rights of others as well as a respect for 
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pluralism — could engage in honest, civil and challenging discussions about the substantive issues 
that shaped the public sphere.  
Williams made himself an example of this by arguing publically with those with whom he did 
not agree, perhaps none more vehemently than the Quaker leadership in neighboring Massachusetts. 
Williams’ greatest criticism of the Quakers was not what he considered their faulty religious ideology 
but their failure to participate in public engagement in a civil manner necessary for civic deliberation. 
In George Fox, Williams chronicled a debate held in 1673 in Newport, where he recalled enduring 
“‘grievous Language’, ‘insulting’, and inter-ruptions from his opponents, despite his protests ‘that 
such practices were against the sober rules of Civility and Humanity.’”225 His concern was not that 
Quakers expressed their ideals in a public manner, but that the uncivil behavior that accompanied 
their opinions truncated open and honest deliberation.  
For Williams, the notion of civil behavior, including appropriateness, common courtesy and 
even friendship was not the same as modern definitions of civility that include politeness, social 
conformity and other passive behaviors. In fact, Williams never intended to limit dialogical strategies 
such as confrontation, disagreement and even hostility. In this way his particular definition of civility 
does not always align with current cultural usages of the term, which often equate civility with 
qualities that may mimic respect for others and respect for pluralism. Davis explains: 
Some critics of the recent focus on civility, like U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence 
Thomas have equated civility with ‘moderation’ or compromise of convictions and 
thus declare that it ‘cannot be the governing principle of citizenship or leadership.’ 
By contrast, Williams insisted that civility must be the governing principle of public 
participation, but his insistence on civility was grounded in the belief that the display 
of mutual respect it implies precludes neither the holding of real convictions nor the 
public debate of those convictions.226  
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Williams advocated for the actualization of deep moral and ideological beliefs through an 
environment of tolerance that respects the freedom of all citizens to hold similar convictions. To 
obtain maximum personal liberty, citizens must participate in an active and engaged public forum 
with “patience [and] respect for our opponents and a commitment to the social kinship that binds us 
to even the most different from us.”227 This minimal commitment to shared notions of civility does 
not require stereotypical ‘polite’ social politeness or nicety, but more importantly requires that 
citizens recognize that individual liberty and civil behavior are mutually reliant. Appropriate 
deference to individual freedom of conscience requires an emphatic commitment to mutual respect 
as well as a citizenry prepared to reflect on conditions needed to ensure such respect. This collective 
reflection itself serves to forge common bonds that rely not on presupposed religious or communal 
values, but on the civil interaction of free and equal citizens. 
 As an important thinker and advocate of individual freedom, Williams provides critical 
insight into the reciprocal relationship between civility, individual liberty and the collective common 
good, particularly for a political theory that does not tie the substantive ethical self-understanding to 
the good of the public. Still, Williams’ writings are best used to inform, not supplant, the liberal 
ideology of modern democracy. As Davis argues, “The comparison of seventeenth century notions 
of civility with invocations of them in the twenty-first century requires considerable care with due 
deference to shifting nuance in words like ‘civility’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘the common good across 
historical boundaries.”228 Yet despite the potential variances in language and culture, the theoretical 
relationship between individual liberty, civility and the collective common good in Williams’ 
arguments relates profoundly to the current American predicament.  
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 Williams’ theory represents an ideal that must be reformed within liberalism in order to 
change the relationship of the individual to the common good. Liberalism must connect the duty of 
civility to more than an idealization, or as a concept that citizens will theoretically choose to uphold 
without any real incentive. To do so means that citizens will not be able to hide civility behind 
hollow gestures and empty manners, nor will they be forced to choose between self-interest and the 
self-understanding of a comprehensive collective common good. When individual freedom is 
intrinsically connected to the preservation of a committed and civil political realm, civility is allowed 
to flourish while individual liberty remains primary. 
 A liberal theory that replaces the idealization of citizenship with the reflexive relationship of 
individual liberty and collective common good aligns most closely with the discourse theory of 
Jürgen Habermas. Ultimately, Habermas seeks to supplant both liberalism and republicanism with 
his third alternative, deliberative discourse theory; understanding Habermas’ construction and 
comparing it to Williams’ ideals can further highlight the potential positive effects of Williams’ 
theory of civility upon liberalism. In “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” Habermas first 
outlines traditional liberalism and republicanism and compares them to one another. He begins with 
comparing the structure of the two theories, arguing first that traditional liberalism is divided into 
distinct spheres. For liberalism, the state is the site of public administration; civil society contains the 
“market structured interactions of private persons and their labor,” and politics — what he calls 
political-will-formation — “mediates between society and state by bringing social interests against 
collective goals of state administration.”229 Conversely, in republicanism, politics and society exist 
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together in such a way that politics is no longer the mediator of social interests against the state, and 
the two in conjunction with each other represent “the reflexive form of substantial ethical life.”230 
The structural differences between liberalism and republicanism have broad implications for 
Habermas. The construction of the traditional liberal political process means that the status of 
citizenship is based on rights vis à vis other citizens and the state. Citizens receive civil protection to 
pursue their own interests as long as they are within the boundaries of the legal statutes. In the 
liberal political realm, citizens assert private interests through elections and private interests are 
aggregated into political will that affect state administration, including policy and offices. This is the 
primary role of politics in liberalism and it is the extent to which citizens interact in one another’s 
lives.  
Like Habermas, this is the liberal model that Rawls seeks to revise in Political Liberalism. In 
this way Rawls, Williams and Habermas share a common project, to construct a political theory that 
creates more than a modus vivendi but an ideal that maximizes individual freedom through mutually 
agreed upon rights. Both Rawls and Habermas compare liberalism to the political rights of 
republicanism, which are positive rights that guarantee an inclusive process of political-will 
formation in which free and equal citizens reach an understanding on which goods and norms lie in 
equal interest to all. From this perspective, Habermas argues, republican citizens may be credited 
with more than the exclusive concern with his/her own interests.231 However, like Rawls, Habermas 
recognizes that positive rights may potentially jeopardize the individual rights of citizens.  
Beyond structural differences, the republican and liberal models also have disparate concepts 
of law. For traditional liberalism, the sole purpose of legal order is to decide who is entitled to which 
rights, and the state is responsible for this oversight. Here, individual rights remain the priority. In 
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republicanism, the legitimacy of law is tied directly to the process by which laws are created. This 
preserves internal connection between citizens’ practice of self-legislation and sway of the law and 
makes the right to vote a positive one, since inclusion in a community is directly connected to the 
autonomy of an individual to contribute and take personal positions. Thus, for Republicans, “The 
authority guaranteed by private law to pursue private, freely chosen goals simultaneously imposes an 
obligation to respect the limits of strategic action which are agreed to be in equal interest of all.”232  
Lastly, each political theory differs in its relationship to the political process itself. In 
traditional liberalism, Habermas argues, politics is essentially the struggle to gain political power. He 
states, “The political process of opinion — and will formation in the public sphere… is shaped by 
the competition of strategically acting collectives trying to maintain or acquire positions of 
power.”233 Success is measured by citizens’ approval of elected officials and counted in votes. 
However, in republicanism, politics is not representative but dialogical. Administrative power can 
only be exercised on the basis of policy and within the constraints of an active democratic process. 
Again, Habermas argues that republicanism “has advantages in that it preserves the radical 
democratic meaning of a society that organizes itself through the communicatively united citizens 
and does not trace ideals back to ‘deals’ made between competing private interests.”234 While 
Habermas believes that politics should not be reduced to the backroom deals of private interest 
groups, he also contends that politics needs not be concerned with the ethical self-understanding of 
a community. Aspects of self-understanding are important to politics, however, Habermas argues:  
Under conditions of cultural and social pluralism, behind politically relevant goals 
there often lie interests and values orientations that are by no means constitutive of 
the political community as a whole, that is, for the intersubjectively shared form of 
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life. These interests and value-orientations, which conflict with one another within 
the same polity without any prospect of consensual resolution, need to be 
counterbalanced in a way that cannot be affected by ethical discourse, even though 
the results of this nondiscursive counter balancing are subject to the proviso that 
they must not violate the basic values of a culture.235 
 
For traditional liberalism, the democratic process is not constitutive of the political 
community, but takes place exclusively in the competing form of compromises between private 
interests; its rules are justified by basic liberal rights including the entitlement to life, liberty and 
property. And in republicanism, the democratic process takes the form of the ethical discourse of 
self-understanding. As Habermas states, “Deliberation must rely on a culturally established 
background consensus of citizens which is rejuvenated by ritualistic reenactment of a republican 
founding act.”236  
Deliberative democracy, Habermas argues, is the bridge that joins these two disparate 
theories, and in doing so creates a political model that moves beyond each, based on ideal 
procedures for deliberation and decision-making. Habermas argues that deliberative democracy is 
able to move beyond liberalism and republicanism by rejecting the philosophy of the subject that 
constrain each of them, including the republican notion that citizens must practice self-
determination as a macro-subject and the liberal claim that citizens must only practice self-
determination within anonymous rule of law. Instead, Habermas argues that discourse theory exists 
within a higher-level intersubjectivity, and thus weaves together “negotiations and discourses for 
self-understanding and justice,” and grounds the democratic procedure in “the presumption that 
under such conditions, reasonable or fair results are obtained.”237 In other words, deliberative 
democracy borrows the traditional liberal ideal of universal human rights as well as the republican 
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ethical life of community, and creates for itself rules of discourse, that derives their content and 
validity from what Habermas calls the structure of linguistic communication. This is the procedural 
foundation of a discursive democracy. 
In this way, deliberative democracy differs from republicanism, which collapses the state and 
society together to create communal and ethical-political will formation as the entirety of the 
political whole; and it differs from traditional liberalism, which can only guarantee the non-political 
good of the private citizen against the rights of other citizens in the market-driven civil realm. 
Instead, discourse theory gives primacy to the process of political will-formation, like republicanism, 
while upholding the constitutional rights of citizens through the institutionalization of procedures. 
In order to do this, it does not rely on the notion of unified ethical citizenry as a “macro-subject” 
nor argue the “autonomous rule of law” to citizens perceived to be independent actors in a 
competitive market-based society. Habermas argues, “The former approach represents the citizenry 
as a collective actor which reflects the whole and acts for its sake; on the later, individual actors 
function as dependent variables in a systemic processes that unfold blindly because no consciously 
executed decisions are possible over and above individual acts of choice (except in a purely 
metaphorical sense).”238 
Deliberative democracy recognizes that the intersubjectivity of communication processes 
exists at once in the realm of democratic decision-making bodies such as congress, and in the 
“informal networks of the public sphere.” With the emphasis is on the procedural structures of 
deliberative democracy, there is a new balance of power between the state, the market and the 
“solidarity from which modern societies meet their need for integration and regulation.” Habermas 
concludes, “The integrative force of solidarity, which can no longer be drawn from sources of 
communicative action, should develop through widely expanded autonomous public spheres as well 
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as through legally institutionalized procedures of democratic deliberation and decision-making and 
gain sufficient strength to hold its own against the other two social forces — money and 
administrative power.”239 When citizens engage in deliberation at both the institutional level as well 
as in the informal networks of the public realm, such as journalistic media, social media and sub-
political organizations, citizen-solidarity subordinates the liberal market economy as well as the 
regulative principles of a republican public administration. Rejecting the philosophy of the citizen-
as-subject allows individuals to move freely between the two opposing ideals; they can be both a 
part of the macro-subject, and the subject of an autonomous rule of law. In this way, citizens emerge 
as the creators and recipients of their liberty and freedom, or as Habermas states, they become both 
the “author and addressees” of their rights.  
This dialectic of public and private autonomy is an important point for Habermas. In “On 
the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy,” Habermas argues that both liberal 
and republican theories seek a reciprocal relationship between popular sovereignty, “as expressed in 
rights of communication and participation that secure public autonomy of citizens” and human 
rights, or “the classical basic rights that guarantee the private autonomy of members of society.”240 
Both theories fall short, with liberalism ultimately choosing private rights over public autonomy, and 
republicanism choosing the opposite. However, the internal relationship between public autonomy 
and private rights is a necessary one. Habermas explains:  
There is no law without the private autonomy of legal persons in general. 
Consequently, without basic rights that secure the private autonomy of citizens there 
is no medium for legally institutionalizing the conditions under which these citizens, 
as citizens of a state, can make use of their private autonomy. Thus public and 
private autonomy presuppose each other in such a way that neither human rights nor 
popular sovereignty can claim privacy over its counterpart.  
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Citizens may only take advantage of their public autonomy if their rights are adequately protected, 
and at the same time citizens will only be able to guarantee that their rights are adequately protected 
if they make use of their political autonomy. In other words, if liberty means that individuals are 
both authors as well as addressees of their rights, then having rights means shaping and defining 
what those rights are. This requires democratic will formation in the form of public autonomy, 
which is not possible with individual rights and private autonomy, including the constitutional rights 
of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly. 
With an understanding of this third model of democracy, a comparison between Williams’ 
notion of civility and Habermas’ discourse theory are easily made. Like Rawls, Williams and 
Habermas argue that negotiations in a democratic structure require a commitment to civility, or as 
Rawls states, they “presuppose a readiness to cooperate, that is a willingness to abide by the rules 
and arrive at the results that are acceptable to all parties, though for different reasons.”241 However, 
both Williams and Habermas argue this point differently. For Rawls, this commitment to public 
reason is generated as a private, personal motivation, which is then brought forward into the public 
political realm. As such, citizen-commitment to impartiality and public reason results from the ideal 
of citizenship, or the act of citizens choosing to bracket their individual interests in the public 
sphere. Conversely, for Habermas, it is within the give-and-take of genuine public deliberation that 
private preferences are adapted, adjusted, and reshaped so as to acquire public certification, while 
also contributing, through the convergence of values resulting from this mutually adaptive dialogue, 
to public or shared preferences, not imposed on individuals, but that emerge from within the 
context of deliberation. In other words, within the dialectic between public and private autonomy, 
for Habermas, or between individual rights and a commitment to the common good, as argued by 
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Williams, civility is not a private ideal brought to the public, but citizens recognizing that the 
commitment to individual liberty and freedom and the civil public sphere are mutually reliant.  
This notion leads to a second important similarity between Williams and Habermas. Rawls 
constructs a narrow conception of a political sphere, where individuals are asked to follow the 
principles of public reason by selecting universalizable principles from their comprehensive 
doctrines for the purposes of a strong and stable polity. However, both Williams and Habermas 
argue that the overlapping consensus is not drawn from the theoretical discoveries of the citizen-
philosopher, but public ideals are generated through the dialogical interactions of civilly engaged 
citizens. Principles of public reason are not restricted to the formal structures of a political polity, 
but occur in everyday interactions of diverse individuals who are mindful of their vulnerabilities and 
mutual dependencies.  
Despite their interesting intersections, there are important distinctions to be made between 
the theories of Habermas and the writings of Williams. Perhaps most importantly, Habermas rejects 
the ideal of the natural law theory of individual freedom of conscience, arguing that a theory rooted 
in a citizen as subject — whether a macro-subject of republicanism or the autonomous subject of 
liberalism — is always argued at the expense of the other. In this way, Habermas would reject 
Williams’ argument for civility, as his theory proceeds from his particular attention to individual 
freedom of conscience. Instead, deliberative democracy focuses on anonymous or subjectless 
procedures that allow for the intersubjective interaction of individuals who deliberate about the ends 
of public life, yet does not rely on a self-legislating citizenry nor expect that a common identity will 
ever be achieved.  
In certain ways, Williams argued the opposite. He contended that individuals are naturally 
moral beings and that citizen-recognition of the vulnerability of the human conscience could incite 
citizens to adopt bonds of civility and commit to a set of behaviors that promote accommodation, 
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friendship and honest deliberation as the epicenter of a shared common good. For Williams, 
tolerance as the boundary condition of civility can be seen as the principle that safeguards moral 
deliberation in a pluralistic public sphere. In prioritizing one’s individual freedom of conscience — 
the freedom to live the life of one’s choosing — citizens must also agree to protect the lives and 
livelihoods of others in a pluralistic society. To do so, tolerance must be prioritized, and citizens will 
engage in public conversation that will promote mutual respect among citizens. As Davis states, 
“Civility to Williams was agreement… on the kind of character that furthers public cooperation and 
the mutual respect that all humans ought to recognize as good.”242 Further, for Williams, civility 
represented human traits including “sociability,” allowing humans to live “soberly and justly among 
their neighbors.”243  
To protect one’s own individual freedom, then, citizens must recognize that all persons are 
entitled to such rights and agree to protect these rights in a pluralistic society. This inspires a feeling 
of mutual reliance in a civil political public interested first and foremost in the protection of 
individual freedom of conscience. Williams emphasized the fragility and vulnerability associated with 
conscience regardless of religious provenance, allowing him to argue that the protection of 
individual freedom of conscience required social resources and civil attention to the formation and 
preservation of conditions required for such protection, including tolerance for others and a respect 
for pluralism.  
As a consequence, Williams may provide a stronger bond for commonality, since his theory 
is not based on abstract rules, which presumably are not directly experienced by all citizens, but 
rather on bonds of relational dependency that are rooted in a collective consciousness of human 
fragility and conscience-based vulnerability. Such bonds of citizenship are experienced in a more 
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authentic way for Williams than for Habermas, and yet Williams is still able to retain the liberal 
realities of individuality and individual autonomy.  
Williams’ theory may lead to a more inclusive and more civil public sphere. Critics of 
Habermas argue that the ideal of the subjectless structure places marginalized and underrepresented 
communities, including women and minorities, at a particular disadvantage. If deliberative 
democracy is strictly procedural — that is, without any foundation in the citizen-subject — all 
decisions, including the forwarding of civil laws and rights, must be made through deliberation. This 
leaves the most advantaged communities, including those with high levels of education and 
advanced deliberative skills, with the greatest advantage since they are likely to have the strongest 
presence in deliberative conversations and conversely, marginalized individuals and communities 
may find it difficult to make their voices and opinions heard. Further, the anonymous rule of law in 
deliberative democracy does not necessarily grant citizens rights qua citizens, which means that there 
is nothing to guarantee disadvantaged communities fair representation. As a result, Habermas’ 
model of deliberation may favor the educated and articulate. By comparison, Williams’ model of 
civility, as it is based on recognition of human vulnerability, allows for greater attention to the 
marginalized and dispossessed in society. Citizens should find this idea particularly attractive, as the 
United States is gripped by growing socio-economic inequalities.  
Williams’ commitment to all citizens may be best represented by his relationship with the 
Native Americans local to colonial Rhode Island. As Davis explains, Williams argued that friendship 
was an important virtue of civility, one at which the Native Americans particularly excelled. “The 
cooperation and the ‘friendly joyning’ with which they went about their-labors confirmed to 
Williams that it was ‘true -with them as in all the World in the Affaires of Earth or Heaven: By 
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concord little things grow great, by discord the greatest come to nothing.”244 The Native Americans' 
capacity for loyalty, productive camaraderie and other virtues of civility, despite differences in 
culture and religion, affirmed Williams’ assertion that a commitment to mutual respect for the rights 
and lives of others can provide a foundation for human cohabitation and flourishing, even across 
religious and cultural boundaries.245  
Critics of deliberative democracy may find Williams’ influence on Rawlsian liberalism easier 
to support that Habermas’ subjectless citizen. Williams’ primary commitment to individual freedom 
of conscience in a pluralistic society means that citizens must commit themselves to a civil sphere 
that protects the individual conscience of all. This requires some prior set of values, such as a sense 
of mutual dependency, which is arguably forged through an awareness of the vulnerabilities 
associated with a respect for individual liberty. In this way, Williams is important in reminding us 
that civility in the public domain emphasizes the importance of liberal individualism, which is 
dependent upon an ethic of caring for the rights and lives of other citizens. This is an ideal of civility 
that must play a greater role in modern liberal democracy.  
Hearteningly, organizations that model themselves on more deliberative forms of 
democracy, including increased sites of public debate and civic engagement, have begun to flourish 
in different areas of the United States. Programs such as The Citizens Initiative Review Board in 
Portland, Oregon, The Democracy Imperative at the University of New Hampshire and The 
Summer Institute for Civic Studies at Tufts University, among others, are bringing together citizens 
to redefine the ways in which we interact with one another as well as how we engage with the greater 
political process. More work needs to be done around generating new, constructive conversations 
about the importance of civic engagement to the freedom of all individuals; these conversations may 
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be spearheaded by independent organizations, educational institutions or policy initiatives. We must 
consider what civility means in our modern democratic liberal structures, not as an aspiration or 
idealization but specifically and realizably. Roger Williams is a great reminder that E Pluribus Unum 
remains relevant: as liberal democratic citizens, we must depend on each other to create a political 
public that strives to maximize the individual freedom of all, and such an ideal cannot be realized 
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